Hadsall v. Sunbelt Rentals Inc., Case No. 20-CV-181-JPS
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | 7th Cir. Case No. 20-2482,Case No. 20-CV-181-JPS |
| Parties | JENNIFER A. HADSALL, Regional Director of Region 18 of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. SUNBELT RENTALS INC., Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
On August 7, 2020, this Court granted Petitioner's, Jennifer Hadsall, Regional Director of Region 18 ("Director"), petition for injunctive relief under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act"). (Docket #18). On August 10, 2020, Respondent, Sunbelt Rentals Inc. ("Sunbelt"), filed a motion to stay the Court's final order granting injunctive relief pending appeal. (Docket #19). The matter became fully briefed on August 26, 2020. (Docket #20, #25, and #26). Upon consideration of Sunbelt's and the Director's submissions, this Court will deny Sunbelt's motion to stay.1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) grants this Court authority to stay an injunction during the pendency of the appeal of a final order. A court's decision whether to stay an order pending appeal is a discretionaryone, informed by the consideration of the following factors provided by the Supreme Court:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The party seeking a stay has the burden of proving that these factors warrant a stay. Id. The first two factors, (1) whether appellant has made a showing of likelihood of success on appeal and (2) whether appellant has demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury absent a stay, are the most critical. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434-435 (2009).
3.1 Sunbelt has not made a showing that it has a substantial likelihood of success on appeal
In the context of a motion to stay a final judgment pending appeal, "where the applicant's arguments have already been evaluated on the success scale, the applicant must make a stronger threshold showing of likelihood of success to meet its burden." In the Matter of Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir. 1997). As a result, to satisfy the first factor, the movant must "demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success, not merely the possibility of success." Id.
Sunbelt's main argument suggesting it has a substantial likelihood of success is that the Court did not apply the Wright Line2 test correctly. (Docket #26 at 2-3). Sunbelt states that (Id. at 2). In particular, Sunbelt argues that the Court needed to find evidence of anti-union animus by Regional Vice President Jason Mayfield ("Mayfield"), who was the chief negotiator and decision maker for the reorganization, in order to apply Wright Line correctly. (Id. at 2-3).
However, Sunbelt's argument lacks merit because there is no rule that requires the Director to prove directly that the ultimate decision maker acted with anti-union animus. Instead, it is well-established that anti-union animus may be inferred from circumstantial or direct evidence. See Challenge Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 815 F. App'x 33, 40 (6th Cir. 2020); Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 939 F.3d 798, 815 (6th Cir. 2019); FiveCAP, Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 768, 778 (6th Cir. 2002); W.F. Bolin Co. v. NLRB, 70 F.3d 863, 871 (6th Cir. 1995); AutoNation, Inc. v. NLRB, 801 F.3d 767, 775 (7th Cir. 2015); Big Ridge, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 2015); Loparex, LLC v. NLRB, 591 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2009); NLRB v. Louis A. Weiss Mem'l Hosp., 172 F.3d 432, 442 (7th Cir. 1999). "'Circumstantial evidence inviting an inference of animus includes, among other examples, 'the company's expressed hostility towards unionization combined with knowledge of the employees' union activities' and 'proximity in time between the employees' union activities and their discharge.'" Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 939 F.3d at 815 (internal citations omitted). Additionally, "[i]n cases involving employers that are corporations [], one must look to the employer's agents (the managers and supervisors)—whose actions can be imputed to the employer—to find the motivations for their actions." Louis A. Weiss Mem'l Hosp., 172 F.3d at 442. Therefore, the Court applied the Wright Line test correctly to determine whether Director had shown anti-union animus wasa substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision to take adverse action against the employees.
Next, Sunbelt argues that Mayfield would have made the same decision, to reorganize the facility and terminate the employees, regardless of the alleged anti-union animus. (Docket #26 at 4-6). Sunbelt provides additional economic information to support its argument. (Id.) However, the Court remains unmoved. Sunbelt has the burden to provide a stronger showing that it has a likelihood of success because the Court already evaluated Sunbelt's argument. In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 115 F.3d at 1301. Sunbelt has not met that burden.
Additionally, Sunbelt argues that the Court "erred in relying on the ALJ's recommendation because it contains many errors, some of which the Court directly repeated in the Order." (Docket #26 at 6). When an ALJ has made a decision regarding the underlying administrative proceedings after presiding over the merits hearing, the court can draw upon the ALJ's factual and legal determinations as "a useful benchmark against which the Director's prospects of success may be weighed." Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 288 (7th Cir. 2001). The court will "give some measure of deference to the view of the ALJ" in determining the likelihood of success. Lineback v. Spurlino Materials, LLC, 546 F.3d 491, 502 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court did not adopt the ALJ's order, instead it relied upon some of the factual and legal determinations as a benchmark to determine the Director's likelihood of success. To be sure, none of the alleged errors that the Court cited in the administrative record have sufficient relevance to change the Court's ultimate opinion regarding the injunction and stay. Indeed, the alleged errors are insignificant and represent a minuscule amount of theinformation the Court used to make its decision regarding the § 10(j) injunction.
Lastly, Sunbelt argues that it has a strong likelihood of success because it filed fifty (50) exceptions to the ALJ's decision. (Docket #20 at 2). This Court is not the Board, who will make the ultimate decision on the merits. Bloedorn, 276 F.3d at 287. Instead, this Court relied upon the parties' submissions, administrative record, and ALJ recommendation to decide the probability that the Director will prevail on the merits before the Board. Thus, the exceptions Sunbelt has filed to the Board have no meaningful significance to the Court's decision.
In sum, because the Court already evaluated Sunbelt's likelihood of success in the § 10(j) injunction order, to obtain a stay, Sunbelt must make a stronger showing that it has a likelihood of success on appeal. Sunbelt has not provided sufficient support—factual or legal—that satisfies this heightened standard. Thus, Sunbelt fails to meet the first factor required to grant a stay pending appeal.
3.2 Sunbelt has not shown it will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay
The Court's original decision found that the Director would be irreparably harmed if a § 10(j) injunction was not granted. (Docket #18 at 11-14). To obtain a stay of that injunction, Sunbelt must provide a stronger showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not imposed. Sunbelt has argued that it will suffer economically by the injunction. This is the same argument Sunbelt made before the Court regarding the § 10(j) injunction. After reviewing Sunbelt's additional arguments and information, the Court finds that Sunbelt has not made a stronger showing.
Additionally, Sunbelt claims that the injunction order requires "face-to-face negotiation sessions," which pose irreparable health and safety concerns to the negotiating teams during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Docket #20 at 8; Docket #26 at 10). This representation is blatantly false. Nothing in the Court's Order requires face-to-face negotiations or in-person negotiations. (Docket #18 at 22-24). Obviously, both negotiating teams' health and safety are of utmost importance. The use of telephone conference calls and video conferencing should be more than sufficient for both parties to negotiate safely during the pandemic.
3.3 The Director will be substantially injured if a stay is granted
(Id. at 12). "[T]he discharge of active and open union supporters risks a serious adverse impact on employee interest in unionization and can create irreparable harm to the collective bargaining process." (Id. at 13) (quoting Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1363 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus, imposing a stay of the injunction would substantially injure the Director.
3.4 The public interest does not support a stay
Sunbelt makes several arguments that a stay is in the public interest....
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