Hagopian v. City of Highland Park

• Decision Date: 13 May 1946
• Docket Number: No. 47.,47.
• Citation: 22 N.W.2d 116,313 Mich. 608
• Parties: HAGOPIAN v. CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

313 Mich. 608

22 N.W.2d 116

HAGOPIAN

v.CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK.

No. 47.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 4, 1946.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1946.

Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by S. Hagopian, claimant, opposed by the City of Highland Park, employer. From an award of compensation by the Department of Labor and Industry, in favor of claimant, the employer brings an appeal in the nature of certiorari.

Award set aside.

BUSHNELL, REID and STARR, JJ., dissenting.

Before the Entire Bench.

Earl B. Young, City Atty., and Gavin D. Smith, City Hall, both of Highland Park, for appellant.

S. Gerard Conklin, of Detroit, for appellee.

BUTZEL, Chief Justice.

The award of the department should be set aside. Mr. Justice Bushnell in writing for affirmance states the main question as follows: ‘Does the workmen's compensation law, Comp.Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq., as now amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, permit compensation under the facts stated?’ The opinion of the department does not detail all of the facts, nor do we know how much of the testimony unfavorable to plaintiff was believed. The cans containing waste paper and street rubbish, were lifted by plaintiff and another man to a third man on the truck. Besides the third man on the truck, there was a driver. There was nothing unusual about the weight of the cans and this work was done regularly by defendant's employees. The department did find that ‘plaintiff previously had a diseased heart and the strain of lifting the can caused an injury to such heart and brought about the acute heart ailment which caused the disability.’ The department either did not believe or disregarded the testimony on the part of plaintiff indicating that there was a fortuitous event incident to his being stricken. We are thus presented with a case where a man who had an ordinary disease of life to which the public in general is exposed, while performing his duties, suddenly finds himself in a worse condition. There is no testimony that plaintiff was doing anything unusual or out of the regular course of his employment, nor did the department find the existence of any trauma or fortuitous event. It needs no expert testimony to show that many diseases with which many are afflicted are progressive in nature and frequently become much more severe. This is particularly true of heart disease, and one suffering from it should not do any lifting or heavy work. Plaintiff does not claim that he suffered from any occupational disease, nor is there any testimony to support such a claim. We have frequently held that under the compensation act, prior to the adoption of the occupational disease amendment, one performing the ordinary work for which he is hired, cannot recover unless there is an accident or a fortuitous event causing the disability. It was for this reason that there was a special provision made in regard to hernia in the occupational disease amendment to the act. In the event of such injury the law provided that the hernia must have been recent in its origin. Act No. 10, pt. 7, Pub.Acts 1912 (1st Ex.Sess.), as added by Act No. 61, Pub.Acts 1937.

In Clifton v. Chrysler Corp., 287 Mich. 87, 282 N.W. 912, 913, we stated: ‘In this State the law is settled that if the injury of which plaintiff complains was occasioned merely by his lifting something heavy in the regular course of his employment, there was no accident and plaintiff is not entitled to an award of compensation. Williams. v. National Cash Register Co., 272 Mich. 553, 262 N.W. 306;Waites v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 280 Mich. 185, 273 N.W. 441;Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Corp., 283 Mich. 162, 277 N.W. 869.’After the occupational disease amendment was adopted by the addition of part 7 by Act No. 61, Pub.Acts 1937, and its subsequent amendments (Comp.Laws Supp. 1940, 1945, § 8485-1 et seq., Stat.Ann.1945 Cum.Supp. § 17.220 et seq.), the law was left with a rather illogical sequence and reference had to be made to the previous part of the act in order to establish procedure, amounts of compensation, etc. The act at all times had to be construed as a whole and parts coordinated together. Podkastelnea v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 198 Mich. 321, 164 N.W. 418. As a result, when Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, was passed, an effort was made to simplify the act and coordinate its parts. The use of the word ‘injury’ could cover not only accident but also occupational diseases. While there was considerable debate as to what the act should cover or not, in the last analysis we must look to the act itself and are bound by its language. The act must be strictly construed. Sutter v. Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co., 297 Mich. 226, 297 N.W. 475. The measure of relief under the act may not be extended beyond its precise terms. Tews v. C. F. Hanks Coal Co., 267 Mich. 466, 255 N.W. 227.

