Hadlock v. Gray

• Decision Date: 09 January 1886
• Docket Number: 12,235
• Citation: 4 N.E. 167,104 Ind. 596
• Parties: Hadlock et al. v. Gray
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

4 N.E. 167

104 Ind. 596

Hadlock et al. v. Gray

No. 12,235

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 9, 1886

From the Fulton Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint.

M. L Essick, O. F. Montgomery, M. R. Smith and G. W. Holman, for appellants.

J. S Slick and S. Keith, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

The appellee alleges in his complaint that he is the owner of the real estate therein described, and that his title rests upon a deed executed to him in January, 1878, by Isaac Cannon, who has since died; that Isaac Cannon's title was founded upon a deed executed to him and his wife, Mary Cannon, by Charles Jackson and wife, on the 20th day of April, 1876 that this deed, omitting the formal parts, reads thus: "This indenture witnesseth, that Charles Jackson and Catharine Jackson, his wife, of Fulton county, in the State of Indiana, convey and warrant to Isaac Cannon and Mary Cannon, for the sum of twelve hundred dollars, the following real estate in Fulton county, Indiana, to wit: Lot number one hundred and eighty-two, as designated on the plat of Shryock & Bozarth's addition to the town of Rochester, with all the appurtenances thereunto belonging, the said Isaac Cannon to pay all taxes thereon from the day of sale. After the decease of said Isaac Cannon and Mary Cannon, the said property to be equally divided between the heirs of said Isaac Cannon and the heirs of Mary Cannon. If said Isaac Cannon shall die before his wife she is to hold the said property until her death, and provided Mary Cannon shall die first, then Isaac Cannon is to hold said property until his death, and at the death of both it is to be divided as above stated." It is also alleged that both Isaac and Mary Cannon are dead; that the deed of the former was made after the death of his wife; that the appellants are the children and grandchildren of Isaac and Mary Cannon; that they claim title to the real estate; that they have, in fact, no title, and that the appellee is entitled to a decree quieting his title. The prayer is, that appellee's title be quieted, and that the appellants be decreed to have no interest in the real estate.

The controlling question in the case turns upon the effect to be given the deed executed to Isaac and Mary Cannon. If that deed vested a fee in them as tenants in entirety, then the judgment below was right; if it vested in them a life-estate for the lives of both, then the judgment is wrong. Our opinion is, that the deed vested in them a life-estate and nothing more.

It is true that where real property is conveyed to husband and wife jointly, and there are no limiting words in the deed, they will take the estate as tenants in entirety. Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424; Dodge v Kinzy, 101 Ind. 102, vide authorities cited p. 105. But while the general rule is as we have stated it, there may be conditions, limitations, and stipulations in the deed conveying the property, which will defeat the operation of the rule. The denial of this proposition involves the affirmation of the proposition that a grantor is powerless to limit or define the estate which he grants, and this would conflict with the fundamental principle that a grantor may for himself determine what estate he will grant. To deny this right would be to deny to parties the right to make their own contracts. It seems quite clear, upon principle, that a grantor and his grantees may limit and define the estate granted by the one and accepted by the others, although the grantees may be husband and wife. Washburn says, in...