Hagen v. Williams
| Decision Date | 04 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 6:14-cv-00165-MC |
| Parties | TIFFANY HAGEN, as Personal Representative for the ESTATE OF MICHAEL CLARENCE HAGEN, Plaintiff, v. MAX WILLIAMS, individually; MITCH MORROW, individually; MARK NOOTH, individually; JUDY GILMORE, individually; JAMES EASTWOOD, individually; RANDY GILBERTSON, individually, JOSE DELGADO, individually; JOHN GILLUM, individually; DONALD HARRIS, individually; JOHN DOE 1-10, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Michael Hagen was an inmate at the Snake River Correctional Institute (SRCI).1 Between October 2011 and January 2012, Hagen repeatedly notified Department of Corrections (DOC) officers and staff that he was being targeted by a white supremacist gang of which fellowinmate Terry Lapich was a member. DOC officials acknowledged the threat to Hagen and approved a transfer to another prison. Instead of being transferred directly from a segregated unit to a new prison, DOC officers transferred Hagen to Lapich's cell. Less than two hours later, on February 2, 2012, Hagen had been so severely beaten that despite being airlifted to a hospital, he died the next day.
I am asked to consider first whether Plaintiff's allegations support a claim of supervisory liability, and second whether some of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts connecting the supervisors to Hagen's death, the claims against the supervisors are dismissed. Because the amended complaint's claims against the individual DOC officers at SRCI do not relate back to the original claims, those claims are untimely. Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.2
Plaintiff Tiffany Hagen is the duly appointed personal representative of Michael Hagen's estate and also Michael Hagen's widow. Plaintiff filed the original complaint on January 30, 2014, against supervisor Defendants Max Williams, Mitch Morrow, MarkNooth, Judy Gilmore, and 10 John Doe DOC employees. On May 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Defendants James Eastwood, Randy Gilbertson, Jose Delgado, John Gillum, and Donald Harris. The added Defendants are officers and staff at SRCI.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the Defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than "the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 678.
While considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burget v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the complaint is dismissed, leave to amend should be granted unless the court "determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995).
Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff's claims against the supervisor Defendants fail to state a claim for relief and (2) the claims against the newly added Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Williams, Morrow, Nooth, and Gilmore, in their respective supervisory roles at the DOC and SRCI "acted with deliberate indifference to the known and recognized constitutional and legal right of Hagen to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." Pl.'sFirst Am. Compl.13, ECF No. 19 (FAC). Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege any direct, personal involvement of the supervisor Defendants in the alleged violations of Hagen's constitutional rights.
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A supervisor may be culpable if he or she is personally involved in theconstitutional deprivation or if there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional violation. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). "The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury." Id. at 1207-08. This includes a supervisor's culpable action or inaction in training, supervising or controlling his subordinates. Id.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Starr is illustrative because it also involved Eighth Amendment claims against a supervisor for injuries suffered by an inmate. In Starr, deputies opened a locked gate allowing inmates to attack Starr. Id. at 1204. The deputies ignored Starr's pleas for help and, after the other inmates stopped attacking him, several deputies began kicking and yelling at Starr as other deputies looked on. Id. Starr sued Sheriff Baca, the offsite supervisor, and the deputies involved in the attack. Id.
The court held that Starr's complaint successfully stated a claim against Sheriff Baca, because the factual allegations went beyond stating the bare elements of a deliberate indifference claim. Id. at 1216. The Starr complaint specifically detailed numerous incidents in which inmates were injured or killed and specifically alleged Sheriff Baca received notice of each incident. Id. The complaint also alleged that Sheriff Baca received several reports of the systematic problems in the county jails under his supervision that resulted in inmate injuries and deaths. Id. Specifically, when Sheriff Baca was a supervisor in 1997, he received a Department of Justice (DOJ) report detailing constitutional violations including abuse of inmates by sheriff's deputies. Id. at 1209. As Sheriff, Baca received weekly reports detailing jail deaths and injuries. Id. In 1999, Sheriff Baca signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under threat oflawsuit requiring him to address constitutional violations of inmates. Id. In 2006, the DOJ issued another report finding continuing noncompliance with the MOU. Id. Seven inmates were killed between 2002 and 2005 and five of those deaths occurred within a six-month period. Id. at 120911. After all but one of these deaths, Sheriff Baca was notified of his deputies' violations for failing to provide reasonable security, lax discipline, and failure to supervise. Id. Sheriff Baca personally signed off on a civil settlement and was aware of another settlement, both involving severe inmate beatings. Id. at 1209- 10. In addition, the Sherriff Department's Special Counsel notified the Sherriff that his deputies' conduct was costing the county millions of dollars in civil judgments and settlements. Id. at 1211. In total, Special Counsel notified Sheriff Baca of 29 cases involving police misconduct that settled for $ 100,000 or more, only eight of which resulted in disciplinary actions or policy changes. Id. In 2005, Special Counsel also reported to Sheriff Baca that the largest LA County jail "is so outdated, understaffed and riddled with security flaws that it jeopardizes the lives of guards and inmates." Id.
The court held that the complaint's numerous allegations were sufficiently detailed and "plausibly suggest that Sheriff Baca acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and was thereby deliberately indifferent to the danger posed to Starr." Id. Even with these detailed allegations, Judge Trott dissented, finding that Starr did not state a causal connection between the Sherriff s individual actions and Starr's assault. Id. at 1217-22 It is clear that there is a high bar for what is considered a sufficient claim for supervisory liability under sectionl983.
Turning to the allegations in this case, Plaintiff has not met that bar. She has not alleged a sufficient causal connection between Defendants Williams, Morrow, Nooth, and Gilmore's acts or failures to act and Hagen's death.
Defendant Williams was the Director of the Oregon DOC until December 21, 2011. FAC 2. Defendant Morrow was the interim Director from January 2012 to February 2012. FAC 3. The Director manages all Oregon State prisons, including SRCI and has a duty to protect all inmates from violence. FAC 2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Williams and Morrow, as Directors, "knew or should have known that the policies and procedures in place at DOC and SRCI failed to provide sufficient protection to inmates," and they "knew or should have known that their subordinates acted with deliberate indifference to inmates' constitutional right to be free from violence." FAC 12.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts with sufficient detail to infer that Williams and Morrow plausibly were aware of the unconstitutional conduct of DOC personnel and were deliberately indifferent to the safety of Hagen. Plaintiff instead relies on the bare assertion that Williams and Morrow would have been aware of "an ongoing problem of inmate violence throughout the DOC and, specifically . . . the murder of an inmate at SRCI by an inmate with whom he had a known conflict." Resp. 12 (citing FAC, ¶¶ 18, 42, 43).
The fact that an inmate was killed in a prison setting prior to Hagen's murder, without more, does not provide the type of notice outlined in Starr. And while a homicide in a prison can never be tolerated by prison officials, there is nothing in this record to indicate any similarity or pattern between the prior...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Monpas v. Multnomah Cnty.
...to name John Doe Defendants[,]” the case is automatically one of misidentification because it requires “a change in parties.” Hagen, 2014 WL 6893708, at *7. See also Fudge, 2021 WL 1414279, at *4 (“The ‘misidentification' reasoning of Hagen applies here because [the plaintiff] seeks to chan......
-
McKenzie v. Portland Police Div.
...defendant should have understood that he or she was the person intended to be sued.” Finicum, 2021 WL 3502462, at *8; see also Hagen, 2014 WL 6893708, at *7 (holding where a plaintiff “intentionally [chooses] to name John [or Jane] Doe Defendants[,]” the case automatically is one of misiden......