Haddonfield Nat. Bank v. Hipple

• Decision Date: 31 January 1933
• Docket Number: No. 107.,107.
• Citation: 164 A. 575
• Parties: HADDONFIELD NAT. BANK v. HIPPLE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

164 A. 575

HADDONFIELD NAT. BANK

v. HIPPLE et al.

No. 107.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 31, 1933.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by the Haddonfield National Bank against Lowell B. Hippie and Alexander Cooper. Prom judgment denying his petition to vacate a judgment by confession, Alexander Cooper appeals.

Affirmed.

French, Richards & Bradley, of Camden, for appellant.

Riggins & Davis, of Camden, for respondent.

The following opinion was prepared by the late Chief Justice GUMMERE, in compliance with the assignment to him. It clearly expresses the view of the court upon the matter involved in the litigation, and is adopted by the court as its own opinion in the cause.

GUMMERE, Chief Justice.

This appeal is taken by Alexander Cooper, one of the defendants below, to review the action of the Supreme Court in refusing to vacate a judgment by confession entered against him and his codefendant, Hippie, in the Supreme Court.

The two defendants applied to the Haddonfield National Bank for a loan of $11,000. The bank made the loan, and the borrowers, at the time of the payment of the money to them, signed a promissory note for the amount and delivered it to the bank. The bank, as a condition to the making of the loan, required security for its payment, and the two defendants thereupon executed and delivered to the bank their joint bond for the amount of the loan, secured by a third mortgage on property owned by them, which was located in Camden county. The bond had attached to it a provision authorizing any attorney to appear for the defendants, or either of them, in any court of competent jurisdiction, in case of the breach of the condition of the bond, and confess judgment for the penalty therein contained as of the last or any subsequent term of court, with costs of suit. While the debt which was secured by the bond and mortgage still remained unpaid to the extent of $10,600, Hipple and Cooper made an arrangement between themselves, by the terms of which Hippie was to take over Cooper's interest in the real estate which was covered by the mortgage and his father was to be substituted as the obligor on the bond in the place of Cooper. The bank was not a party to this agreement, which was subsequently executed by Cooper and the two Hippies. After this was done, the original note which was given in exchange for the loan, or, rather, a renewal thereof, was taken up by the two Hippies, and another note was made by them and given to the bank in its place; but when this was done Cooper was informed by the bank that it would not recognize any discharge of liability on his part from the obligation contained in the bond, and that it would hold him liable on that obligation in case there was finally a default in the payment of the moneys loaned by it to Hippie and himself. This condition arose—that is, a default in payment occurred—and thereupon the bank caused a judgment by confession to be entered in the Supreme Court by a duly authorized attorney against Hippie and Cooper. Cooper then filed a petition in that court, asserting that he was under no obligation to pay the debt and praying that the judgment against him be set aside and vacated. A rule to show cause was allowed, and on the return thereof it was dismissed by Justice Lloyd, before whom the matter came on to be heard, after deducting from the judgment a small amount, which he apparently considered should not have been included therein.

The petition for the order vacating the judgment was based upon three grounds, viz.:

(1) That the affidavit on which the said judgment was entered does not set forth the true consideration of said bond, in accordance with the statute in such case made and provided.

(2) Petitioner was released by plaintiff from all liability on the bond on which the judgment was entered. (3) Any debt owing by petitioner secured by said bond has been paid.

These being the only grounds submitted to the Supreme Court for opening and vacating the judgment, the other matters argued by counsel for the appellant are not properly before us for review, except the legality of the action of the...