Hagstrom v. Sargent

• Decision Date: 27 February 1951
• Citation: Hagstrom v. Sargent, 137 Conn. 556, 79 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1951)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HAGSTROM v. SARGENT et al. SARGENT v. McCARRON et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 189

79 A.2d 189

137 Conn. 556

HAGSTROM v.SARGENT et al.

SARGENT v.McCARRON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 27, 1951.

Milton Krevoling, Hartford, A. A. Giddon, Hartford (Morton E. Cole and Cyril Cole, Hartford, on the brief), for appellant(plaintiff and defendant Hagstrom).

J. Ronald Regnier, Hartford, for appellees(defendants and plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, INGLIS, O'SULLIVAN and BALDWIN, JJ.

BROWN, Chief Judge.

There actions to recover for personal injuries resulting from the collision of two automobiles proceeding in opposite directions were tried together.In the first, Hagstrom, a passenger in one of the cars, a Ford, sued George Sargent, the owner, and Bernice Sargent, the driver, of the other car, a Chevrolet.In the second, Bernice Sargent sued Hagstrom and McCarron, the driver of the Ford, alleging that they were engaged in a joint venture.The jury rendered a verdict for Hagstrom as plaintiff and a verdict for him and McCarron as defendants.The court set aside both verdicts and Hagstrom has appealed in each case.No claim is made that the issue as to joint venture is involved in the determination of either appeal.

Rye Street in South Windsor runs in an easterly and westerly direction.On the afternoon of August 22, 1941, which was a bright fair day, McCarron, with Hagstrom as a passenger, was driving his Ford westerly along Rye Street and Bernice Sargent was driving the Chevrolet owned by her husband along the street in the opposite direction.Upon a section of the road which is straight and level for several hundred feet the cars were in collision at a point near the middle of the traveled way, which was seventeen and one-half feet wide.The Ford came to rest in a ditch on the north side of the road and the Chevrolet remained on the road, but crosswise of it, headed north, with about a third of the car north of the middle of the highway.The front, particularly the left front portion, of each car was badly damaged by the impact.No detailed recital of the evidence is necessary to present the question determinative of the appeals.The testimony of the driver and passenger of each car was that their vehicle at all time kept to its extreme right side of the road and was proceeding at a moderate speed, which was reduced almost to a stop just before the collision, and that the other car, as it approached, either was on its left side of the road or progressed on a diagonal course to its left across the road at a high rate of speed which continued until the impact occurred.

In addition to this conflicting direct testimony as to how the collision happened, there was evidence of certain physical facts.Besides that of the location and condition of the two cars after the accident, there was undisputed evidence of a mark some sixty-four feet long made by the right wheel or wheels of the Chevrolet.This was parallel to and one foot five inches north of the south edge of the road, except that near its easterly end it turned toward the north on an angle and terminated at a point three feet five inches north of the southerly edge of the road and a short distance west of where the rear left wheel of the Chevrolet stood after the accident.The undisputed evidence also established that there was underfender dirt, glass and debris in the middle and to the north of the middle of the road.There was no evidence of any wheel marks of the Ford car.In its memorandum of decision ordering the verdicts set aside, the court made mention of the conflict in the direct testimony as to how the collision occurred but, referring to the physical facts recited above, concluded that notwithstanding this conflict 'the verdict could not have been reasonably reached and is manifestly unjust and is so palpably against the evidence as to indicate that the jury must have made some mistake in the application of legal principles or were influenced by lack of knowledge or understanding and that the jury must have given determining effect to evidence which is irreconcilable with the admitted and indubitably established physical facts.'

The court relied upon the principle that it is 'the court's duty to set aside the verdict if its manifest injustice [is] so plain and palpable as to justify the suspicion that the jury or some of its members were influenced by prejudice, corruption, or partiality.* * * And this is true even if the evidence was conflicting, and there was direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff who prevailed with the jury.'Roma v. Thames River Specialties Co., 90 Conn. 18, 19, 96 A. 169.This rule applies when 'it is apparent from physical facts or other evidence compelling belief that the jury were swayed by improper motives.'Joanis v. Engstrom, 135 Conn. 248, 251, 63 A.2d 151, 152.Well established as this principle is, we have repeatedly given expression to the caution to be exercised in its application, to avoid infringing upon the...