Hagan v. Quinn
| Decision Date | 23 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | 13–3357 |
| Citation | 84 F.Supp.3d 826 |
| Parties | Kathleen A. Hagan, Joseph V. Prieto, Richard A. Peterson, and Gilberto Galicia, Plaintiffs, v. Patrick J. Quinn, Jerome Stermer, and Velisha Haddox, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
John A. Baker, Baker Baker & Krajewski LLC, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Terence J. Corrigan, Illinois Attorney General, Springfield, IL, for Defendants.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint filed by Defendants Patrick J. Quinn, Jerome Stermer, and Velisha Haddox. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' federal claim. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs' lawsuit to protect their jobs was not constitutionally protected speech. In any event, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages. Further, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claim.
Plaintiffs Kathleen Hagan, Joseph Prieto, Richard Peterson, and Gilberto Galicia are former arbitrators of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission. According to Plaintiffs, many Illinois media outlets published articles in 2011 suggesting there were problems with the Illinois workers' compensation system, and the media coverage generated significant public interest on the subject that eventually prompted action at the Illinois General Assembly. (Compl.¶¶ 11–12.) In addition, various individuals and interest groups directly contacted members of the General Assembly and the Governor to voice concerns about the workers' compensation system, ultimately leading to the enactment of Public Act 97–18. (Compl.¶ 14.)
On June 28, 2011, Governor Quinn signed Public Act 97–18 into law. The Act provided several changes to the workers' compensation system, including a provision requiring the terms of employment of all arbitrators to terminate on July 1, 2011. (Compl.¶¶ 17, 23.) The Act further provided that all arbitrators shall be appointed initially by the Governor.1 (Compl. ¶ 22; see also 820 ILCS 305/14.)
At the time the Act was signed, Plaintiffs were all employed as arbitrators for the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission. (Compl.¶¶ 7–10.) On July 12, 2011, Plaintiffs, along with Peter Akemann, filed a three-count Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Workers' Compensation Commission. (Compl. ¶ 20; see also Hagan v. Quinn, No. 11–CV–3213, 2014 WL 3052631 (C.D.Ill. July 7, 2014) ().
Plaintiffs' underlying complaint comprised three claims. In Count I, Plaintiffs alleged that the termination of their employment as provided under Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest in their jobs without due process of law. Hagan, No. 11–CV–3213, 2014 WL 3052631, at *1. Count I sought compensatory damages and an injunction “prohibiting Defendants from removing Plaintiffs from their office or from appointing any other person to that office, or from taking any other action in retaliation for the Plaintiffs's protection of their civil rights in this cause.” (Underlying Complaint, p. 7.) Count II sought the same relief, alleging that Plaintiffs lost their liberty interests in their reputations and good names without due process of law due to the contents of a press release issued by Governor Quinn the day he signed Public Act 9718 into law. Id. at pp. 7–9. In Count III, Plaintiffs asked the Court to declare Public Act 97–18 unconstitutional as to them because the Act denied them their property interest without due process of law. Id. at p. 10.
Plaintiffs' underlying lawsuit was originally assigned to this Court. This Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that Plaintiffs had little likelihood of success, given that the legislative process was all the process to which they were due before the terms and conditions of their jobs were changed by legislation. (Underlying lawsuit, 7/29/2011 Order.) However, this Court did allow the underlying lawsuit to survive a motion to dismiss for further development of the record. (Underlying lawsuit, 1/19/12 Order.) After reassignment to United States District Judge Colin S. Bruce, Plaintiffs' underlying lawsuit was dismissed on summary judgment, Judge Bruce concluding that the legislative process was all the process due Plaintiffs. Hagan, No. 11–CV–3213, 2014 WL 3052631. By that time, Plaintiffs had conceded the dismissal of their liberty interest claim (Count II). The underlying lawsuit is now on appeal and has been consolidated with another appeal from the Southern District which reached the same conclusion as Judge Bruce. Dibble v. Quinn and Akemann v. Quinn, Appellate Cases 14–2328 and 14–2746 (7th Circuit).2
As provided by Public Act 97–18, Plaintiffs continued to work as incumbent arbitrators, despite the legislative termination of their terms of employment, until Governor Quinn decided against reappointing them on October 14, 2011. (Compl.¶¶ 23, 24.) Plaintiffs allege that Governor Quinn made this decision in conjunction with Defendant Stermer, Governor Quinn's Chief of Staff, and Defendant Haddox, an advisor to Governor Quinn. (Compl. ¶¶ 25; see also Compl. ¶¶ 5–6.) According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he sole reason that Governor Quinn, Stermer, and Haddox [decided] to terminate the employment of the Former Arbitrators was because of the lawsuit that they brought on July 12, 2011.” (Compl.¶ 27.)
On October 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed this two-count Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated their First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for filing the underlying lawsuit. Count II is a supplemental state law claim for violations of the whistleblower protections in the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act. 5 ILCS 430/15–5 et seq.
This Court has jurisdiction over the claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count I. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claim in Count II because the claim stems from the same transaction or series of transactions as Count I. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper in this Court because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims took place in the Central District of Illinois. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008). A complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint that does not allow the court to “infer more than the possibility of misconduct” is not entitled to relief. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) provides that “[a] copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Accordingly, the settled law of the Seventh Circuit is that courts evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings at the stage of a motion to dismiss must consider not only the complaint itself, but also “documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n. 1 (7th Cir.2012).
To make out a prima facie case for First Amendment retaliation, a public employee must plausibly allege that “(1) [their] speech was constitutionally protected, (2) [they] have suffered a deprivation likely to deter speech in the future, and (3) [their] speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's action.”
Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2006) (other citations omitted). At issue here is whether the underlying lawsuit was constitutionally protected speech.
Generally, a public employee's lawsuit is protected speech if the employee is speaking “as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2501, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011) (); Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 896–97 (7th Cir.1994) (). If Plaintiffs' underlying lawsuit did not involve a matter of public concern, then the analysis stops. There can be no First Amendment violation without protected speech. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs were acting as citizens and not pursuant to their official arbitrator duties when they filed the underlying lawsuit. Cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951 () The question, then, is whether the underlying lawsuit was a matter...
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Hagan v. Quinn
...that, as a "matter of law, Plaintiffs' lawsuit to protect their jobs was not constitutionally protected speech." Hagan v. Quinn , 84 F.Supp.3d 826, 827 (C.D. Ill. 2015). Applying the Connick – Pickering framework for assessing First Amendment claims by government employees, the district cou......
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McBride v. Mclean Cnty.
...officials is limited to lawsuits in which the official "is speaking ‘as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’ " Hagan v. Quinn , 84 F.Supp.3d 826, 830 (C.D.Ill. 2015). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) she suffe......
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Hoffman v. Dewitt Cnty.
...officials is limited to lawsuits in which the official “is speaking ‘as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’ ” Hagan v. Quinn , 84 F.Supp.3d 826, 830 (C.D.Ill.2015) (quoting Guarnieri , 131 S.Ct. at 2501 ).Defendants do not argue that Hoffman was not speaking as a citizen when he filed......
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Hagan v. Quinn
...that, as a "matter of law, Plaintiffs' lawsuit to protect their jobs was not constitutionally protected speech." Hagan v. Quinn, 84 F. Supp. 3d 826, 827 (C.D. Ill. 2015). Applying the Connick-Pickering framework for assessing First Amendment claims by government employees, the district cour......