Haggerty v. Steitz

• Decision Date: 04 October 2019
• Docket Number: 905,CA 19–00266
• Citation: 176 A.D.3d 1622,107 N.Y.S.3d 918 (Mem)
• Parties: Edward J. HAGGERTY, as Trustee of the James J. Haggerty Trust, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Philip M. STEITZ, doing Business as Premier Tire Company, Inc., Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

176 A.D.3d 1622

107 N.Y.S.3d 918 (Mem)

Edward J. HAGGERTY, as Trustee of the James J. Haggerty Trust, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Philip M. STEITZ, doing Business as Premier Tire Company, Inc., Defendant–Respondent.

905

CA 19–00266

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: October 4, 2019

GUSTAVE J. DETRAGLIA, JR., UTICA, FOR PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT.

PAPPAS, COX, KIMPEL, DODD & LEVINE, P.C., SYRACUSE (P. DOUGLAS DODD OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, NEMOYER, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff, the lessor of a building, commenced this action to recover damages allegedly resulting from, inter alia, defendant's breach of a lease requiring defendant to obtain "[b]usiness liability and property damage insurance." After a nonjury trial, Supreme Court determined that plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant breached the lease by failing to obtain fire insurance, and the court therefore dismissed the complaint. We affirm. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the lease is ambiguous with respect to the kind of insurance that defendant was required to obtain because the language used in the lease's insurance clause " ‘is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation’ " ( Roche v. Lorenzo–Roche, 149 A.D.3d 1513, 1514, 52 N.Y.S.3d 778 [4th Dept. 2017], quoting Chimart Assoc. v. Paul, 66 N.Y.2d 570, 573, 498 N.Y.S.2d 344, 489 N.E.2d 231 [1986] ). Because the lease is ambiguous, the parties were properly permitted to offer extrinsic evidence to establish their intent in using the language in the insurance clause (see Greenfield v. Philles Records, 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569, 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 780 N.E.2d 166 [2002] ; Ames v. County of Monroe, 162 A.D.3d 1724, 1726, 80 N.Y.S.3d 774 [4th Dept. 2018] ). Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the court's determination is supported by "a fair interpretation of the evidence" ( Cianchetti v. Burgio, 145 A.D.3d 1539, 1541, 44 N.Y.S.3d 293 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 908, 57 N.Y.S.3d 713, 80 N.E.3d 406 [2017] ; see Suprunchik v. Viti, 139 A.D.3d 1389, 1390, 31 N.Y.S.3d 727 [4th Dept. 2016] ).