Haefele v. Davis

Decision Date27 June 1951
PartiesHAEFELE et al. v. DAVIS et al.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Suit by Martin F. Haefele, and others, against Thomas Davis, and others, as officers of Union, for an injunction restraining defendants from interfering with seniority rights of plaintiffs and their employment. The Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, In Equity, No. 17, October term, 1949 President Judge Valentine, made an order dismissing the bill of complaint, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, No 148, January term, 1951, Per Curiam, held that to make additional finding on testimony admitted by Chancellor for historical purpose only and not as substantive evidence without first affording plaintiffs opportunity to offer contradictory evidence, was improper.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Bell and Jones, JJ., dissented.

Max Rosenn, Harold Rosenn and Rosenn & Rosenn, all of Wilkes-Barre, for appellants.

Nelson A. Bryan, Elliot Bredhoff and Frank P. Lenahan, all of Wilkes-Barre, Thomas E. Harris, Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before STERN, STEARNE, JONES, BELL, LADNER, and CHIDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case involves the seniority rights of the three plaintiffs appellants in this court. After preliminary objections were dismissed to the complaint which asked for an injunction against defendants restraining them from interfering with the seniority rights of the plaintiffs and their employment and asking for damages for previous interference, a hearing was held, findings of fact were made by the Chancellor, President Judge Valentine, and an order was made dismissing the bill of complaint.

All three of the plaintiffs have been employed by the Vulcan Iron Works for a number of years. All are machinists, and were members of the defendant Union. In February, 1945, plaintiff Martin F. Haefele, was upgraded to the position of foreman in this plant. In September, 1947, the other two plaintiffs were also upgraded to foremen. Because of a recession in business conditions all three plaintiffs were dismissed as foremen on June 15, 1949. They did not remain members of the Union when they became foremen. Due to the objections of the defendant Union none of the plaintiffs have been re-employed by the company as machinists and the Union by official action has denied them membership.

Plaintiffs' position is that by reason of seniority rights they were entitled to be employed as machinists when they were downgraded. In support of this position they contend that when they were upgraded to the position of foremen they did not lose their previously acquired seniority rights. They do not take the position that the time spent as foremen counted toward their seniority.

The collective bargaining agreement executed between the Company and the Union provides as to seniority rights as follows: ‘ Seniority shall cease upon (a) justifiable discharge (b) voluntary quitting (c) if the employee does not return to work within five days after written notice to address appearing on company's records. The Company shall notify the Union at the same time the employee is notified to return to work.’

The case turns on the proper construction of the ambiguous phrase ‘ voluntary quitting.’ In construing this phrase, a majority of the court regard as significant the finding of fact, which the court en banc added to those found by the chancellor, as follows: ‘ 20. During the negotiations for the collective bargaining agreements, the representatives of the Union proposed that a provision be inserted in the contract which would give a production worker, who was elevated to assistant or foreman, the right, in the event of a decrease in the personnel of the company, to resume his former employment as a production worker and retain his seniority status. This was not assented to by the management of the company and no such provision was inserted in any of the contracts.’

However, when the testimony on which this additional finding was based was introduced by defendants' witness, the plaintiffs-appellants moved to strike it out as violating the parol evidence rule. Whereupon the learned Chancellor in his ruling said, ‘ It is very clear, I think, that anything that occurred prior to the execution of that agreement doesn't amount to anything as far as substantive evidence is concerned. Everything is in writing and all the negotiations are merged in the contract and I will allow Mr. Cann's testimony to stand as purely historical to show what happened leading up to the contract.’

At the argument counsel for appellants stated, that misled by this ruling, he did not offer evidence to contradict or deny the testimony of defendants' witness on this point. That the court en...

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