Haggard v. Henderson, 17217
| Decision Date | 18 December 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 17217,17280.,17217 |
| Citation | 382 F.2d 288 |
| Parties | William H. HAGGARD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. John Taylor ALDRIDGE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Norman D. Lane, Nashville, Tenn., for appellee Haggard.
Jack Wright Robinson (Court Appointed), Nashville, Tenn., for appellee Aldridge.
David W. McMackin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., and Reporter, State of Tennessee, of counsel, for appellant.
Before O'SULLIVAN, EDWARDS and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
Certiorari Denied December 18, 1967. See 88 S.Ct. 600.
O'SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge.
The appellees, John Taylor Aldridge and William H. Haggard, were, in different Tennessee state court trials, convicted and sentenced for major criminal offenses, and as habitual criminals. Following separate habeas corpus proceedings in United States District Courts of Tennessee, they were ordered released upon holdings that their primary convictions, for murder in the case of Aldridge and for burglary and larceny in the case of Haggard, had been obtained in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By the Attorney General of Tennessee, the respondent Warden prosecutes these appeals which were heard together in this Court.
The effect of the Tennessee habitual criminal statute, 7 Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2801 et seq, is to enhance the punishment of those found guilty of a particular crime, where it is shown that they have been convicted of other serious crimes in the past.
Under Tennessee's then applicable "common law" method of procedure, the prosecution in these two cases was permitted to read to each jury the entire indictments, which contained counts concerning both the substantive offenses then being tried and the habitual criminal charges; and evidence of the defendants' earlier convictions was allowed to be presented as part of the state's case-in-chief.1 It was this procedure that the District Judges found prejudicial to the defendants and deprived them of their right to a fair trial on the substantive criminal charges brought against them.
Both of the District Judges' decisions were handed down before the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Spencer v. State of Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). That opinion declared that combining in one indictment charges of prior offenses together with the immediate charges, reading the entire indictment to the jury and offering proof of such earlier offenses, all before submitting the case to the jury, was not a state practice offensive to the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is clear to us that the Spencer decision controls the Haggard case, and that the order of the lower court therein must be reversed.
But the effect of Spencer on the Aldridge case calls for further discussion. 7 Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2801 requires a showing of three prior felony convictions before the sanction imposed by the statute can be invoked in a criminal proceeding. At Haggard's trial only three prior offenses were proved. But at Aldridge's murder trial not just three earlier convictions were introduced into evidence, but eight — offenses ranging from larceny to attempted murder. Counsel for appellee Aldridge contends that this showing of so many earlier convictions to the jury far exceeded whatever legitimate purpose the State of Tennessee had in attempting to enforce its habitual criminal statute, and could only have been done with the intent to prejudice the jury against Aldridge. For this reason, counsel argues, the Spencer decision is distinguishable and inapposite here.
Counsel for appellant responds that the need to show three prior convictions under 7 Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2801 is merely a minimum requirement, and...
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Johnson v. Rewerts
... ... a basis for habeas relief. See Haggard v. Henderson, ... 382 F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1967); See also Lonberger v ... Jago, ... ...
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Murray v. Superintendent, Kentucky State Penitentiary
...interest in trying all the issues in a one-stage trial." See also Wilson v. Wiman, 386 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1967); Haggard v. Henderson, 382 F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1967). A key holding of Spencer was that a defendant's rights are deemed protected by limiting instructions. A jury is presumed ......
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Lonberger v. Jago
...the case to the jury, (is) not a state practice offensive to the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Haggard v. Henderson, 382 F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Evans v. Cowan, 506 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir 1974); Wilson v. Wiman, 386 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. Appellant's attempts to distin......
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Ransom v. Davis, PETITIONER-APPELLANT
...case, we find that it was not improper for the prosecutor to introduce evidence of petitioner's prior convictions. See Haggard v. Henderson, 382 F.2d 288, 289 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1024 (1967). We further find that since petitioner was given adequate notice of the convictions u......