Hadel v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. of Springfield, R-12

• Citation: 990 S.W.2d 107
• Decision Date: 11 March 1999
• Docket Number: R-12,No. 22383,D,22383
• Parties: Jim HADEL and Lisa Ege, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD,efendant-Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 107

990 S.W.2d 107

Jim HADEL and Lisa Ege, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD, R-12,

Defendant-Respondent.

No. 22383.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

March 11, 1999.

Douglas W. Greene and Douglas W. Greene, III, of Springfield, for Appellant.

Charles B. Cowherd, Husch & Eppenberger, L.L.C., of Springfield, for Respondent.

Before SHRUM, P.J., MONTGOMERY, J., and BARNEY, J.

PER CURIAM.

On March 28, 1995, Jim Hadel and Lisa Ege, individually and as agents and representatives of a class consisting of the membership of Local Union No. 20 affiliated with the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers of America ("Appellants"), filed a two count petition in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board of Education of School District of Springfield, R-12 ("Respondent") arising from three past and contemplated future roofing project(s) relating to Respondent's existing school facilities. See infra. In its judgment, the trial court found the issues in favor of Respondent and denied Appellants' request for injunctive relief. Appellants appeal raising two points of trial court error, discussed below. We affirm.

The key question in this appeal arises from the interpretation to be given to Section 177.086, RSMo 1994, as later amended by Section 177.086, RSMo Cum.Supp.1996. ¹ Section 177.086, RSMo 1994, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

1. Any school district authorizing the construction of facilities which may exceed an expenditure of two thousand five hundred dollars shall publicly advertise, for two successive weeks, in a newspaper of general publication ....

2. No bids shall be entertained by the school district which are not made in accordance with the specifications furnished by them and all contracts shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder complying with the terms of the letting, provided that the said school district shall have the right to reject any and all bids.

The 1996 amendment to the foregoing section increases the expenditure limits from "two thousand five hundred dollars" to "twelve thousand five hundred dollars," effective August 28, 1996. No other substantive changes were made. See § 177.086, RSMo Cum.Supp.1996.

The parties entered into pre-trial, amended stipulations of uncontroverted facts which were filed with the trial court on April 11, 1997. These stipulations, in pertinent part, are useful in explaining this case and the reasons why Appellants brought their action. They reveal that:

During 1993 and 1994, [Respondent] used its employees to do work on the roofs of three separate school buildings which involved removing and replacing the roofing materials from less than 20% of the roof surface area on each of the school buildings. Each of those jobs involved an expenditure of over $2,500.

...

The roofing work by [Respondent's] employees ... does not result in any change in the size, type or extent of the roofs of the buildings on which such work is performed. The work is done on existing roofs which have deteriorated due to age, weather and usage.

Additionally, it was jointly stipulated that:

[Respondent] expects to do roofing work in the future which involves the removal and replacement of up to 20% of the total roof area of one of its buildings at a cost of over $12,500, in which case it intends to follow its [normal] policy with respect to advertising for bids ....

With regard to Respondent's policy and practice in advertising for bids, it was also jointly stipulated that:

It was and is the policy and practice of [Respondent] to advertise for bids all projects involving the removal and replacement of faulty and worn roofing materials encompassing more than 20% of the total roof surface area of one of its buildings where the cost of such work was expected to exceed the sum of $2,500 .00 prior to August 28, 1996, and after that date where the cost of such work is expected to exceed the sum of $12,500.00.

In the first count of their petition, Appellants sought a declaration from the trial court that: (a) the roofing work performed in 1993 and 1994 at the behest of Respondent was in fact "construction work" as opposed to "maintenance work;" (b) that Respondent "improperly and illegally performed construction work for roofing projects on city schools without appropriate legal bids and public advertisement ...;" and (c) "that [Respondent] will, in the future, improperly and illegally perform construction work for roofing projects on city schools without appropriate legal bids and public advertisement for bids as contemplated by state statute, unless enjoined and prohibited by this Court." In their second count, Appellants sought injunctive relief to enjoin Respondent from "committing or allowing to be committed any further acts, omissions, or violations of [Respondent's] bidding procedure as defined by state statute."

