Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal

• Decision Date: 07 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 13-00-275-CV.,13-00-275-CV.
• Citation: Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal, 100 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App. 2002)
• Parties: HAGGAR APPAREL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Maria O. LEAL, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

100 S.W.3d 303

HAGGAR APPAREL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Maria O. LEAL, Appellee.

No. 13-00-275-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

November 7, 2002.

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Chris A. Brisack, Neil E. Norquest, Norquest & Brisack, LLP, McAllen, Jorge C. Rangel, Rangel Law Firm, Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Aaron Pena, Jr., Edinburg, John G. Escamilla, Rodriguez, Pruneda, Tovar, Calvillo & Garcia, McAllen, Armando Escamilla, Harlingen, for appellee.

Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices DORSEY and RODRIGUEZ.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice VALDEZ.

Maria O. Leal brought suit against Haggar Apparel Co., her former employer, for disability discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliatory discharge. After trial, the jury found in favor of Leal on her claim for disability discrimination and awarded her $43,700 in past lost earnings and employment benefits and $8,000 in past compensatory damages. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and awarded attorney's fees plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Haggar appeals this judgment by five issues. We affirm.

Disability Discrimination

Leal brought suit against Haggar under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. §§ 21.001.5566 (Vernon 1996 & Supp.2002). The act prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee in any way based on the employee's disability. TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 21.051(a) (Vernon 1996). An individual may be classified as disabled under any one of three definitions in the act: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (Vernon Supp.2002). A "major life activity" is considered to be something akin to caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, or working. See Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied); Hartis v. Mason & Hanger Corp., 7 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).

The determination of whether an individual is disabled is necessarily fact intensive. Garcia, 28 S.W.3d at 596; Primeaux v. Conoco, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ). In determining whether an individual is disabled in a major life activity, the jury considers (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact, resulting from the impairment. Garcia, 28 S.W.3d at 596; Norwood v. Litwin Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).

When the impaired major life activity is the ability to work, the statute requires the plaintiff to show substantial limitation by proving, at a minimum, that the plaintiff is unable to work in a broad class of jobs. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999); Kiser v. Original, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Garcia, 28 S.W.3d at 599-600. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139.

With regard to the major life activity of working, the ADA regulations explain that the term "substantially limits" means:

[S]ignificantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The ability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (1996); see Primeaux, 961 S.W.2d at 405. Factors to consider in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in working include, but are not limited to: (1) the geographical area to which the person has reasonable access; (2) the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment; and (3) the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities, within that geographical area from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). For example, an individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs. This is so even if the individual is able to perform jobs in another class, for example, the class of semi-skilled jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2, App., § 1630(j).

To prevail on a "record of disability" claim, a plaintiff can show that he has a history of, or has been misclassified as having a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Kiser, 32 S.W.3d at 453 (citing Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir.2000)).

Alternatively, an employee is also regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if his employer mistakenly believes the employee (1) has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Kiser, 32 S.W.3d at 453. In both instances, it is necessary that the employer entertain misperceptions about the individual. The employer must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. Id.

Standard of Review

In discrimination cases, Texas courts apply the McDonnell Douglas or Burdine burden-shifting analysis established by the United States Supreme Court. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)(discussing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)); M.D. Anderson Hosp. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000)(per curiam); Tex. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1995). Under this burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Stanley Stores, Inc. v. Chavana, 909 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied); Adams v. Valley Fed. Credit Union, 848 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).

If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge. Stanley Stores, 909 S.W.2d at 560; Adams, 848 S.W.2d at 187-88. If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were rather a pretext for discrimination. Stanley Stores, 909 S.W.2d at 560; Adams, 848 S.W.2d at 187-88. Despite the shifting burden of proof, the plaintiff at all times retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact. Stanley Stores, 909 S.W.2d at 560; Adams, 848 S.W.2d at 187-88.

When, however, as here, a case has been fully tried on its merits, we do not focus on the burden shifting scheme described above. Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educational Fund 218 F.3d 392, 402 (5th Cir.2000); see Prestige Ford Co. v. Gilmore, 56 S.W.3d 73, 82 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Once the case has been submitted to the jury, the adequacy of a party's showing at any particular stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is unimportant. Travis v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex., 122 F.3d 259, 263 (5th Cir.1997). Instead, we inquire whether the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's ultimate findings. Rutherford v. Harris Cty., Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Berry Co., 165 F.3d 390, 394 (5th Cir.1999). Leal must show that disability discrimination was a motivating factor in Haggar's decision to terminate her. See Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex.2001) (applying "motivating factor" as standard of causation in TCHRA unlawful practice claims); see also Rutherford, 197 F.3d at 180-81; Travis, 122 F.3d at 263. Discrimination may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Quantum Chem. Corp., 47 S.W.3d at 476; Hartis v. Mason & Hanger Corp., 7 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).

Disability

In its first issue, Haggar contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding in response to question one that Haggar discharged or discriminated against Leal in retaliation for her disability. Leal suffered from a work-related injury to her left hand which required surgery and substantial treatment. Haggar contended that it terminated Leal not because of the injury, but because of excessive absenteeism and Leal's failure to comply with Haggar's policy concerning absences from work.

In considering no evidence or legal sufficiency points of error, we consider only the evidence and inferences from the evidence favorable to the decision of the trier of fact, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See State...