Hadix v. Johnson

• Citation: 45 F.Supp.2d 584
• Decision Date: 18 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 80-73581.,80-73581.
• Parties: Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

45 F.Supp.2d 584

Everett HADIX, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Perry M. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.

No. 80-73581.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 18, 1999.

Neal Bush, Detroit, MI, Jeanne E. Mirer, Roy, Shecter, Bloomfield Hills, MI, Larry W. Bennett, Cox, Hodgman, Troy, MI, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, MI, Deborah A. LaBelle, Ann Arbor, MI for Plaintiffs.

Thomas C. Nelson, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, Donald S. McGehee, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Tort Defense Division, Lansing, MI, Theodore E. Hughes, Janet Van Cleve, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, Leo H. Friedman, Michael A. Nickerson, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, Richard M.C. Adams, Susan Przekop-Shaw, Michigan Department of Attorney General Corrections Division, Lansing, MI, Jann R. Baugh, Michigan Department of Attorney General, International Trade & Agriculture Div., Lansing, MI, Ann Arbor, MI, Barbara A. Schmidt, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Mental Health Division, Lansing, MI, Lisa C. Ward, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER and ORDER OF TRANSFER

FEIKENS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case continues to be subject to a defense motion to terminate its consent decree. Two state prison cases have been on my docket for many years. This case involves male inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan (SPSM) in Jackson. A similar case, Glover et al. v. Johnson, Case No. 77-71229, involves female inmates in Michigan prisons. In that case, the female inmates prevailed and remedial orders were entered to bring about parity. Recently in that case, I filed an opinion which brings it, hopefully, to a conclusion. I have long sought finality in both cases.

Congress has stated, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, that consent decrees which have been entered in prison cases in federal courts should be reconsidered and terminated if the statutory indications are met.

Commenting on this statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) has stated that "The interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison cases remain at all times with the judiciary." Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.1998). The consent decree in this case provides for an Out-of-Cell Activity Plan and for a Break-Up Plan, which seeks to correct alleged constitutional violations in the confinement of inmates.

SPSM was constructed many years ago when it was believed that it would be cost efficient to house all male inmates in one very large facility. It has frequently been referred to as the "Big House." It became apparent over time that many confinement problems were caused by housing all prisoners in one facility; consequently, the Break-Up Plan provided for in the consent decree sought to correct these conditions. The prison is now being restructured so that there will be five autonomous facilities, hereinafter referred to as Facilities A, B, C, D and E.

I conclude that where compliance with the consent decree has been achieved, those portions of the consent decree should be terminated. Heretofore, I have begun to do so.¹ I continue that process in this opinion and order. The Break-Up Plan (the Plan) in the consent decree has brought about compliance in many instances, and it is realistic to provide for termination of those aspects of the Plan which have achieved their goals.

II. BACKGROUND

                The history of this case is stated in the
                previous decisions of this court. See, Hadix
                v. Johnson,    947  F.Supp. 1113
                (E.D.Mich.1996);    947  F.Supp. 1100
                (E.D.Mich.1996);    933  F.Supp. 1360
                (E.D.Mich.1996);    879  F.Supp.  743
                (E.D.Mich.1995);    896  F.Supp.  697
                (E.D.Mich.1995);    792  F.Supp.  527
                (E.D.Mich.1992);    740  F.Supp.  433
                (E.D.Mich.1990);    712  F.Supp.  550
                (E.D.Mich.1989);    694  F.Supp.  259
                (E.D.Mich.1988)
                

In 1980, plaintiffs, inmates at SPSM, brought a class action against various state prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties entered into a court-approved consent decree designed to remedy the constitutional violations alleged in plaintiffs' complaint in 1985.² In 1996, defendants filed a motion to terminate the consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3). On November 1, 1996, I denied defendants' motion to terminate (947 F.Supp. 1100), finding that the relevant provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. On January 13, 1998, the Sixth Circuit reversed, Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943. That court concluded that the PLRA is constitutional and that the powers of the federal courts are not restricted as the defendants contended. Accordingly, the case has been remanded to me for consideration of the merits of defendants' motion to terminate.

