Haddock v. State
| Decision Date | 28 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 60434.,WD 60434. |
| Citation | 75 S.W.3d 872 |
| Parties | Billy Gene HADDOCK, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Amy M. Bartholow, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Stephanie Morrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
Before ELLIS, P.J., and EDWIN H. SMITH and HOWARD, JJ.
Billy Gene Haddock appeals from an order of the circuit court denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his Rule 29.151 motion for post-conviction relief. The appellant was convicted, after a bench trial, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County of one count of voluntary manslaughter, § 565.023,2 for which he was sentenced to fifteen years in the Missouri Department of Corrections (DOC).
In his sole point on appeal, the appellant claims that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion, without an evidentiary hearing, because he alleged facts, not conclusions, which were not refuted by the record, and which, if true, would establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that a reasonably competent attorney, in the same or similar circumstances, would have "argue[d] a theory of involuntary manslaughter to the trial court," which his trial counsel failed to do.
We affirm.
Shortly after midnight on December 28, 1997, police officers were dispatched to the appellant's home in Independence, Missouri, in response to a domestic violence call. When the officers arrived, they found the appellant outside the house and his wife, Melinda, lying on her back inside the doorway. She was not breathing, and the officers could not find a pulse. An autopsy would later reveal that the cause of death was strangulation.
The appellant was arrested and charged with one count of murder in the second degree, § 565.021. He waived his right to a jury trial and, on November 9, 1998, proceeded to a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. A forensic pathologist testified at the trial that the death by strangulation had occurred after a very violent struggle; that the victim's injuries suggested that the strangulation went on for a period of time; and that as she was strangled, she was impacted into the floor or possibly a wall.
The appellant testified in his own defense at trial. He described marital problems, testifying that his wife had had an extramarital affair with one of their neighbors. He also testified that his wife had tried to kill herself on two different occasions, that she abused alcohol and methamphetamines, and that she was under psychiatric care. The appellant stated that on the night that he killed his wife, the two had been drinking vodka. They argued about various matters and, according to the appellant's testimony, the next thing he recalled was being on top of his wife, straddling her on the floor in the hallway. He stated that, when he became aware of his surroundings and saw his wife, he slapped her in the face.
The appellant and his wife continued to argue and, at about 11:30 p.m., she stated that she was leaving to make a call to get counseling. The appellant followed her to the door. He claimed that she tripped as she went out the front door, which caused him to grab her shirt and pull her back into the house. However, a neighbor who lived across the street and who was on his porch at the time testified that he heard "a lady screaming profusely for help." The neighbor saw the victim emerge from the front door of her house and get pulled back in and, as she tried to stand up, he heard her say, "God help me." The door was then slammed shut.
The appellant testified that, after closing the door, he again straddled his wife on the floor. According to the appellant, his wife began to tell him repeatedly that she was still having an affair with the neighbor and that the baby she was carrying was not the appellant's. He said that to stop her from saying those things, he began choking her, and he continued to choke her until she was quiet and no longer resisting. He contended that he never intended to kill her, but only to stop her from talking.
At the close of the evidence, the appellant's attorney argued that the evidence supported only a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, while the State argued that the evidence supported a conviction of second-degree murder. The trial court, acting as the finder-of-fact, found the appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced him to fifteen years in the Missouri DOC.
The appellant filed a direct appeal, which was denied by this court in State v. Haddock, 24 S.W.3d 192 (Mo.App.2000). After the appellant filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, counsel was appointed and filed an amended motion, which alleged, inter alia, that the appellant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that he should be found guilty of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The motion court, without an evidentiary hearing, overruled the appellant's motion, making the following finding in denying the appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:
An allegation that defense counsel gave an ineffective closing argument is a matter of trial strategy; issues regarding sound trial strategy do not provide a basis for post-conviction relief. State v. Hamilton, 791 S.W.2d 789, 797 (Mo.App.1990). Furthermore, in making this claim Movant overlooks the fact that his case was not a jury trial but a trial to the Court. If the Court had believed that the evidence supported a finding of guilt of involuntary manslaughter, nothing would have precluded the Court from finding Movant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 15 (Mo. banc 1991). Therefore Movant cannot claim that defense counsel's argument in this regard prejudiced his defense.
This appeal followed.
Appellate review of a motion court's denial of a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of whether the court's findings and conclusions issued in support thereof, as required by Rule 29.15(j), are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k); State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Mo. banc 1998). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Clay, 975 S.W.2d at 140.
I.
The appellant claims that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion, without an evidentiary hearing, because he alleged facts, not conclusions, which were not refuted by the record, and which, if true, would establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that a reasonably competent attorney, in the same or similar circumstances, would have "argue[d] a theory of involuntary manslaughter to the trial court," which his trial counsel failed to do. Specifically, he claims that the evidence at trial supported his conviction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, based on a finding of reckless homicide, such that if the lesser-included offense had been argued by counsel to the trial court, there was a reasonable probability that he would have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter rather than voluntary manslaughter.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984), requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise in similar circumstances; and (2) the movant was prejudiced as a result. State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 729, 746 (Mo. banc 1997). If either the performance or the prejudice prong of the test is not met, then we need not consider the other, and the movant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. Id. To satisfy the performance prong, the movant must overcome the presumptions that any challenged action was sound trial strategy and that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of professional judgment. Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a movant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
If the motion court determines that the motions, files, and records of the case conclusively show...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bello v. State
...or of jurors being influenced by impermissible factors. Furthermore, the court is presumed to know and apply the law, Haddock v. State, 75 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Mo.App.W.D.2002), and is presumed not to have been affected in sentencing by arguably prejudicial evidence. Anderson v. State, 402 S.W.......
-
State v. Neher, No. 27153 (Mo. App. 6/27/2006)
... ... See Cason v. State, 987 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Mo. App. 1999). The court had the inherent power to convict Defendant of the lesser-included possession offense, even if neither party asked the court to do so. See State v. Kohser, 46 S.W.3d 108, 111-13 (Mo. App. 2001); Haddock v. State, 75 S.W.3d 872, 876-77 (Mo. App. 2002). In determining whether a double jeopardy violation occurred, we examine the substance of the trial court's ruling, rather than its form, to determine its precise nature. State v. Smith, 988 S.W.2d 71, 78 (Mo. App. 1999); State v. Reed, 770 S.W.2d ... ...
-
Reid v. State
... ... Haddock v. State, 75 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo.App. W.D.2002); see also Morales v. State, 104 S.W.3d 432, 434 (Mo.App. E.D.2003) ... Discussion ... A. Motion court's reliance on plea counsel's affidavit ... In denying Movant's claim regarding plea counsel's: (1) ... ...
-
State v. Neher
... ... See Cason v. State, 987 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Mo.App.1999). The court had the inherent power to convict Neher of the lesser-included possession offense, even if neither party asked the court to do so. See State v. Kohser, 46 S.W.3d 108, 111-13 (Mo.App.2001); Haddock v. State, 75 S.W.3d 872, 876-77 (Mo.App.2002). In determining whether a double jeopardy violation occurred, the substance of the trial court's ruling, rather than its form, is examined to determine its precise nature. State v. Smith, 988 S.W.2d 71, 78 (Mo.App. 1999); State v. Reed, 770 S.W.2d 517, ... ...