Hagle v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-23186-CV-WILLAMS/REID |
| Parties | AUTUMN HAGLE, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Broward County's (“Broward County”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [ECF No. 18], and Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.'s (“RCCL”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [ECF No. 19], (collectively the “Motions to Dismiss”). The Motions to Dismiss were referred to me by the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams for a report and recommendation. [ECF No. 21]. For the reasons outlined below it is RECOMMENDED that Broward County's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [ECF No. 18], which addresses Counts VI through X, be GRANTED, and RCCL's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [ECF No. 19] which addresses Counts I through V, be GRANTED as to Counts II through V, but DENIED as to Count 1.
The following facts from the Complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of evaluating the Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff Autumn Hagle (“Hagle” or “Plaintiff”) was a passenger aboard RCCL's ship Allure of the Seas (the “ship”). [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11]. On December 23, 2021, the ship stopped at Port Everglades, Florida, to disembark. [Id. at ¶¶ 4; 13]; see also [ECF No. 18 at 1-2]. RCCL leased a Port Everglades cruise ship terminal from Broward County, who owned the terminal. [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13]. Broward County contracted with Intercruises Shoreside & Port Services, Inc. (“Intercruises”) who in fact provides embarkation and debarkation staff to process passengers arriving at Port Everglades. [Id.]. RCCL pays Broward County for Intercruises' services and, in turn, Broward County pays Intercruises. [Id.].
On December 23, 2021, Port Everglades experienced a power outage. [Id. at ¶ 19]. Broward County and Intercruises knew that Port Everglades was experiencing a power outage and communicated this fact to RCCL. [Id.]. Despite the power outage, RCCL required its passengers to disembark the cruise ship at Port Everglades. [Id. at ¶ 21]. Defendants knew or should have known that escalators and elevators were not working because of the power outage. Defendants did not warn passengers that because of the power outage, certain areas where they would disembark were poorly lit. [Id. at ¶¶ 20-21]. Defendants knew that “passengers would have to descend stairways while holding their luggage in the darkness.” [Id.]. Defendants' employees guided passengers through the terminal and into a stairwell that “was pitch black.” [Id. at ¶ 22]. To assist passengers navigating through the dark stairwell, Defendants' employees “lined up along the stairwell moving their [cellular] phone lights up and down the stairs to ‘illuminate' the steps.” [Id.]. The passengers were instructed to proceed down the stairwell and Plaintiff did as she was instructed. [Id.]. As Plaintiff walked down the stairwell carrying her luggage she was “cautious and was watching where she was going.” [Id.]. Despite this, because of insufficient lighting, Plaintiff could not see the steps as she descended, and fell forward. [Id.]. As a result of her fall, she “suffered severe and permanent injuries including but not limited to avulsion fracture of the anterior process of the calcaneus of the right foot, avulsion fracture of the dorsum talus and navicular of the right foot, and avulsion fracture involving the medial portion of the navicular bone abutting the os navicularis of the right foot.” [Id. at 23].
As a result, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against RCCL, Broward County, and Intercruises, seeking money damages including interest from the date of the incident. See [Id.]. In her 14-count Complaint she asserts five counts against RCCL for: (I) failure to provide a reasonably safe means of disembarking; (II) negligent operation; (III) negligent failure to warn; (IV) negligent training; and (V) negligent supervision. She asserts five causes of action against Broward County: (VI) negligent operation; (VII) negligent failure to warn; (VIII) negligent retention; (IX) negligent training; and (X) negligent supervision. She also asserts three counts against Intercruises for: (XII) failure to warn; (XIII) negligent training; (XIV) negligent supervision. [Id.]. Broward County and RCCL subsequently filed their Motions to Dismiss. See [ECF Nos. 18; 19].
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To achieve this end, pleadings must contain more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Therefore, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamed v. Palestinian Autho., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). Rather, the plausibility “standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of the required element.” Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
In considering a Motion to Dismiss, courts are limited to considering the complaint and attachments thereto, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007). Further, although “[i]n the rule 12(b) motion-to-dismiss context, a judge generally may not consider materials outside of the four corners of a complaint ... [a] court may consider a document that has been attached to a motion to dismiss, however, if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and its authenticity is not challenged.” Pouyeh v. Bascom Plamer Eye Inst., 613 Fed.Appx. 802, 808 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Day v. Taylore, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005)).
As an initial matter, it must be noted that the parties agree, and this Court finds, that the instant case is controlled by maritime law. “Federal maritime law applies to actions arising from alleged torts ‘committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters.'” Smolinkar v Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 787 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1989)). Federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction also extends to cases involving the disembarkation process of passengers from cruise ships. Lipkin v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 93 F.Supp.3d 1311, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2015). As this case involves an incident in which Plaintiff was disembarking a cruise ship, maritime law applies.
Defendants raise the same four arguments in their Motions to Dismiss: (1) that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because they contain mere conclusory allegations and fail to plead notice on Defendants' part; (2) that the dangerous condition leading to Plaintiff's injuries was open and obvious; (3) Plaintiff impermissibly comingles claims for direct and vicarious liability; and (4) Plaintiff's negligent operation claims are not cognizable under federal admiralty law. See generally [ECF Nos. 18; 19]. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
I. The Sufficiency of Notice as to Plaintiff's Negligence Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for negligent failure to warn, negligent retention, negligent training, and negligent supervision all fail because those claims require Defendants to be on notice of the alleged negligent conduct or condition, and that the Complaint merely asserts notice through conclusory allegations without factual support.
“Under maritime law, the duty of care owed by a cruise operator to its passenger is ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances, which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.” Harding v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 90 F.Supp.3d 1305, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
What connects Plaintiff's various negligence-based causes of action is that for liability to attach, the defendant must have notice of the negligent conduct or condition at issue. Here, Plaintiff asserts five theories of notice: (1) notice through the power outage itself; (2) notice through prior similar incidents; (3) notice through the presence of Defendants' employees; (4) notice through policies and procedures; and (5) notice of industry standards.
In Count I Plaintiff alleges that RCCL breached its non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe means of disembark from the ship. [ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 29-35].
As a common carrier, cruise ship operators owe their passengers a nondelegable duty to provide a safe means in which their passengers may board and disembark their ships. See e.g., Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 339 F.3d 1309, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2003) (...
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