Hagood v. Cnty. of El Paso

Decision Date22 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 08–11–00280–CV.,08–11–00280–CV.
PartiesRandy HAGOOD, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF EL PASO, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Chad Baruch, The Law Office of Chad Baruch, Rowlett, TX, for Appellant.

Ruben Duarte, Assistant County Attorney, El Paso, TX, for Appellee.

Before McCLURE, C.J., RIVERA, and ANTCLIFF, JJ.

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice.

Randy Hagood brought suit against his former employer, the County of El Paso, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. On May 11, 2011, the County filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. After hearing arguments, the trial court entered a final judgment and, without specifying the grounds, granted summary judgment in favor of the County. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Randy Hagood began working for the County as a paralegal in the district attorney's office in March 2001. In early 2007, the County remodeled the district attorney's office. At the time, Hagood was on extended leave after settling an issue regarding overtime pay, which is unrelated to the instant suit. Hagood was also reassigned from the Appellate Division to the White Collar Crime Division. As a result of these changes, when Hagood returned to work in February 2007, he had been relocated from a private office to an open cubicle.1 The distance from Hagood's new cubicle to the white collar unit was approximately the same as the distance from his old office to the white collar unit.

On March 20, 2007, Hagood complained to the County for the first time regarding an alleged physical disability. It is undisputed that Hagood's right foot was partially amputated when he was approximately fifteen years old. As a result, Hagood walks on the remaining part of his foot while wearing a prosthetic device to help with his balance. In his March 20 e-mail to Marcos Lizarraga, Hagood claimed that the distance he had to walk in the office was aggravating his partially amputated foot.2 Hagood requested the County provide a reasonable accommodation for his physical handicap. He also insisted that the County move him to an “office” outside of his new supervisor's office. Lizarraga set up a meeting to discuss Hagood's complaints and on March 26, 2007, Lizarraga, Hagood, and two representatives from the County's human resources department met to discuss accommodations.3

On May 7, 2007, Hagood presented the County with forms from Dr. Johann Penninck restricting Hagood to walking thirty feet per day. The following day, the County placed Hagood on unpaid leave. On June 11, 2007, Hagood was observed walking in excess of his doctor's prescribed restriction through worker's compensation surveillance.

On June 11, 2007, Hagood informed the County that Dr. Penninck had adjusted his walking restriction to 100 feet per day. Dr. Penninck had also requested that Hagood'sworkstation be placed within fifteen feet of his supervisor's office. On June 21, 2007, the County terminated Hagood's employment. According to the termination notice, Hagood was terminated for failing to participate in good faith to find a reasonable accommodation for his alleged disability and for failing to be candid with the County regarding the extent of his disability.

On August 29, 2008, Hagood filed suit against the County under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. He alleged that the County: (1) discriminated against him because of his disability; (2) denied him the reasonable accommodation of limiting his walking distance; (3) terminated him because of his disability; (4) failed to engage in the interactive process as required; and (5) retaliated against him for opposing a discriminatory practice and/or filing a charge.

The County filed a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. Hagood filed a response opposing the County's motion. On July 20, 2011, without specifying the grounds for its ruling, the trial judge entered an order granting the County's motion. The record further reflects that both parties were notified of the trial court's order on July 28, 2011. On August 2, 2011, the trial court entered a second final judgment. On August 29, 2011, Hagood filed a motion for new trial and on September 26, 2011, he filed the instant appeal. Issue One, Hagood argues he presented sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue with respect to his disability claim. Similarly, in Issue Two, he contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning his retaliation claim.

JURISDICTION

We begin by addressing the County's contention that we lack jurisdiction to hear this case because Hagood failed to timely file his notice of appeal.

Applicable Law

Generally, a party must file notice of appeal within thirty days of when the judgment is signed. SeeTex.R.App.P. 26.1. However, where a party timely files a motion for new trial, the appellate time table is extended, allowing a party has ninety days from the signing of the judgment to timely file their notice of appeal. See id. at 26.1(a)(1). To be considered timely and thus operate to extend the appellate timetable, a motion for new trial must be filed within thirty days after the judgment was signed. SeeTex.R.Civ.P. 329b(a); Williams v. Flores, 88 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex.2002); Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Tex.1995).

Where a trial court modifies, corrects, or reforms a judgment, in any respect, the time for appeal shall run from the time the modified, corrected, or reformed judgment is signed. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h). Any change, whether material or substantial, made in a judgment while the trial court retains plenary power, operates to delay the start of the appellate timetables until the date the modified, corrected, or reformed judgment is signed. Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); see also Clark v. McFerrin, 760 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (finding that a reinstated judgment which was identical to first except for the date of entry qualified as modification, correction, or reformation of said judgment thereby restarting the appellate timetables); Holder v. Holder, 808 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991, no writ) (indicating that a second judgment, signed within a trial court's period of plenary power, would operate to restart the appellate timetables even if only change was the signatory date).

