Haddock v. Westrock CP, LLC, 1:19-cv-01390-SKO

• Decision Date: 16 December 2021
• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-01390-SKO
• Parties: JOSE HADDOCK, Plaintiff, v. WESTROCK CP, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

JOSE HADDOCK, Plaintiff,
v.
WESTROCK CP, LLC, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-01390-SKO

United States District Court, E.D. California

December 16, 2021

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS (Docs. 45, 64)

SHEILA K. OBERTO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Jose Haddock (“Plaintiff”) raises a single claim of negligence against Defendant Westrock CP, LLC (“Defendant”). (Doc. 1-2 at 4-7.) On July 30, 2021, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff. (Doc. 45.) On August 31, 2021, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 62.) On that same date, Plaintiff also filed a motion to withdraw admissions previously made.^[1] (Doc. 64.) On September 8, 2021, Defendant filed an opposition to the motion withdraw admissions. (Doc. 66.) On October 27, 2021, Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion for summary judgment.^[2] (Doc. 70.) The Court

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reviewed both of the motions and related papers and found the matters suitable for decision without oral argument.^[3] The hearing set for September 25, 2021, was therefore vacated. (Doc. 67.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY Defendant's motion for summary judgment and GRANT Plaintiff's motion to withdraw admissions.

II. BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2019, Paul Rocha, an employee of KLX, LLC (“KLX”), and a co-worker of Plaintiff, drove a trailer to Defendant's facility to be loaded. (Doc. 45-2, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”); Doc. 45-4, Deposition of Paul Rocha (“Rocha Dep.”) 11:12-19, 14:14- 24, 27:4-7.) After the trailer was loaded with pallets and sealed, Mr. Rocha drove the trailer to the KLX yard. (SUMF at 2; Rocha Dep. 31:21-32:7.) The next day, on May 2, 2019, Plaintiff picked up the trailer and drove it to its destination location. (Doc. 62-3, Plaintiff's Additional Material Facts (“PAMF”); Doc. 62-1, Deposition of Jose Haddock (“Haddock Dep.”) at 36:18-22.) When Plaintiff attempted to open the doors of the trailer, the load fell onto Plaintiff's body and head. (PAMF at 3; Haddock Dep. 24:23-25:2; Doc. 70-3 at 2.)

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exact nature of this

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responsibility, however, varies depending on whether the issue on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that “no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id. By contrast, if the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, “the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice in this respect. Id. at 929; see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (footnote omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That remains the province of the jury or fact finder. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a factual predicate from which the inference may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Analysis

“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to use due care, that [it] breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. Recovery for negligence depends as a threshold matter on the existence

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of a legal duty of care.” Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 213 (2021), reh'g denied (May 12, 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal.4th 370, 397 (1992).

Defendant contends that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on Plaintiff's sole claim for negligence because Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care. (Doc. 45 at 2, 9.) Specifically, Defendant claims that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”) place the obligation of ensuring that cargo is secured on motor carriers (i.e., Plaintiff's employer, KLX), and not on shippers (i.e., Defendant); thus, in cases where a motor carrier has had an opportunity to inspect the cargo, the shipper does not owe an employee of the motor carrier a legal duty to ensure that the cargo is secured. (Id. at 5-9.)

Plaintiff counters that California law, and not the FMSCR, applies because the instant case involves intrastate commerce-not interstate commerce.^[4] (Doc. 62 at 4-5.) Citing Pedeferri v. Seidner Enterprises, 216 Cal.App.4th 359 (2013), Plaintiff asserts that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care to properly load and secure the cargo in the vehicle. (Id. at 5-7.) In Pedeferri, the California Court of Appeal held that a commercial vendor owed a duty of care to persons on or near the roadway who are injured as a result of the vendor's negligence in loading and securing cargo in a vehicle in a way that distracts the vehicle's driver. Pedeferri, 216 Cal.App.4th at 371.

The Court finds that neither party has articulated the applicable duty of care owed by a shipper.^[5] Federal law and California law are in accord on this issue:

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In cases in which the shipper loads the conveyance furnished by the carrier, the following rule applies: “The primary duty as to the safe loading of property is therefore upon the carrier. When the shipper assumes the responsibility of loading, the general rule is that he becomes liable for the defects which are latent and concealed and cannot be discerned by ordinary observation by the agents of the carrier; but if the improper loading is apparent, the carrier will be liable notwithstanding the negligence of the shipper.”

Albers v. Gehrke, 4 Cal.App.3d 463, 478 (1970) (quoting United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1953) (“Savage”)); see also BBD Transportation Co. v. Buller, 49 Cal.App.3d 124, 132 (1975) (“the prevailing rule, and the rule in California is that if the overloading is apparent to the carrier, i.e., the driver, ‘the carrier will be liable notwithstanding the negligence of the shipper.'”) (quoting Albers, 4 Cal.App.3d at 478)); Env't Transportation of Nevada, LLC v. Mod. Mach. Co. Inc., No. C18-5445RBL, 2020 WL 1847747, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2020) (“According to the Savage case, a shipper who assumes the duty of loading is liable for latent or concealed defects created by that loading.”).

Whether a defect is patent, rather than latent, and thus apparent by reasonable inspection is generally a question of fact unless there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom-in which case the matter can be determined as a matter of law. Romo v. S. Pac. Transportation Co., 71 Cal.App.3d 909, 915 (1977); accord Smart v. Am. Welding & Tank Co., 149 N.H. 536, 826 A.2d 570, 575 (2003) (“[W]hether a defect in loading is obvious through ordinary observation or concealed is a question of fact.”).

Here, it appears to be undisputed that Defendant's employees loaded the trailer. (See Doc. 70-3 at 2.) Accordingly, Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care if the alleged defect in loading was latent. Albers, 4 Cal.App. at 463; Savage, 209 F.2d at 445. Whether the alleged loading defect was patent or latent is a factual issue for the jury to resolve, especially given the parties' dispute over the extent of Mr....