Hadley v. State

Decision Date08 August 1986
Docket NumberNo. 1084S385,1084S385
Citation496 N.E.2d 67
PartiesElmo T. HADLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Justice.

Following a jury trial, appellant Elmo T. Hadley was convicted of murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.), and found to be an habitual offender, Ind. Code Sec. 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1985 Repl.). His 50-year sentence on the murder charge was enhanced by 30 years as a result of the habitual offender finding.

Hadley raises twelve issues in this direct appeal:

1) The sufficiency of the evidence on the murder charge;

2) Whether the court erred in refusing to admit a report of an investigating officer's telephone conversation with Hadley's brother;

3) The adequacy of the court's efforts to determine Hadley's competency;

4) Whether the court improperly admitted portions of his grand jury testimony;

5) The court's denial of his motion for change of venue;

6) Whether the court properly denied Hadley's motion for individual voir dire and sequestration of jurors during voir dire;

7) The adequacy of the hearing on Hadley's motion to suppress identification evidence;

8) Whether photographs of Hadley's arrest and others showing the autopsy of the victim were properly admitted;

9) Whether the court erred in permitting the State to call a "surprise witness" to testify during the habitual offender proceedings;

10) Whether the court correctly admitted a transcript of a hearing in which Hadley acknowledged prior felony convictions;

11) The sufficiency of the evidence on the habitual offender question.

The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows. Elmo Hadley lived in Elkhart with his father, Reverend Theodius Hadley, his mother Jannie Mae Hadley, and his sister Clara. Hadley stayed in the basement of his parents' home and rarely ate meals with his family.

Hadley's parents became ill several hours after eating Sunday dinner on February 27, 1983. They complained of flu-like symptoms. Throughout the following week, their illness recurred whenever they ate or drank. Soon after Clara returned from a weekend trip, she became ill. Two of the Hadley's grandchildren subsequently stayed at the Hadley home and also became ill. The parents' condition failed to improve, and they were hospitalized on Saturday, March 5. Tests showed they were suffering from low blood pressure and dehydration, symptoms of arsenic poisoning.

The Hadleys normally drank distilled water, rather than tap water. At the hospital, Reverend Hadley drank the hospital's tap water, but his wife drank from a bottle of distilled water brought from their home. Mrs. Hadley's condition deteriorated, and she died on March 13. Reverend Hadley eventually recovered. Subsequent tests showed that arsenic poisoning caused Mrs. Hadley's death and the illness of her husband and daughter. Investigators found arsenic in a distilled water bottle discarded in the Hadleys' garage and in the bottom of a glass in their bedroom.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hadley contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's determination that he poisoned his mother. He claims the "credible" evidence shows merely a nonexclusive opportunity to commit the crime, together with a suspicion among family members that Hadley was the killer. Hadley also claims that the prosecution failed to prove that he possessed the requisite intent to commit murder because the evidence showed he was non compos mentis.

He concedes that this Court will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, except where the evidence most favorable to the State is so devoid of probative evidence as to preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Liston v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 502, 250 N.E.2d 739. A verdict will be upheld if the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, as viewed most favorable to the State, establish the existence of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Fordyce v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 108.

Hadley urges the Court to discard testimony about his alleged confessions to a jail officer and to a former cellmate because they are "inherently incredible." The jail officer waited more than two months to report the confession which Hadley allegedly made while being transported to a doctor's office. The former cellmate had previously revealed jailhouse confessions in return for judicial leniency and the charges pending against the cellmate at the time of Hadley's trial were dismissed in exchange for his testimony about Hadley's alleged confession. Nevertheless, defense counsel had ample opportunity to reveal any questionable aspects of the testimony during cross-examination. The challenged veracity of the witnesses was a matter for the jury to weigh; it did not bar admission of the testimony.

Even without the testimony about Hadley's confessions, sufficient evidence existed to convict him of murder. Several employees of a Kokomo drug store testified that they saw Hadley purchase a total of six yellow bottles of a colorless, liquid ant poison during three shopping expeditions in February and early March of 1983. They said Hadley attempted to conceal the label of the ant poison bottles when he paid for them. The ant poison contained arsenic. Hadley's father saw Hadley try to conceal a yellow can at their home. Soon after the poison purchase, Hadley's parents became ill. He was the only person in the home who remained unaffected.

Hadley argues that the fatal dose of arsenic probably came in the bottle of distilled water which Mrs. Hadley requested from her hospital bed. He notes that his brother, Isaac, delivered the bottle to their mother. Notwithstanding appellant's attempt to blame his brother, the test of the sufficiency of the evidence in a homicide prosecution is not whether someone else could have committed the crime. Instead, where the evidence is circumstantial, the reviewing court need find only that the jury could draw from the evidence an inference reasonably tending to support the finding of guilt of the defendant. McCraney v. State (1983), Ind., 447 N.E.2d 589. This standard was met. Conjecture about uncharged potential suspects simply is not enough to overturn a jury verdict.

Equally unpersuasive is Hadley's argument that the prosecution failed to prove intent. The State used evidence of Hadley's strange behavior and beliefs (he often called his parents and siblings "impostors" and "aliens") to establish a motive for the poisoning. Existence of a motive for homicide may provide the basis for an inference of intent. German v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 370, 337 N.E.2d 883. Hadley argues that evidence of his delusions showed he was non compos mentis and therefore incapable of forming the necessary intent. 1 To convict a person of murder, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Bixler v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 1093, cert. den., --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 106, 88 L.Ed.2d 86.

Appellant cites two recent cases in which we explained that one who is non compos mentis cannot form intent to commit a crime. Sills v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 228; Terry v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085. These cases provide little support for Hadley's position because both involve intoxication defenses. Furthermore, in Terry v. State, we held that a person would not be relieved of responsibility for his actions "when he was able to devise a plan, operate equipment, instruct the behavior of others or carry out acts requiring physical skill." Id., 465 N.E.2d at 1088. Hadley was employed full-time at the time of his parent's death. He was alert enough to buy poison which would not be detected without laboratory tests. He was conscious enough of his illegal conduct to try to conceal the poison at the time of purchase. He subsequently implemented a devious plan to kill his parents. His intent to murder his mother--as well as his father--was painfully clear. A non compos mentis argument is not properly raised in this context.

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that all elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. Admission of a Police Report

In another effort to implicate his siblings, Hadley offered a report of an investigating officer's telephone conversation with Theodis Hadley, Jr., appellant's brother. Hadley claimed it would show that Theodis was uncooperative with the police but was never investigated as a suspect. The court refused to admit the police report, ruling that it was hearsay and irrelevant. The court did allow testimony concerning the report but prohibited any mention of the content of the telephone conversation between Theodis and the officer.

Hadley contends that that the document was not hearsay or, alternatively, that the report falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, whether verbal or written, offered at trial to prove the truth of the matter stated therein. Mulligan v. State (1986), Ind., 487 N.E.2d 1309.

We need not address the merits of this issue because appellant has waived his argument by failing to include the officer's report in the record. Error alleged but not disclosed by the record is not a proper subject for review. State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind.App. 610, 291 N.E.2d 70. Furthermore, Hadley was able to elicit through the testimony of the investigating officer evidence that Theodius did not cooperate with police and was not investigated. Hadley has shown no prejudice and cannot claim error.

III. Hadley's Competency

Appellant claims that the trial court violated Ind. Code Sec. 35-36-3-1 by failing to conduct a...

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