Hagen v. Snow

• Decision Date: 04 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. 36403,36403
• Parties: Inga HAGEN et al., Appellants, v. Harold J. SNOW, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 100

69 N.W.2d 100

244 Minn. 101

Inga HAGEN et al., Appellants, v. Harold J. SNOW, Respondent.

No. 36403.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 4, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court

In construing a charge as a whole, its adequacy in correctly setting forth controlling principles of law is to be measured by the meaning it reasonably conveys to the jurors who hear it only once and have no opportunity to examine it in written form. Even though a jury charge may be close inspection be found to be technically correct in its entirety, a new trial should be granted if its impact upon the jury is likely to convey, and reasonably does convey, an erroneous understanding of controlling principles of law. Held, that it was prejudicial error not to have given the substance of plaintiffs' requested instruction under the circumstances presented.

Hvass, Weisman, Peterson, King & Schwappach, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, O. C. Adamson II and David W. Nord, Minneapolis, for respondent.

CHRISTIANSON, Justice.

Separate actions are brought by plaintiffs to recover for personal injuries sustained when they were struck by an automobile driven by defendant. The cases were consolidated for trial and the jury returned a verdict for defendant in both cases. Plaintiffs appeal from the orders of the trial court denying their motion for a new trial.

At about 7:50 p.m. on the evening of January 31, 1952, plaintiffs, Henry and Inga Hagen, husband and wife, 70 and 72 years of age, respectively, were crossing Eleventh avenue south from east to west on the south side of Seventh street south in the city of Minneapolis when they were struck by defendant's car which was proceeding south on Eleventh avenue south.

For purposes of this opinion, Eleventh avenue south, which is 42 feet wide, shall be considered as running north and south, and Seventh street south, which is 40 feet wide, as running east and west. They intersect each other at approximately right angles. Just prior to the accident plaintiffs had got out of an automobile at the southeast corner of the intersection. Before starting to cross Eleventh avenue south, plaintiff Henry Hagen looked to the north and saw the lights of a vehicle approximately one block away. As he had his wife were walking across the intersection he looked to the north again and 'saw the light kind of slowing down.' Plaintiffs had proceeded across Eleventh avenue south for a distance of approximately 34 feet when their forward progress was impeded by a puddle of water at least six inches deep and approximately 16 feet wide at the southwest corner of the intersection. When they reached the puddle, they angled off to the south so as to get around it and were walking in a southwesterly direction. They had taken four or five steps when they were struck by defendant's automobile coming from the north.

Defendant testified that he was driving his car in a southerly direction on Eleventh avenue south approximately nine to ten feet from the westerly curb at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour and that as he entered the intersection he slowed down to 18 to 20 miles per hour. However, one of plaintiffs' witnesses testified that defendant was traveling about 25 miles per hour. Defendant further stated that as he approached the intersection with Seventh street, he saw the lights of some traffic approaching him on Eleventh avenue about halfway down the block ahead of him; that he also observed a group of pedestrians on the southeast corner of the intersection apparently waiting to cross Eleventh avenue; that when he was about 15 feet north of the southerly crosswalk traversing Eleventh avenue, he saw the plaintiffs dressed in dark clothing, who were then about 20 to 25 feet away and approximately 14 feet south of the intersection walking in a slightly southwesterly direction; and that upon seeing plaintiffs he immediately put on his brakes but was unable to stop in time to avoid colliding with them. There was testimony, however, by other witnesses to the effect that plaintiffs were approximately five feet south of the southerly crosswalk and eight feet from the westerly curb line of Eleventh avenue south when they were struck and that defendant stated after the accident that he had first seen plaintiffs when he was ten feet from them.

The intersection in question was described as poorly illuminated with only one street light catercorner from the scene of the accident. The streets were wet in spots with occasional areas of ice under the water and somewhat slippery. Defendant's windshield had previously been spattered with mud which affected his visibility.

The only error assigned on appeal pertains to the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' requested instruction reading as follows:

'If you find that the pedestrian crosswalk in the area immediately east of the southwest corner of the intersection of Seventh Street and Eleventh Avenue South was obstructed by a puddle of water, the plaintiffs, and each of them, were justified in diverting their course to avoid this obstruction if reasonably prudent persons would have so conducted themselves in a similar situation and under similar circumstances.'

The record discloses that plaintiffs' counsel requested the foregoing instruction both before the arguments to the jury and at the conclusion of the charge and that an exception was noted before the jury retired. The refusal to give such an instruction was assigned as error in plaintiffs' motions for a new trial.

After instructing the jury in general terms as to negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause, the trial court stated in its charge:

'It is the law if a statute has been violated, that violation itself is prima facie evidence of negligent conduct and that means just what it says, unless such conduct is explained or shown to have had no bearing by all the facts and circumstances established by the evidence in this case.'

Thereafter the court read to the jury the pertinent provisions of the speed statute, M.S.A. § 169.14, subds. 1 and 3, the pertinent provisions of the right-of-way statute, § 169.21, subds. 2, 3, and 5, the definition of 'sidewalk', § 169.01, subd. 33, the definition of 'crosswalk', § 169.01, subd. 37, and the clear-windshield statute, § 169.71. It then concluded its instructions on these points as follows:

'These are the only statutes I will call your attention to and they were called to your attention so you will be familiar with them and can determine whether from the evidence there was any violation of them. You must see that no one is attempting, by calling your attention to them, to indicate that they were violated. In addition to these statutes which are simply rules...