The title to the act was changed when the occupational disease amendment was adopted. In the amendment by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, relied upon by plaintiff, no change of title was made, nor do we believe that it was necessary. The title remained as it was and only provided for compensation for disability or death resulting from occupational injuries or diseases or accidental injuries to employees. There was nothing whatsoever in the act to indicate that the aggravation of a preexisting sickness or disease without any accidental or fortuitous event was covered. In Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N.W. 485, 489, L.R.A.1916A, 283, Ann.Cas.1916D, 689, where recovery was sought for the occupational disease, there was no provision in the law in regard to occupational diseases but it was sought to read such a provision into the law. We held:

‘If it were to be held that the act was intended to apply to such diseases, it would, in so far as it does so, be unconstitutional and in violation of section 21 of article 5 of the Constitution of this State, which provides that:

“No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.'

‘That the act, if it were held to apply to and cover occupational diseases is unconstitutional in so far as it does so is shown by the fact that the body of the act would then have greater breadth than is indicated in the title. A careful analysis of the title of the act shows that the controlling words are ‘providing compensation for accidental injury to or death of employes.’ No compensation is contemplated except for such injuries. The prefatory words are generally dependent upon the above-quoted clause. The only compensation provided is for ‘accidental injury to or death of employés,’ and the last clause of the title restricts the right to compensation or damages in such cases ‘to such as are provided by this act.’'

The same reasoning applies to an act which it is claimed gives recovery for injuries not caused by accident or occupational disease. The title does not cover it.

The amended act itself was not intended to cover aggravation of pre-existing disease without an accident or fortuitous event. It is true that in wording the act, the words ‘accident’ or ‘accidental’ as they existed in the prior acts and amendments frequently were omitted, but the words still remained both in the title and in the body of the act itself. It will be found that in section 2, part 3 of the act, Comp.Laws 1929, § 8441, the board is still known as ‘[The] Industrial Accident Board’ with a seal described by the words ‘Industrial Accident Board-Michigan-Seal.’ This is important but not at all decisive. However, under section 17 of part 3 of the act, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, the employer is obligated to keep a record of the ‘time and cause of the accident, the nature and extent of the injury and disability,’ etc. In part 4, section 1, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943 (Comp.Laws Supp. § 8460, Stat.Ann.1945 Cum.Supp. § 17.195), the contract or policy of insurance must agree to make payment ‘on account of all accidents' and provide for the furnishing of medical, surgical and hospital services if needed on account of all ‘accidents' happening to the employees. 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 8465 (Stat.Ann. § 17.200), provides for an ‘accident fund.’ Section 15 of part 2, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943 (Comp.Laws Supp.1945, § 8431, Stat.Ann.1945 Cum.Supp. § 17.165), provides for the obligation and liability of employer if he ‘has notice or knowledge of the happeningof said ‘accident’ within three months after the happening of the same.' We believe that the rewording of the act was for the purpose of making all of its provisions more homogeneous so as to cover injuries from occupational disease as well as accidents. The wording of section 1 of part 7 of the act as amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, provides for ‘Definition. Whenever used in this act.’ It states in paragraph (c) of section 1: ‘The term ‘personal injury’ shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable.'

Section 2 of part 7, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943 (Comp.Laws Supp. 1945, § 8485-2, Stat.Ann.1945 Cum.Supp. § 17.221), further provides: ‘The disablement of an employe resulting from such disease or disability shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury within the meaning of this act and the procedure and practice provided in this act shall apply to all proceedings under this part, except where specifically otherwise provided herein.’

The words ‘personal injury,’ as used in section 1 of part 2, previously defined by our court, was broadened in meaning by the occupational disease amendment. The precise time of such disability in case of an occupational disease could not be as...