A. FACILITIES SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT DECREE

The consent decree and concomitant Break-Up Plan encompass the former Central Complex of the State Prison of Southern Michigan. According to the Plan, the Central Complex will be divided into five mostly autonomous facilities, Facilities A through E. These facilities are designated in the plan as follows:

FACILITY A: Physically comprised of the former Egeler Facility, this facility is designated to receive, process, evaluate, classify and place incoming male State prisoners. This facility also houses and provides services for prisoners from throughout the State who are receiving short-term medical treatment rendered through Duane L. Waters Hospital, and provides custody, security and support services for the hospital.

FACILITY B: This facility is designated to house and provide services for prisoners classified as Level IV inmates, including prisoners in need of protective or segregated custody.

FACILITY C: This facility is designated to house and provide services for prisoners classified as Level V inmates, including prisoners in need of administrative segregation.

FACILITY D: This facility is designated to house and provide services for prisoners classified as Level I inmates, including sex offenders. Services for these prisoners include participation in public works programs and jobs outside the security perimeter when appropriate.

FACILITY E: This facility is designated to provide centralized food production, laundry, warehouse, vehicular maintenance, and some building maintenance operations to serve Facilities A through D.

Of these facilities, Facility B is the first prison to be opened. The renovations required under Section VIII., Management, of the consent decree have been completed. It consists of former cellblocks 4 and 5, and provides exercise, medical and dental areas, a school, a library, a dining hall and a gym, services available to inmates classified at security level four.

Defendants have repeatedly contended that these facilities, as they are completed, are "new" facilities and not part of the "Central Complex," and thus are not subject to the terms of the consent decree. In particular, defendants have argued that Facility B, because it is now complete, is not subject to the terms of the consent decree. I have previously rejected this notion:

Defendants also introduce the notion that the facilities resulting from the implementation of Section VIII of the Decree are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Hadix Consent Decree. However, defendants are obligated to implement all sections of the Consent Decree, including Section VIII, until, pursuant to Section XII of the Decree, the court terminates jurisdiction. Furthermore, I previously ordered, in the Order accepting Consent Judgment (dated May 13, 1985), that physical or operational modification of the facilities located within the walls of SPSM does not affect the jurisdiction of this court, especially when the process of modification was anticipated by and conducted under the jurisdiction of the court. Hadix v. Johnson, 896 F.Supp. 697, 704 n. 8 (E.D.Mich.1995). In that opinion, I also ordered that all references in the Out-of-Cell Activity Plan to "Central Complex" be changed to "Facilities subject to the Hadix Decree" in an attempt to settle that matter. Id., at 705. I reiterate that Facilities A-E, including the completed Facility B, are Hadix facilities, subject to the consent decree.

III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TERMINATE

I now turn to defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree as it pertains to these facilities.

A. Facility A

Despite the deadline and timetable for completion, which I ordered based on defendants' proposal and their agreement, the major work on Facility A has not yet begun. In a letter dated January 8, 1999,³ defendants have proposed a substitute plan, to replace the court-approved plan, and have stated that renovations to this facility are subject to obtaining legislative approval for funding.

This is most troubling, since the defendants had previously represented to me at the time of the original project approval that funds were available for the entire project. Furthermore, there is already in place an agreement by the defendants, expressly stated by the then-director of the Department of Corrections, Kenneth McGinnis, that if modifications of plans for this (or any other) facility were necessary, those modifications could be approved by the SPSM Decentralization Team (SDT)⁴, and further consideration by me would be unnecessary. I have already authorized SDT to approve such changes.

In any event, because of the special nature of this facility, I find that the evaluation of the adequacy of defendants' alternative proposal is best left to a determination of this matter at an upcoming health care compliance hearing before Judge Enslen. Evaluation of defendants' proposed alternatives is primarily a medical issue, involving assessments of the effect that such proposed...