Hagan v. State
| Decision Date | 31 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9503-CR-134,49A02-9503-CR-134 |
| Parties | Clayton HAGAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appellant-defendant Clayton Hagan appeals his convictions for two counts of Burglary, 1 both Class B felonies, and two counts of Theft, 2 both Class D felonies. Hagan presents two issues for review, which we combine and restate as: whether the Marion County Superior Court--Juvenile Division's waiver of jurisdiction is supported by the evidence.
On June 26, 1993, Hagan and John Guerin decided to break into two homes. In order to gain entry into the homes, they kicked open the doors and cut the screens. Thereafter, both Hagan and Guerin removed property from the homes.
On June 28, 1993, the State questioned Hagan regarding the crimes. After consulting with his parents, Hagan signed a waiver of his rights and confessed to the crimes. Further, Hagan agreed to return the stolen property. Thereafter, the State filed a delinquency petition against Hagan alleging that he had committed acts, which, had they been committed by an adult, would have constituted two counts of burglary, both Class B felonies, and two counts of theft, both Class D felonies. Hagan was subsequently placed on home detention pending the disposition of the proceedings.
On August 12, 1993, the State filed a motion requesting the trial court to waive juvenile jurisdiction pursuant to IND.CODE § 31-6-2-4(e). The court conducted a hearing on the State's motion on November 17 and December 14, 1993, during which the State presented evidence that Hagan was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses, that probable cause existed that he committed the charged acts, and that the charged acts would constitute a felony if they were committed by an adult. In response, Hagan presented several witnesses, including school teachers and coaches, a psychologist, and Hagan's parents, who all testified that it was in the best interests of Hagan and the community that jurisdiction remain with the juvenile court. Several of the witnesses further testified regarding the progress Hagan had made since being placed on home detention including the increase in his grade point average from a 2.5 to a 3.6, his compliance with the requirements of home detention, and his progress in individual and family counseling. The State presented no rebuttal evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.
Thereafter, on December 20, 1993, the court granted the State's motion to waive jurisdiction, finding that the State had proved that Hagan was sixteen years of age or older, the charged crimes would be Class B felonies if committed by an adult, and there was probable cause to believe Hagan committed the charged crimes. In addition, the court stated:
The Court heard sufficient testimony regarding Clayton's position that he should remain in the Juvenile Justice System, but there is nothing at this point that the Juvenile Justice System can do to assist this young man in his rehabilitative efforts and considering the nature of the charges that the State has pointed out in its portion of the case the Court will grant the State's Motion to Waive Juvenile Court Jurisdiction.
Record at 136. After jurisdiction was waived, Hagan was tried and convicted of two counts of burglary, as Class B felonies, and two counts of theft, as Class D felonies. On November 18, 1994, Hagan was sentenced to six years imprisonment for each burglary conviction and one and one-half years for each theft conviction, all of which were to run concurrently and all of which were suspended.
This case presents us with a question regarding the legislature's revision of the juvenile court system. Specifically, we must consider the extent of a juvenile judge's discretion to waive a juvenile into adult court and the extent to which this court may review such a waiver.
The waiver statute, I.C. § 31-6-2-4(e), provides:
... [T]he court shall upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hearing, waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) the child is charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be:
(A) a Class A or Class B felony, ...
(2) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the act; and
(3) the child was sixteen (16) years of age or older when the act charged was allegedly committed;
unless it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system. 4
According to the State, because I.C. § 31-6-2-4(e) provides that the court "shall" waive jurisdiction, the statute should be interpreted to require that once the first three elements of the statute are met, the juvenile court is required to waive jurisdiction, and, should the court decide not to grant waiver, it is purely a matter of grace. With this interpretation of the statute, our review would be limited to a determination of whether the first three factors were met and we would be prohibited from reviewing whether it was in the juvenile and the community's best interests to remain in the juvenile system.
On the other hand, Soward v. State, 606 N.E.2d 885, 886 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), provides that once the first three factors of I.C. § 31-6-2-4(e) are proven, a presumption is created in favor of waiver. It is then within the discretion of the juvenile court to retain the child in the juvenile system or to waive juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. Soward goes on to provide that on review, a court's exercise of discretion will be reversed if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts of the case. Id. According to this language, we would have the right to review the juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction beyond the three factors set forth in the statute.
We agree with Soward that a juvenile judge's decision to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile accused of committing a crime should not be beyond the review of this court. To accept the State's position, that waiver is mandatory and not subject to review once the first three factors of the waiver statute are met, would render meaningless the final portion of the statute, which provides that the juvenile shall be waived "unless it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system." I.C. § 31-6-2-4(e). We believe that by retaining such language in the statute, the legislature intended the best interests of the child and the safety and welfare of the community to be a consideration, although not an element, of the juvenile court when deciding whether to waive jurisdiction. Thus, we shall review the juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction to determine whether the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts of the case.
Initially, we note that we do not...
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