Haggwood v. Magill
| Decision Date | 27 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 5:15-cv-03271-RMG-KDW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Jerome Antonio Haggwood, Plaintiff, v. John Magill; Holly Scaturo; Kimberly Poholchuck, and Warden Stevenson, Defendants. |
Jerome Antonio Haggwood ("Plaintiff"), a civil detainee in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health ("SCDMH") through its Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program ("SVPTP"), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court on two Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Magill, Scaturo, and Poholchuck on February 15, 2016 and by Defendant Stevenson on the same day. ECF Nos. 27, 28. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court entered a Roseboro Order1 on February 16, 2016, advising Plaintiff of the importance of such motions and of the need for him to file adequate responses. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff filed one Response to both Motions for Summary Judgment by placing it with his institutional mailroom on June 8, 2016. ECF Nos. 58, 58-3. Defendant Stevenson filed a Reply on June 22, 2016, ECF No. 61, and Defendants Magill, Scaturo, and Poholchuck filed a Reply on June 23, 2016, ECF No. 62. This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)and (e), D.S.C. Because the Motions for Summary Judgment are dispositive, a Report and Recommendation ("Report") is entered for the court's review.
Plaintiff is civilly detained in the SVPTP, which is housed in the Edisto and Congaree units of the Broad River Correctional Institution, part of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"). ECF No. 28-1 at 1.2 Defendant Magill is the current Director of SCDMH, Defendant Scaturo is the Director of the SVPTP, Defendant Poholchuck is the Program Coordinator of the SVPTP, and Defendant Stevenson is the former Warden of Broad River Correctional Institution. Plaintiff filed his Complaint by presenting it for mailing to his institutional mailroom on August 13, 2015, alleging constitutional claims against Defendants based on the conditions of his confinement. ECF No. 1-1. Specifically, Plaintiff refers to the "first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth . . . [and] fourteenth amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution . . ." and contends that Defendants, collectively,3 are responsible for policies andprocedures that allegedly violate his constitutional rights because they subject him to double bunking, unsafe food, and mold and mildew on the walls of his living area. Compl. 4-6, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his medical condition because the treatment offered in the SVPTP is allegedly inadequate, Defendants have subjected him to corporal punishment, and Defendants have forced him to wear a yellow jumpsuit whenever he is being transported in public, which allegedly exposes him to negative stigma from members of the public. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff also asserts that he is being racially discriminated against because "a disproportionate number of caucasin [sic] residents are being and have been released compared to Black residents." Id. at 6. Plaintiff sues each Defendant officially and individually, id. at 4, and requests monetary compensation in the sum of $1,000,000.00; punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 8.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, after careful review and consideration of the evidence and arguments submitted, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motions be granted, thus ending this case against them.
Plaintiff filed this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging claims against four Defendants, collectively. Defendants Magill, Scaturo, and Poholchuck ("the SCDMH Defendants") filed one Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Stevenson filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment. Both Motions argue that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all of Plaintiff's claims. Because Plaintiff's allegations do not vary as to the multiple Defendants and because Defendant Stevenson expressly adopted and joined in the Motion filed by the SCDMH Defendants, ECF No. 27-1 at 2, this Report discusses Defendants' motions together and addresses each of Plaintiff's claims in turn.
Plaintiff contends Defendants' policies result in conditions of confinement that violate his constitutional rights because the conditions are "in such an inhumane state that he is being treated physically worse than a prisoner." ECF No. 1 at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he is subjected to corporal punishment, double bunking of persons designated "sex offenders" places his safety in danger, and that the food provided by SCDC is "contaminated and or disrespected by inmates and or third parties." Id. at 5. Plaintiff also alleges that living conditions in the SVPTP "are inhumane and illegal by any standards . . ." because "mold mildew and even asbestos is present in large amounts in both living units of the S.V.P.T.P. . . . ." Id. at 6. Defendants submit that they are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim because Plaintiff has failed to prove that the alleged conditions rose to the level of constitutional violations because Plaintiff has not shown that he suffered any injury from the conditions alleged. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff has not shown that the SCDMH Defendants failed to exercise appropriate professional judgment and discretion in making decisions about the conditions in the SVPTP. ECF Nos. 27-1 at 9; 28-1 at 11. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not shown that any of them were personally aware of or intentionally disregarded any of the conditions of which he complains. ECF Nos. 27-1 at 9-10; 28-1 at 15-16.
Involuntarily committed mental patients retain a liberty interest in conditions of reasonable care and safety and in reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). Due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. When deciding whether a civilly-institutionalized individual's constitutional rights have been violated, the courts must balance the individual's liberty interest against the relevant state interests, but deference must begiven to the decisions of professionals. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. "[T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id. at 323. Deference to professionals ensures that federal courts do not unnecessarily interfere with the internal operations of state institutions. Id. at 322.
"A civilly committed individual under the SVPA most closely resembles the custody status of a pre-trial detainee." Treece v. McGill, No. 3:08-3909-DCN-JRM, 2010 WL 3781695, at *4 (D.S.C. Sep. 21, 2010). A pretrial detainee's § 1983 claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In any event, "[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988).
Under the Eighth Amendment, protection against cruel and unusual punishment includes protection against inhumane conditions of imprisonment. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). Where claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are concerned, in order to determine whether a prison official has violated a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights (or a pretrial detainee or mental patient's Fourteenth Amendment rights), a court must analyze "whether the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component)." Id.; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (). "What must be established with regard to each component 'varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.'" Williams, 77 F.3d at...
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