Haffner v. Dir. of Revenue
| Decision Date | 19 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 107926,ED 107926 |
| Citation | 602 S.W.3d 268 |
| Parties | Jena Rae HAFFNER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
FOR APPELLANT: Eric William McDonnell, 301 W. High Street, Jefferson City, MO 65105.
For Respondent: William Jerome Ekiss, Bond Wilkison, 5770 Mexico Road, Suite A, St. Peters, MO 63376.
The Director of Revenue ("Appellant") appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County rescinding the suspension of Jena Rae Haffner's ("Respondent") driver's license. We reverse and remand.
This case began roughly at 2 a.m. on November 12, 2016. Respondent was driving home on Interstate 44 after meeting friends at a local restaurant. Evidence at trial later revealed that Respondent was driving with a blood alcohol content of .175%. Respondent struck another vehicle from behind, causing both drivers to lose control. Respondent's car hit an abandoned vehicle parked on the shoulder, flipped, landed on its roof, and slid across four lanes of traffic before coming to rest in the middle of the highway. Officer Velarde ("Officer Velarde") of the Webster Groves Police Department responded to the crash and, seeing Respondent was injured, requested paramedics.
Before the paramedics arrived, Officer Velarde began investigating the crash scene. He spoke with Respondent, who informed him that she was the driver of the overturned vehicle. While speaking with Respondent, Officer Velarde noticed that her breath smelled like alcohol, she had watery, blood-shot eyes, her speech was slurred, and she seemed confused and disoriented. Officer Velarde asked Respondent if she had been drinking. Respondent was slow to answer Officer Velarde's question, but eventually stated, "I had some drinks with my friends[.] (sic) what's that have to do with anything [?] (sic) [Y]ou need to worry about getting all of my clothes off the road." Officer Velarde asked Respondent to walk to the curb and sit down. As Respondent attempted to sit on the curb, she lost her balance and almost fell over. Eventually, Officer Velarde had to handcuff Respondent for her own safety, because she kept attempting to re-enter the highway to collect items that were thrown from her car in the wreck. Officer Velarde testified that at this time Respondent was in his custody, but not under arrest. Officer Velarde did not conduct any field sobriety tests because of Respondent's injuries. When the paramedics arrived Officer Velarde removed the handcuffs so they could treat Respondent. Another officer, Officer Wunderlich ("Officer Wunderlich") arrived on scene. When the ambulance left to take Respondent to the hospital, Officer Velarde stayed at the scene and asked Officer Wunderlich to follow Respondent to the hospital to obtain a blood sample.
When Officer Wunderlich made contact with Respondent at the hospital, she was in a hospital bed with her neck stabilized.
Officer Wunderlich read Respondent the Implied Consent Warning contained in the Missouri Department of Revenue Alcohol Influence Report ("Alcohol Influence Report"). This warning states, in pertinent part:
You are under arrest and I have reasonable grounds to believe you were driving a motor vehicle while you were in an intoxicated ... condition. To determine the alcohol ... content of your blood, I am requesting you submit to a chemical test of your ... blood[.] If you refuse to take the test, your driver license will immediately be revoked for one year. Evidence of your refusal to take the test may be used against you in prosecution in a court of law.... (emphasis added)
Officer Wunderlich then asked Respondent for a blood sample to test her blood alcohol content and informed her that if she refused, her license would be immediately revoked. Respondent consented to the blood draw. Officer Wunderlich again Mirandized Respondent, and she stated that she understood her rights. Respondent remained in the hospital room while Officer Wunderlich went to retrieve a blood sample kit, and she later signed a separate hospital form consenting to the blood draw. A blood sample was taken, and it revealed Respondent had a blood alcohol content of .175%.
Pursuant to Section 302.505, RSMo., Respondent's license was suspended. She filed a petition for trial de novo in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County. A commissioner initially upheld the suspension of Respondent's license. A rehearing was granted on Respondent's motion, and the trial court found Respondent was not physically restrained and never submitted to the authority of any officer at the time she consented to the blood draw, and therefore was never arrested. Thus, the trial court reasoned, "[Appellant] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [Respondent] had been arrested at the time she submitted to the blood alcohol test." Accordingly, the trial court rescinded the suspension of Respondent's driver's license. Appellant filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment on March 22, 2019, and the trial court heard argument on the motion on April 19. The trial court denied Appellant's motion on May 22, 2019. This appeal follows.
Appellant raises one point on appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in finding it failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was arrested at the time she submitted to the blood alcohol test. Appellant argues Respondent was arrested pursuant to Section 544.180 and Smither v. Director of Revenue, in that Respondent was injured in a serious crash, was told she was under arrest while hospitalized, agreed to provide a blood sample requested under Missouri's Implied Consent Law, and did not attempt to terminate the encounter with law enforcement. Thus, Appellant reasons Respondent was arrested by actual physical restraint, and by submission to Officer Wunderlich's authority.
We review the trial court's judgment in this case as we do any other court-tried civil case; the court's judgment will be affirmed unless "there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." Goforth v. Dir. of Revenue, 593 S.W.3d 124, 126-27 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting White v. Director of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307-08 (2010) ) "The evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment and all contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded." Smith v. Dir. of Revenue, 594 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). While we defer to the trial courts factual findings, however, the issue of whether the defendant was arrested under the facts found by the trial court is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. Mills v. Dir. of Revenue, 568 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) ; see Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 44 (Mo. banc 2012) ( that when presented with an issue of mixed questions of law and fact, the reviewing court defers to the factual findings made by the trial court so long as they are supported by competent substantial evidence, but will review de novo the application of the law to those facts).
Appellant's sole point on appeal alleges the trial court erred in finding Respondent was not under arrest at the time she consented to the blood draw. Appellant reasons that Respondent was arrested by actual physical restraint, and by submission to Officer Wunderlich's authority when he read her the Implied Consent Warning telling her she was under arrest, and she consented to the blood alcohol test. We agree.
Revocation and suspension of drivers’ licenses is governed by Section 302.505, which provides, "The department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle while [intoxicated]...." Section 302.505.1. For a suspect to be arrested, it is generally required that there be actual restraint of his or her person, or that he or she submit to the officer's custody. Section 544.180. Merely informing the suspect that he or she is under arrest is, generally, insufficient. Smither v. Dir. of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Mo. banc 2004). But in cases where there is an injured suspect already immobilized or incapacitated, courts have found further physical restraint is "impractical and unnecessary...." Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 164 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005) ; Smither, 136 S.W.3d at 799 (citing Saladino v. Dir. of Revenue, 88 S.W.3d 64, 68-69 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) ). An individual submits to an officer's custody or authority where "he is told that he is under arrest and assents to the directions of the arresting officer without attempting to leave the premises." Minor v. Dir. of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (quoting State v. Nicholson, 839 S.W.2d 593, 596-97 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992) ) (internal quotations omitted).
The trial court found that Officer Wunderlich "inadvertently" told Respondent she was under arrest but did not actually arrest her because he did nothing to physically restrain Respondent to effectuate the arrest. The trial court made this finding under the impression that Officer Wunderlich should have placed Respondent in handcuffs or otherwise restrained her freedom of movement by removing her from the hospital or taking her to jail. Such finding is a misapplication of the law.
In holding that Respondent was not arrested, the trial court relied on Callendar v. Director of Revenue. 44 S.W.3d 866 (Mo.App. W.D. 2001). However, this reliance was misplaced because Callendar is wholly inapplicable to this case. While there were some facts in Callendar that are similar to this case—that the defendant was in a car accident and the officer...
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