Haden v. Dowd

• Decision Date: 28 November 1939
• Docket Number: 27279.
• Citation: 23 N.E.2d 676,216 Ind. 281
• Parties: HADEN v. DOWD, Warden.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

23 N.E.2d 676

216 Ind. 281

HADEN v. DOWD, Warden.

No. 27279.

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 28, 1939

Appeal from La Porte Circuit Court; Wirt Worden, Judge.

Oscar B. Thiel, of Gary, for appellant.

Omer S. Jackson, Atty. Gen., and Hubert E. Dirks, Deputy Atty Gen., for appellee.

FANSLER Judge.

The appellant sought to be discharged from the custody of the warden of the Indiana State Prison by a habeas corpus proceeding in the Circuit Court of La Porte County. A writ issued, but upon motion it was quashed. The appellant refused to plead further and there was judgment against him.

It appears from appellant's petition that an affidavit was filed against him in the Superior Court of St. Joseph County charging him in three separate counts with robbery, robbery while armed, and automobile banditry; that he entered a plea of guilty and there was judgment, regular in form, sentencing him for twenty-five years upon the first count, for ten years upon the second count, and for twenty-five years upon the third count; that by the terms of the judgment the sentences upon the first and third counts were to run concurrently, and the sentence upon the second count was to begin at the expiration of the sentence upon the first count. It further appears that he is held in custody by reason of a commitment issued in execution upon this judgment.

It is asserted in his petition and in the briefs and argument before this court that the judgment is void for the reasons (1) That the Superior Court of St. Joseph County was without jurisdiction to sentence him for more than one of the offenses charged; that it exhausted its jurisdiction by finding him guilty of the greatest offense; and that it had no jurisdiction to cause sentences to run consecutively; and (2) that he was not represented by counsel, and was not sufficiently advised of his constitutional right to have counsel; that 'he did not intelligently waive his right to be represented by counsel and did not intelligently enter plea of guilty to the affidavit' that before entering his plea it was represented to him by the prosecuting attorney that if he would enter a plea of guilty he would see that no greater sentence than ten years would be imposed upon him; that he entered a plea of guilty with this understanding, and that without his consent, and contrary to such representations, he was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.

The Superior Court of St. Joseph County has general jurisdiction to try criminal cases within that county. It appears from the appellant's petition for habeas corpus that an affidavit was filed charging him with three felonies. Prosecution by affidavit is authorized by the statute. He was before the court in person and entered a plea of guilty. The Superior Court had jurisdiction to construe the statute and the law and determine what judgment could be and should be entered against him. It had power and jurisdiction to decide whether he desired counsel, and whether he waived the right to counsel with a full understanding of his constitutional rights. It has often been said that jurisdiction to decide involves the power to decide wrong or erroneously. Since the Superior Court of St. Joseph County acquired jurisdiction of the defendant's case and of him, no other state court of general jurisdiction can wrest from that court jurisdiction to decide questions arising in that case, and no other state court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction to pass upon and determine whether the Superior Court of St. Joseph County acted erroneously or abused its judicial discretion. We are not concerned here with the question...