Hadley v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 16 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 101979.,101979.
• Citation: 224 Ill.2d 365,864 N.E.2d 162
• Parties: Willie B. HADLEY, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

864 N.E.2d 162

224 Ill.2d 365

Willie B. HADLEY, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

No. 101979.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 16, 2007.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Leslye Jones-Beatty, Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Linda T. Coberly, John F. Kness, of Winston & Strawn, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Plaintiff, Willie B. Hadley, an inmate at Big Muddy River Correctional Center, filed a class action complaint in the circuit court of Sangamon County, seeking to enjoin defendant, the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC or the Department), from charging him and other allegedly indigent inmates a $2 co-payment for nonemergency medical and dental services. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2004). The circuit court granted DOC's section 2-615 motion to dismiss. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004). A divided appellate court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 362 Ill.App.3d 680, 298 Ill.Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. We allowed DOC's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff has been incarcerated since his arrest in 1976 and is serving an indeterminate sentence of 24 to 74 years. Plaintiff claimed that during the two-year period beginning in February 2002, DOC charged his inmate trust fund account a total of $44 in co-payments for nonemergency medical and dental services. Plaintiff claimed that such charges ran afoul of section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections, under which an "indigent" inmate is "exempt" from the $2 co-payment (730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2004)). More specifically, plaintiff alleged that DOC implemented a policy, through its administrative directives, of deducting the statutory co-payment from an inmate's trust fund account irrespective of whether funds were available, and requiring inmates who requested nonemergency medical or dental services to first sign a "Request for Payment" form authorizing DOC to deduct the co-payment from present or future funds in the inmate's account. In addition to violating the statute, plaintiff argued, this policy thrust indigent inmates into further debt. Plaintiff noted that he had filed an institutional grievance challenging DOC's practice, which was denied. Through his complaint, plaintiff sought to enjoin DOC from forcing indigent inmates to sign the request-for-payment form prior to receiving nonemergency medical and dental services.

DOC filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss the complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004). DOC argued that section 3-6-2(f), when read in its entirety, "states that an indigent inmate must be treated the same as a solvent inmate, and is thus exempt from the requirement to pay the co-payment before receiving treatment," but that the "statute does not forever relieve the inmate of his requirement to pay." (Emphasis in original.) According to DOC:

"Treatment will not be withheld, nor will an inmate be treated differently, because the inmate is a pauper; however, the inmate will be expected to pay the required amount when and if he is financially able to do so. Plaintiff has not alleged, and indeed cannot claim, that he is certain to remain indigent for the entire period of his incarceration. If his financial circumstances change and he is at some point capable of remitting the co-payments he has accrued, he will be required to do so. In the event that Plaintiff remains indigent and is released with a negative balance on his trust fund account, that indebtedness will not follow him into the free world."

In response, plaintiff argued that section 3-6-2(f) nowhere states that an indigent inmate is required to pay the $2 co-payment once the inmate becomes solvent. Plaintiff relied on the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "exempt." The circuit court granted DOC's motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the circuit court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 362 Ill.App.3d 680, 298 Ill.Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. The appellate court concluded that DOC's regulatory scheme was inconsistent with the statutory language. Specifically, the appellate court held that DOC's special definition of "indigent," which considers the inmate's ability to remit the co-payment "during the entire term of his or her incarceration" (20 Ill. Adm.Code § 415.30(g)(3) (2005)), and DOC's practice of restricting future funds in the inmate's account (20 Ill. Adm.Code § 415.30(g)(2) (2005)), conflicted with the plain language of the statute and the ordinary definitions of "indigent" and "exempt." 362 Ill.App.3d at 686-87, 298 Ill. Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. The appellate court concluded that section 3-6-2(f) "gave plaintiff a clear right to an exemption from the $2 co-payment if, at the time he sought nonemergency medical or dental services, he lacked the means to pay it." 362 Ill. App.3d at 687, 298 Ill.Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. Based on plaintiff's allegation that DOC charged the co-payments to his inmate trust account even though he had no funds or assets, thus putting his account balance in "negative territory," the appellate court found that "plaintiff has alleged the first of the three conditions for granting an injunction: a certain and clearly ascertainable right that needs protection." 362 Ill.App.3d at 687, 298 Ill.Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. The appellate court also found that plaintiff adequately pleaded the two remaining conditions for injunctive relief—irreparable injury and lack of an adequate remedy at law—and that the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The appellate court thus reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. 362 Ill. App.3d at 688-89, 298 Ill.Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. We allowed DOC's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

I

The present appeal arises from the grant of a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, a matter subject to de novo review. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill.2d 351, 364, 290 Ill.Dec. 525, 821 N.E.2d 1099 (2004). Whether plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed turns on whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged "a certain and clearly ascertainable right that needs protection." 362 Ill. App.3d at 687, 298 Ill.Dec. 635, 840 N.E.2d 748. This, in turn, depends upon an issue of statutory interpretation, namely, whether DOC's definition of what it means to be an "indigent" inmate, and its related rules, appropriately implement section 3-6-2(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections or, as the appellate court held, conflicts with that statute. On this issue of law our review also proceeds de novo. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill.2d 590, 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876 (2005); Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill.2d 81, 86, 265 Ill.Dec. 877, 773 N.E.2d 641 (2002).

We acknowledge that where, as here, an agency is charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute, courts will give deference to the agency's interpretation of any statutory ambiguities. Taddeo, 216 Ill.2d at 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876; People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill.2d 36, 48, 269 Ill.Dec. 21, 779 N.E.2d 875 (2002); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. State of Illinois Department of Employment Security, 131 Ill.2d 23, 34, 136 Ill.Dec. 86, 544 N.E.2d 772 (1989); Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 95 Ill.2d 142, 152, 69 Ill.Dec. 78, 447 N.E.2d 295 (1983). Thus, "[a] court will not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation adopted by the agency charged with the statute's administration." Church v. State of Illinois, 164 Ill.2d 153, 162, 207 Ill.Dec. 6, 646 N.E.2d 572 (1995), citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Courts, however, are not bound by an agency's interpretation that conflicts with the statute, is unreasonable, or is otherwise erroneous. Taddeo, 216 Ill.2d at 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876; Press v.Code Enforcement Board of Appeals, 149 Ill.2d 281, 285, 172 Ill.Dec. 398, 595 N.E.2d 1068 (1992); Carson Pirie Scott, 131 Ill.2d at 34, 136 Ill.Dec. 86, 544 N.E.2d 772.

As in all cases of statutory interpretation, our duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 246, 302 Ill.Dec. 735, 850 N.E.2d 172 (2006). The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d at 246, 302 Ill.Dec. 735, 850 N.E.2d 172; Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 466, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000). Where the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids of construction. Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill.2d 498, 508, 281 Ill.Dec. 534, 804 N.E.2d 499 (2004); Lulay, 193 Ill.2d at 466, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521.

With these principles in mind, we consider the statute at issue and DOC's interpretation thereof.

II

Section 3-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections requires DOC to "establish accounting records with accounts for each person who has or receives money while in an institution or facility of the Department" and to "allow the withdrawal and disbursement of money by the person under rules and regulations of the Department." 730 ILCS 5/3-4-3 (West 2004). Subject to DOC regulations, an inmate may receive funds for deposit into his or her account from outside sources or through employment with DOC. See 20 Ill. Adm.Code § 205.50 (1988) (describing restrictions on funds...