Hadley v. Groose, s. 95-2392
| Citation | 97 F.3d 1131 |
| Decision Date | 26 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95-2515,Nos. 95-2392,s. 95-2392 |
| Parties | Russell Bryan HADLEY, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Michael GROOSE; Paul Caspari; James Purkett, Superintendent of the Farmington Correctional Center; Jeremiah (Jay) W. Nixon, Attorney General, Respondents/Appellants. Russell Bryan HADLEY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Michael GROOSE; Paul Caspari; James Purkett, Superintendent of the Farmington Correctional Center; Jeremiah (Jay) W. Nixon, Attorney General, Respondents/Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Michael J. Spillane, argued, Jefferson City, MO (Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, on the brief), for Respondents/Appellants.
Burton Newman, argued, Clayton, MO, for Petitioner/Appellee.
Before BOWMAN, HEANEY, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
The State of Missouri appeals the district court's 1 order granting Russell Hadley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of December 11, 1985, Hazel Smith, an elderly resident of a trailer park in Webb City, Missouri, awoke to find a man with a knife standing beside her bed. The man blindfolded Mrs. Smith with her pajamas and then sodomized her. He also robbed her of a small amount of personal property and cash.
On the morning of December 15, 1985, Mrs. Smith awoke to hear someone attempting to force the front door to her trailer open. A newly-installed safety chain prevented the intruder's entry. Mrs. Smith told police that she "knew it was the same individual" from the December 11 attack. She testified at trial, however, that she only saw the intruder's head and not his face, and did not offer any testimony connecting the December 15 intruder to the December 11 attack.
Hadley was arrested and charged with the December 11 attack. He was represented by public defenders Larry Maples and Craig Johnston. After a one-day trial on May 2, 1986, the jury returned that same night with a verdict finding Hadley guilty of sodomy, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action. As a prior offender, Hadley was sentenced to consecutive thirty-year terms on each count. Hadley's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Hadley, 736 S.W.2d 580 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). His motion for post-conviction relief was denied, and this denial was affirmed on appeal. Hadley v. State, 771 S.W.2d 943 (Mo.Ct.App.1989).
Hadley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After a limited evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Hadley's petition and request for a full evidentiary hearing on the ground that his claims were procedurally barred. Hadley v. Groose, No. 91-0951-CV-W-6, 1994 WL 14855 (W.D.Mo. Jan. 19, 1994) (). We concluded that Hadley's claims were not barred and reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and further consideration of Hadley's claims. Hadley v. Caspari, 36 F.3d 51, 52 (8th Cir.1994) (per curiam).
On remand, after conducting a two-day hearing, the district court granted Hadley's petition, concluding that Maples and Johnston had been ineffective in dealing with the introduction of evidence regarding the December 15 attempted break-in. Hadley v. Groose, No. 91-0951-CV-W-6, 1995 WL The State appeals, arguing that the district court erred in conducting a second evidentiary hearing and that the district court erroneously concluded that Maples and Johnston had been ineffective. Hadley cross-appeals, arguing that he was entitled to relief on grounds alleged in his petition that the district court did not address.
307424 (memorandum and order).
With respect to the State's first contention, the district court can hardly be faulted for complying with our directive that it hold an evidentiary hearing.
Turning to the merits of the district court's ruling, the key to understanding this case is to appreciate the damning nature of the evidence of the December 15 attempted break-in, for we agree with the district court "that what the jury believed about Dec 15. was the 'make-or-break' aspect of the case." Memorandum and Order at 14. Hadley was never charged in relation to the December 15 incident, yet the trial court allowed the introduction of testimony regarding the subsequent attempted break-in to show identification, common scheme or plan, and motive.
The State's case regarding the December 11 attack was weak. Smith's eyewitness identification of Hadley was described by the district court as "not very powerful" and "rather weak." 2 The only other evidence linking Hadley to the attack was a single pubic hair found at the scene, which had characteristics consistent with Hadley's pubic hair, and a semen sample left by a person with Type A blood--Hadley's blood type and the blood type of approximately 42% of the population. Furthermore, Hadley presented evidence establishing an alibi for the time of the attack.
The evidence regarding the attempted break-in on December 15 developed as follows. Mrs. Smith called the police on December 15 soon after the foiled intruder left. Officers Rogers and Breeden arrived at Mrs. Smith's trailer at 5:43 a.m. on December 15. Deputy Sheriff Parrill arrived shortly thereafter. A light snow had fallen that morning. Rogers's report contained the following statement:
This R/O [reporting officer] also observed that there were snow tracks in the shape of footprints on the victim's front porch. The tracks appeared to be that of boots with cleat type soles. The victim stated no one had been on her porch recently. This R/O and Officer Breeden made a canvass of the victim's yard and found several footprints in the snow leading to and from the victim's trailer to the street in front of the house, however, it was not possible to trace the prints further than the street area.
This R/O and Officer Breeden checked the area around trailer # 6 and Officer Breeden found footprints in the snow around trailer # 6.
Trailer # 6 was the trailer of Mary Ellen Reding, Hadley's mother. Although Hadley was living there on December 10-11, he had moved out of the trailer prior to December 15.
At a deposition in the present case, Rogers testified that he traced the footprints out to the edge of the street, where they disappeared; he did not trace them farther. Rogers also testified that it was Breeden who discovered the footprints outside Reding's trailer. Rogers observed three or four different types of footprints, none of which were the same as those outside Mrs. Smith's trailer. Rogers stated that the footprints at Mrs. Smith's trailer appeared to be from a hiking-type boot, not a cowboy boot.
Deputy Sheriff Parrill's report stated that the footprints in the snow "led S.E. to Road then vanished." Parrill testified at Hadley's post-conviction relief hearing that the snow The prosecutor added the following note to Rogers's report: "These officers followed tracks to road--lost them in road & they appeared on opposite side, leading to Hadley's trailer." The fact that it was the prosecutor who added this note was not disclosed until after trial.
was soft in Mrs. Smith's yard but compacted in the road, that there were no visible prints in the road, and that he did not attempt to trail the prints farther.
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the December 15 attempted break-in. The prosecutor argued for admission of the evidence, stating that the footprints found on December 15 leading to Reding's trailer were "similar in size, shape, to what had been in front of" Mrs. Smith's trailer and that the footprints in front of Mrs. Smith's trailer "could be identified in going up to Hadley's trailer." Agreeing with the prosecutor, the trial court stated that "you have the footprints leading out to the road and to the defendant's trailer," and that "we have the footprints pointing to his trailer."
The prosecutor then moved to substitute Officer Breeden for Officer Rogers as a witness at trial. The prosecutor argued that the police report referred to "following the snow tracks and the shape of footprints up to the defendant's front porch," and that Breeden was the officer who had followed the footprints. He argued that there was no surprise to the defense because Breeden's testimony would be "identical to what is reflected in Officer Rogers's report." The trial court allowed the substitution, stating that "the testimony of this witness is not different from that shown in the police reports." The court allowed the defense to interview Breeden at the courthouse prior to his testimony.
Breeden was the State's final witness at trial. He testified that there were spots of snow shaped like a shoe on Mrs. Smith's porch. He then drew a diagram showing the tracks leaving Mrs. Smith's yard, disappearing at the road, and reappearing and leading to Reding's trailer, which he referred to as "Hadley's" trailer. He testified that the tracks in front of "Hadley's" trailer were "very similar in size and general shape" to those in front of Mrs. Smith's trailer, and that he only found one set of tracks. He also testified that "Hadley's" trailer was directly visible from Mrs. Smith's front door. On cross-examination, Breeden stated that although he couldn't be sure that the tracks in front of Reding's trailer were the same as those in front of Mrs. Smith's trailer, they were "generally very similar." He was not asked about the contents of Rogers's or Parrill's report.
During the defense's case, Maples and Johnston put on no alibi evidence for the night of December 14 and early morning of December 15, and they did not call Rogers to testify about the footprints, even though Rogers was at the courthouse. When Hadley testified, they failed to ask him any questions regarding his whereabouts the morning of December 15; they asked him only whether he had gone to Mrs. Smith's...
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