Hagaman v. Gillis

Decision Date15 July 1896
Citation68 N.W. 192,9 S.D. 61
PartiesE. S. HAGAMAN, Plaintiff and respondent, v. C. W. GILLIS, Defendant and appellant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Davison County, SD

Hon. D. Haney, Judge

Affirmed

H. C. Preston

Attorney for appellant.

A. E. Hitchcock

Attorney for respondent.

Opinion filed July 15, 1896

CORSON, P. J.

In 1889 one D. C. Gillis, the father of the defendant, was the owner of a tree claim in Davison county, in this state, and in that year had transactions with the plaintiff, resulting in the relinquishment of said tree claim, and placing the same in the hands of the plaintiff, but it was never filed in the land office. The plaintiff, who was a resident of the state of Michigan, before his return home, left this tree claim, with other property he had purchased, in charge of the defendant, the son of D. C. Gills, as agent. In 1893, about the time for proving up on said claim, the defendant procured one Brooks to file a contest against said tree claim, and thereupon notified the plaintiff of such contest, and informed him that it could be settled for $750, and advised the plaintiff to settle, as the claim, when proved up, could be sold for $1,500. The plaintiff acted upon this information and advice, and at once prevailed upon the father, D. C. Gillis, who was also a resident of the state of Michigan, to come to South Dakota and prove up his said tree claim, and returned to him the relinquishment which he had received, in order to enable said D. C. Gillis to make the required proof. The said D. C. Gillis, the father, came to Davison county, where his son resided. Brook’s contest was withdrawn, the required proof made, the proper duplicate receipt given, and the claim sold for $1,500. Of this sum, the father or son, or both, retained $750, as money they had paid to Brooks, the cow testant, to withdraw his contest, but who in fact, was paid only $25 for his services and expenses in filing the same. This action was instituted to recover the $750 so fraudulently withheld by the defendant and his father from the plaintiff. The action was tried to a jury, and verdict and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and from the judgment the defendant appeals.

The errors relied upon by the defendant for a reversal of the judgment are as follows:

(1) The court erred in admitting in evidence a copy of the receiver’s receipt issued to D. C. Gillis for the tree claim in controversy, and also erred in receiving in evidence a copy of the relinquishment by Delavan C. Gillis and wife to the tree claim in controversy, which was marked “Exs. Y and Z.”

(2) The evidence does not show that respondent became the owner of the land. The alleged contract of purchase was oral. Gillis was to make proof, and then give him a deed. This could not be performed within a year. The agreement was for a sale of real estate, and not valid, because of no note or memorandum in writing subscribed by the, party to be charged.

(3) The evidence does not show that respondent relied upon any representations made, or was fraudulently induced by appellant or his father to take $750 in the settlement claimed to have been paid Brooks.

On the trial the plaintiff sought to prove the contents of the relinquishment by copies. The foundation for this secondary evidence was laid as follows: (1) It was shown that the plaintiff had possession of the original papers. (2) That in the state of Michigan, plaintiff delivered the original papers to D. C. Gillis. (3) Since that time he had not seen them, and did not know where they were. (4) That he did not know the postoffice address of said D. C. Gillis, or his residence or whereabouts, and could not obtain his deposition. (5) That at the time of the trial said D. C. Gillis was in the state of Washington, and out of the jurisdiction of the court. The plaintiff also proved that he had served notice upon the defendant to produce the original relinquishment in court at the trial of said cause, and that said D. C. Gillis was out of the state. These copies, when offered in evidence, were objected to upon the grounds that the evidence was incompetent, no sufficient foundation laid for it, that it was not evidence of purchase, etc. The objections were overruled, and exceptions duly taken.

The only contention of appellant, in this court, is that there is no evidence that the notice was served in time to enable the defendant to produce the original, and that there is no evidence that the defendant failed to produce the original on the trial, It does not affirmatively appear by the record when the notice was served, and hence this court cannot say the trial court erred in its decision. In the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below erred in its rulings, it will be presumed that its rulings were correct. The party alleging error in this court must be able to establish affirmatively the existence of such error by the record. Kent v. Dakota F. & M. Ins. Co.,(1891). But, upon principle and authority, we think the ruling of the court was correct. It was shown that the last person in possession of the original relinquishment was D. C. Gillis, and he was shown at the time of the trial to be living in the state of Washington. There was no presumption that this document was in the possession of the defendant, and hence no notice to him to produce it was necessary. The rule in such cases is thus stated by the supreme court of the United States in Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125: “It is well settled that, if books or papers necessary as evidence in a court in one state be in possession of a person living in another state, secondary evidence, without further showing, may be given to prove the contents of such papers, and notice to produce them is unnecessary.” Shepard v. Giddings, 22 Conn. 282; Eaton v, Campbell, 7 Pick. 10; Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475; 1 Greenl. Ev. note a, § 561. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff, in ...

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