Hagerty v. Mann

• Decision Date: 29 June 1881
• Citation: 56 Md. 522
• Parties: ANN HAGERTY v. ARTHUR H. MANN, and others.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

56 Md. 522

ANN HAGERTY v. ARTHUR H. MANN, and others.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 29, 1881

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., ALVEY, ROBINSON RITCHIE and MAGRUDER, J.

Frederick J. Brown, for the appellant.

Wm. Pinkney Whyte, for the appellees.

MAGRUDER J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from the decree dismissing the appellant's bill.

The bill sets out the death of Edward Hagerty, of Baltimore City intestate, in September, 1865; that his widow Eleanor M. Hagerty, became his administratrix, duly giving bond as such, with John Mann and John A. Flaherty, as her sureties; that from sales of property and cash in hand, she had in hand the sum of $2252, which it was her duty to distribute, but which she has failed to do; that the complainant, and one only brother, William Hagerty, both living in Ireland, are the only next of kin, and the complainant is entitled to one-fourth of the amount for distribution, of which she has received no part, although she has demanded payment of the administratrix, who is no longer a resident of Maryland; that John Mann, one of the sureties, is dead, and his executor has closed his estate and passed a final account and made distribution; that the appellant has accordingly brought suit on the administration bond against John A. Flaherty, the other surety, and obtained judgment for $889.56 and costs, upon which a fieri facias has been issued and returned nulla bona; and that having thus exhausted her remedy at law, she files this bill against the distributees of John Mann, to compel them to pay her claim as set forth.

The defences made and relied on in this Court, (the others made below being manifestly untenable,) are laches and lapse of time, and settlement, and upon these grounds taken together, the learned Judge below bases his decree dismissing the bill. These are the grounds as taken in his opinion:

"The remaining two grounds of defence, to wit: laches and settlement, or probable settlement, which should be considered together, constitute in my view a valid defence to the claim; if we reject the evidence of an alleged settlement of the claim, as the counsel for the complainant contends should be done, then we find a lapse of more than twelve years between the creation of the claim, and its assertion in this suit, during which time the complainant has allowed the estate of the surety to pass into the hands of strangers to the transaction, who are ignorant of its details, and can only imperfectly defend themselves. If, on the other hand, we give any weight to that evidence, there is the strongest ground to believe, if there be not absolute proof, that the claim was adjusted and settled between the attorneys of the complainant and the administratrix respectively. The authorities abundantly show that such a lapse of time, without reasonable and sufficient excuse, which permits the relations of parties and of property to be changed without objection, will bar a recovery; and they also show, that the same consequence will follow such neglect of prosecution, as tends to destroy or impair by forgetfulness and loss of proof, a defence which might have been made to a fresher and more promptly urged claim. Here, all these results are apparent, and as a consequence, the bill should be dismissed."

We cannot perceive why these two defences should be thus coupled together, as if the one could be made to eke out the deficiencies of the other. If laches properly applies, it is a good and conclusive defence, and cannot require the help of an imperfectly proved defence of settlement; but if it does not apply, the other imperfect defence cannot help it; and neither's weakness is helped by the other. If the complainant has sued in good time, then the rules of evidence are not to be relaxed in favor of a defence defectively made. And if there is no satisfactory proof of settlement, then there is no reason that the complainant should be held to suffer for not having sued sooner than by law and practice, she would ordinarily be required to do.

Taking each defence separately, therefore, let us see if either is fatal to the complainant's right of recovery.

At law, the complainant would have still had the clear right to sue. For allowing the thirteen months for the settlement of the estate, twelve years had not elapsed from time of default made, and the administration bond was still liable to be sued. Ordinarily, a party has the same time in equity as at law in which to bring suit. There may be circumstances of peculiar hardship, where a party stands by and allows other rights and interests to attach to the subject-matter, in which a Court of equity will impute laches, even where the statutory period of limitations does not apply, as was said by Chief Justice TANEY, in McKnight vs. Taylor, 1 How., 161: "That it is not merely in analogy to the Statute of Limitations, that a Court of equity refuses to lend its aid to stale demands; there must be conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of this Court. When these are wanting, the Court is passive and does nothing; laches and neglect are always discountenanced;" and as enforced in Nelson vs. Hagerstown Bank, 27 Md., 74, and the authorities there cited.

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