Haggard v. State
| Decision Date | 21 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PL-1502 |
| Citation | 163 N.E.3d 330 |
| Parties | Herbert C. HAGGARD and Alice M. Haggard, Appellants-Defendants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff, and Jerry L. Hillenburg and Morgan County, Indiana, Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellants: Benjamin A. Spandau, Brandon E. Tate, Tate Bowen Daugherty Funk Spandau LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Natalie F. Weiss, Benjamin M.L. Jones, Aaron T. Craft, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] This case concerns the State of Indiana's, through the Indiana Department of Transportation ("INDOT"), appropriation of property as part of the ongoing improvement of Interstate 69 ("I-69") through Morgan County, Indiana. The State filed a complaint for appropriation of real estate owned by Jerry Hillenburg and named Herbert C. Haggard and Alice M. Haggard ("the Haggards") as defendants as to any interest they may have in the land as a consequence of their easement over the property. The Haggards filed objections to the State's complaint because they had not received an offer to purchase their easement prior to the State filing its complaint and moved the trial court to vacate the order of appropriation. The Haggards appeal from the trial court's order overruling their objections and their motion to vacate the order of appropriation and raise the following restated issue: whether the trial court erred when it overruled the Haggards' objections to the State's complaint and motion to vacate the order of appropriation.
[2] We affirm.
[3] On February 21, 2020, the State filed its Complaint for Appropriation of Real Estate with the trial court for the improvement of I-69 under project number 0300382. Appellants' App. Vol. II at 15-16. In order to complete the improvement of I-69, the State needed to obtain a fee simple title with full limitation of access, easement rights with full limitation of access, and temporary right of way for building removal (to expire three years after commencement of construction) to real estate owned by Jerry L. Hillenburg ("Hillenburg"). Id. Hillenburg owned the land by virtue of a Warranty Deed and Reservation of Easement ("the Deed") recorded on May 20, 1981 in the Morgan County Recorder's Office. Id. at 15-16, 23-25. The State's complaint acknowledged that the Haggards may hold an interest in the real estate by virtue of an easement in the Deed recorded on May 20, 1981. Id. at 16. The State alleged that it had attempted to acquire the owners' interest in the real property for $310,000 for the owners' interests and any damages that may be caused by the State's appropriation but that the State and the owners had been "unable to agree to a purchase price or to the amount of benefits and damages, if any, which may be sustained by reason of this appropriation." Id. at 16. The State therefore requested that the trial court: (1) "appoint three ... disinterested parties to appraise the value of the interests to be appropriated and the amount of benefits and damages, if any, caused by the appropriation" ; and (2) "order the disinterested parties to join in making one ... written report" to the trial court. Id. at 16. The Haggards were served with the complaint on February 28, 2020. Id. at 6.
[4] On March 18, 2020, the Indiana Supreme Court issued its order under Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CB-150 granting the Morgan County Courts' petition for emergency relief due to COVID-19 (the "March 18 Order"). Due to the national emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the March 18 Order, utilizing Indiana Administrative Rule 17, authorized the tolling, from the effective date of the order through April 10, 2020, "of all laws, rules, and procedures setting time limits for speedy trials in criminal and juvenile proceedings, public health, mental health, and appellate matters; all judgments, support, and other orders; and in all other civil and criminal matters before the Morgan County Courts." Id. at 51. The March 18 Order was extended through subsequent orders by the Indiana Supreme Court with the provisions of the Administrative Rule 17 emergency plan and orders to terminate on July 6, 2020. Id. at 53-60.
[5] On April 14, 2020, the State filed a motion for appropriation and appointment of appraisers. Id. at 31-33. On the same day, the trial court granted the State's motion and ordered the appointment of one disinterested freeholder of Morgan County and two disinterested appraisers. Id. at 39-40. On May 8, 2020, the appraisers filed their report, in which they assessed that the fair market value of the land was $42,650, the fair market value of the improvements to the land was $20,600, and the damages to the residue of the defendants' real estate caused by the State's appropriation was $270,750. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 2-4. The total appraised just compensation was $334,000. Id.