Relevant Facts

On July 20, 2011, the trial court issued the following order granting the County's motion for summary judgment:

ORDER

On this the 15th day of July, 2011, came on to be heard Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having considered said Motion is of the opinion that the Motion should be in all things granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

SIGNED the 20 day of July, 2011.

Then, on August 2, 2011, the trial court signed a second order which provided as follows:

FINAL JUDGMENT

On May 11, 2011, Defendant, COUNTY OF EL PASO, filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff RANDY HAGOOD filed its response to the County's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 8, 2011. A hearing on Defendant's motion was held on July 15, 2011.

The Plaintiff and Defendant appeared by and through their respective attorneys and announced ready for said hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing and upon oral argument of counsel, the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Court that Plaintiff take nothing from Defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that Plaintiff's attorney recover no fees associated with this judgment and it is the finding of the Court that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party and as such Plaintiff's attorney is not entitled to any fees whatsoever arising from the prosecution of this cause.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this cause be and is dismissed with prejudice to the rights of Plaintiff to refile the action or any part of it against the County of El Paso. All relief requested in this case and not expressly granted is denied.

SIGNED on this, the 2 day of August, 2011.

It is undisputed that Hagood filed his notice of appeal on September 26, 2011, more than thirty days after the trial court signed either of the above referenced judgments.4 It is also undisputed that Hagood filed a motion for new trial on August 29, 2011, more than thirty days after the trial court signed the first order but less than thirty days after the trial court signed the second order. Therefore, if the date the first order was signed (July 20, 2011) dictates Hagood's thirty day period in which to file his motion for new trial, then his motion for new trial, and by extension his notice of appeal, were untimely filed and this Court lacks jurisdiction. SeeTex.R.App.P. 26.1. However, if the timetable begins to run as of the date the trial court signed the second order (August 2, 2011), then Hagood's motion for new trial was timely and served to extend the appellate timetable thereby making his notice of appeal timely filed. SeeTex.R.App.P. 26.1(a)(1). Accordingly, we must determinewhether or not the August 2 order restarted the appellate timetable.

Jurisdiction is Proper

The County asserts that because: (1) its motion for summary judgment addressed all of Hagood's claims; and (2) no other parties were plaintiffs or defendants, the trial court's first order (signed July 20, 2011), resolved all the issues in the lawsuit. The County further contends that the August 2, 2011 order “did not expand or reduce the scope of the July 20th order,” and therefore argues that the fact the trial court signed a later judgment on August 2 “is immaterial.” We disagree.

The County is correct that the original summary judgment was signed on July 20, 2011 and that it was a final judgment. But the record also shows that on August 2, 2011, while ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Donaldson v. Tex. Dep't of Aging & Disability Servs.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 5 Mayo 2016
    ...he could perform the “essential functions” of his position; and (4) the employer refused to make such accommodations. Hagood v. Cty. of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2013, no pet.). We note that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is not applicable to a reasonab......
  • El Paso Cnty. v. Vasquez
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 5 Mayo 2016
    ...employment decision because of her disability. Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir.1996) ; Hagwood v. County of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 515, 523 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) ; Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748, 757 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). ......
  • Jurach v. Safety Vision, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 12 Diciembre 2014
    ...for the breakdown of the ‘informal, interactive process' is traceable to the employee and not the employer”); Hagood v. Cnty. of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 515, 525–26 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2013, no pet.) (“Although an employee is not required to accept an offered accommodation, if he rejects a reason......
  • Sedona Pacific Housing P'ship v. Ventura
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 22 Mayo 2013
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Chapter § 3-9 § 1630.9. Not Making Reasonable Accommodation
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Maslanka's Texas Field Guide to Employment Law Title Chapter 3 The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
    • Invalid date
    ...the kind of accommodations envisioned by the [ADA] regulations"). Texas courts adhere to this reasoning: • Hagood v. County of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment for employer where employee would accept only one accommodation to cut down on......
  • Chapter § 3-12 § 1630.12. Retaliation and Coercion
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Maslanka's Texas Field Guide to Employment Law Title Chapter 3 The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
    • Invalid date
    ...that a "motivating factor" test applies per Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2001). • Hagood v. County of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (in fn. 7 embracing "but for" standard under Texas Labor Code). But all is not lost for plaintiffs in po......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT