Hagedorn v. Rockafellow

• Decision Date: 31 December 1920
• Docket Number: No. 33519.,33519.
• Citation: 190 Iowa 553,180 N.W. 688
• Parties: HAGEDORN v. ROCKAFELLOW, Judge, et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

190 Iowa 553

180 N.W. 688

HAGEDORN

v.ROCKAFELLOW, Judge, et al.

No. 33519.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 31, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Shelby County; J. B. Rockafellow, Judge.

The plaintiff, having been convicted of contempt of court in violating a writ of injunction, brought this action in certiorari to review the proceedings. Affirmed.Douglas Rogers, of Manning, for petitioner.

Thos. H. Smith and Ernest M. Miller, both of Harlan, for defendants.

LADD, J.

[1] Daniel Torpy owned the S. E. 1/4, N. E. 1/4, of section 13, in township 81, north of range 37, in Shelby county, and, learning that Charles Hagedorn was about to move thereon, sued out a writ of injunction, reading:

“You are hereby temporarily strictly enjoined and restrained from entering upon or taking possession of said premises, or any part thereof, or of any of the improvements thereon, or from in any way interfering with this plaintiff in the possession and enjoyment of said premises and the improvements, either by himself or agent or any lessee of said premises, until the further order of our said court in the premises.”

[2] This writ, together with the original notice of the beginning of this action, was served on him January 19, 1920. Though the land was not described in the writ, it was described in the original notice, and the evidence indicates that Hagedorn was fully aware of the premises intended, and that the writ of injunction had reference thereto. See Coffey v. Gamble, 117 Iowa. 545, 91 N. W. 813;Carr v. District Court, 147 Iowa, 663, 126 N. W. 791, Ann. Cas. 1913D. 378. When served, he had reached the house with team and family, but whether his furniture had been set up in the house was in controversy. According to the weight of the evidence, his stoves and other furniture had been placed. He had not occupied any other portion of the premises, however, and admitted subsequently to having purchased a cow and brought her on the premises, and it was fully proven that when the wife of Henry Torpy. in substance, requested him to yield possession entirely, and afterwards in part, to Henry Torpy, to whom Daniel had leased the premises, he refused, and informed her no one could have possession until he was directed by his brother to yield the same. In taking the cow on the farm, and occupying the same otherwise than when served with the writ, he was violating the injunction. It will be observed that the restraining order was “from entering upon or taking possession of said premises, or any part thereof, or of any of the improvements thereon.” This was without reference to who might be in possession thereof, and that was of no concern to Hagedorn. His duty was to obey, and in extending his possession from the house to the entire premises, and also in taking the cow upon the same, he was violating the writ. Moreover, in excluding the lessee of Daniel Torpy from the premises, he was interfering with the plaintiff in the enjoyment of the premises, other than the house, and therein was acting in violation of the writ.

[3] II. The contempt proceedings were prosecuted in the name of the state. Though this might have been done under the title of the case in which the writ of injunction was issued (Manderscheid v. District Court of Plymouth County, 69 Iowa, 240, 28 N. W. 551), and being incidental thereto, that course has our approval, and there can be no objection to separately docketing and prosecuting in the name of the state (Fisher v. Cass County District Court, 75 Iowa, 232, 39 N. W. 283;Geyer v. Douglass, 85 Iowa, 93, 52 N. W. 111;State v. Stevenson, 104 Iowa, 52, 73 N. W. 360). The rule permitting the prosecution for contempt in the name of the state rests on the sovereign's interest in enforcing obedience to civil authority, and is not limited to any particular class, as liquor nuisance contempts.

[4] III. In response to the information accusing Hagedorn of contempt of court, he filed an answer, which, among other things, he pleaded to the merits in the main action. This portion of the answer was rightly stricken on motion. The issue was not whether the writ had been regularly or rightly issued, but whether Hagedorn had violated it. First Cong. Church v. City...