[6] On May 14, 2020, the State filed exceptions to the report of the appraisers and a demand for jury trial, arguing that the appraisers' report overstated the fair market value of the land, the fair market value of the improvements taken by the State, and the damages to the residue of the defendants' real estate caused by the State's appropriation. Id. at 8-9. Based on this, the State argued that the appraisers' report overstated the total amount of just compensation. Id . On June 5, 2020, the Haggards also filed exceptions to the report of the appraisers and demand for jury trial, alleging that the amount of assessed damages was too low. Id. at 10-12.
[7] On July 2, 2020, the Haggards filed a motion to vacate the trial court's order of appropriation, and they submitted their objections to the State's complaint for appropriation. Appellants' App. Vol. II at 47-66. In their motion to vacate, the Haggards argued that the appropriation order should be vacated because the State failed to make the Haggards an offer to purchase prior to the State filing its complaint. Id. at 49. The Haggards argued that their objections were timely filed because various COVID-19-related orders tolled all deadlines until July 5, 2020. Id. at 48. In their objections to the State's complaint, the Haggards alleged that under Indiana Code section 32-24-1-5(a), the State was required to make them an offer to purchase the property at least thirty days before filing a complaint. Id. at 62-63. The Haggards contended that the State failed to do so and provided as evidence an email where counsel for the State admitted that no pre-suit offers were made to the Haggards because "the billboard matter was offered to Outfront Media LLC for the physical sign and the other offer was made to the fee owner, Jerry Hillenburg." Id. at 61-64, 66.
[8] On July 15, 2020, the State filed a motion to overrule the Haggards' objections and their motion to vacate the order of appropriation, arguing that the Haggards' objections were legally deficient because: (1) INDOT is exempt from having to prove that it made a good-faith effort to purchase real estate pursuant to Indiana Code section 32-24-1-13 ; and (2) generally, a condemnor only has to make an offer to the owner of the real estate, and the Haggards did not meet the definition of owners of the real estate at issue; the State further argued that the March 18 Order did not apply to objections so the Haggards' objections were untimely. Id. at 67-71. On the same date, the Haggards filed a notice of intent to respond and requested a hearing. Id. at 74. On July 25, 2020, the Haggards filed their response to the State's motion and reply in support of their motion to vacate the order of appropriation and their objections to the State's complaint for appropriation. Id. at 76-86. The Haggards argued that the Indiana Supreme Court's June 8 order extended the March 18 Order so that tolling continued until July 5, 2020 and because they filed their objections on July 2, 2020, the objections were timely. Id. at 78-80. The Haggards further contended that they were in fact owners because they had a reserved right in the real estate, which was recorded by the Deed. Id. at 81. The Haggards asserted that because the State failed to make an offer to purchase the Haggards' reserved right in the real estate prior to filing its complaint, the condemnation action was illegal, and the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 81-85. On July 31, 2020, the trial court overruled the Haggards' objections and motion to vacate the order of appropriation. Id. at 11. The Haggards now appeal.
[9] The State has inherent authority to take private property for public use. Knott v. State , 973 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied . Eminent domain proceedings for seizing private property are powerful instruments of government. Id. (). "As long as the governmental entity intends to use the land for a public purpose that is constitutional, there are few defenses to prevent a taking." Id. Such powers and rights, however, are not unlimited. Id.
[10] Judicial review of an eminent domain action is "limited to whether the condemnation proceedings were legal, whether the condemnor had the authority to condemn the property, and whether the property was to be taken for a public purpose." Boyd v. State , 976 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied . Additionally, courts have the power to question whether the condemnation was fraudulent, capricious, or illegal. Knott , 973 N.E.2d at 1262 ()...
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