Prior to trial, it was further stipulated by the parties that the trial court would be requested to determine one primary issue:

Whether the removal and replacement of faulty and worn roof materials encompassing up to 20% of the total roof surface area on one of [Respondent's] school buildings (involving expenditures of more than $2,500.00 prior to August 28, 1996, and more than $12,500.00 thereafter) constitute 'repair' or 'maintenance' as claimed by [Respondent] so as to not require advertised bids under Section 177.086 RSMo., or does such work constitute 'construction' as alleged by [Appellants] so that advertised bids under Section 177 .086 RSMo. are required. ²

In its judgment, the trial court found against Appellants in both counts, and denied Appellants' request for injunctive relief. The trial court made the following pertinent findings:

3. The word 'construction' appearing in § 177.086.1 RSMo.1994, as amended, is not defined in that statute, but that same word is defined in § 290.210(1), RSMo.1994, which is part of the prevailing wage law for the State of Missouri. In § 290.210(1) RSMo.1994, the term 'construction' is defined and it is distinguished from the terms 'repairs' or 'maintenance.' The Court believes that said definitions are useful in the interpretation of the term 'construction' as it appears in § 177.086.1 RSMo.1994, as amended, under the doctrine of pari materia.

4. § 177.086.1 RSMo.1994, as amended, does not require advertised bids for the removal and replacement of faulty and worn roof materials encompassing up to 20% of the total roof surface area of one of [Respondent's] buildings (involving expenditures of more than $2,500 prior to August 28, 1996, or more than $12,500 thereafter) in that such work constitutes 'repairs' or 'maintenance.'

5. The costs of this action should be taxed to [Appellants].

Appellants raise two points of trial court error. In their first point and accompanying argument, Appellants essentially maintain that the trial court erred by erroneously applying " § 176.086 RSMo 1994 as amended," because regardless of the percentage of roof space involved, if the contemplated expenditures exceeded the minimum monetary amount, then publicly advertised bidding was required. In this same vain, Appellants also maintain that the trial court erroneously construed the statutory definition of "construction" as defined in section 290.210, in that section 290.210 defines "construction" as "construction, reconstruction, improvement, enlargement, alteration, painting and decorating, or major repair." Therefore, Appellants argue that the legislative scheme envisioned that whenever any "repair" exceeded the applicable, minimum monetary amount such "repair" became a "major repair," requiring public advertisement for bids. In their second point, Appellants assert that the "trial court erroneously considered facts and hypothetical facts not in evidence as well as facts, hypothetical facts and hypothetical possibilities not contemplated nor included in the parties' stipulation of uncontroverted facts."

"Under the standard of review in declaratory judgment cases, we will affirm the decision of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996).

In our review we must determine whether the trial court drew correct legal conclusions from the stipulated facts entered into by the parties. See Hay v. Kohl, 902 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo.App.1995). If there are conflicts among the facts stipulated they will be considered as having been determined in accordance with the result reached by the trial court. Id. at 852. The judgment will be affirmed if the result reached is correct on any tenable basis. Id.

In construing a statute, we bear in mind several fundamental concepts. Initially, we observe that construction of a statute is a question of law, not judicial discretion. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 908 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 1995). Our ultimate purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. State ex rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. banc 1997); City of Ellisville v. Lohman, 972 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo.App.1998). We will read statutes in their plain, ordinary and usual sense. Bosworth v.. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. banc 1996). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the language as written and will not resort to statutory construction. M.A.B. v. Nicely, 909 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. banc 1995). If construction is necessary, we will construe a statute, or a provision thereof in context. State ex rel. Lebeau v. Kelly, 697 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Mo.App.1985). In order to shed light on a statute's meaning, this Court may also consider other statutes that involve similar...