Hahl v. Sugo

• Decision Date: 17 December 1901
• Parties: HAHL et al. v. SUGO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

169 N.Y. 109

62 N.E. 135

HAHL et al.

v.SUGO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 17, 1901.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Fourth department.

Action by Charles F. Hahl and others against Barbara Sugo. From a judgment of the appellate division (61 N. Y. Supp. 770) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Haight, J., dissenting.

Fred D. Corey, for appellant.

Clark H. Hammond, for respondents.

WERNER, J.

This suit was brought to obtain a decree to compel the defendant to remove that portion of the wall of her building which encroaches upon the lands of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs and the defendant are, and for many years have been, the respective owners of adjoining lots on the west side of Monroe street in the city of Buffalo, between Howard street on the north and Clinton street on the south. In the summer of 1895 the defendant erected a 2 1/2 story brick house upon her lot, the northerly wall of which encroaches upon plaintiffs' lot, as set forth in the findings of the trial court. In 1896, after said house was completed, the plaintiffs brought an action in the supreme court to recover possession of the strip of land thus invaded by the defendant. The action was tried at a trial term, and a jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The defendant paid the costs and took a new trial, under section 1525 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The action was tried a second time, with the same result, and judgment was entered on the 11th day of January, 1898, establishing the plaintiffs' title in fee to the premises in dispute and their right to the possession thereof. That judgment contained a provision directing the defendant to forthwith remove from said premises all obstructions and erections of every kind placed thereon by her. In all other respects it was the ordinary judgment in an action to recover the possession of real property. That provision of the judgment was stricken out by the court on the defendant's motion, and thereafter the plaintiffs issued to the sheriff of Erie county an execution in the usual form. This execution was subsequently returned by the sheriff with an indorsement thereon stating in substance that the strip of land described therein was occupied by a portion of the stone foundation and brick wall of defendant's house, and that it was impracticable for him to remove the same. After such return of the execution, and before the commencement of the action at bar, the plaintiffs made a motion at a special term for an order directing the defendant to remove that portion of the wall of her house which encroaches upon the plaintiffs' land, which motion was denied. Thereupon the plaintiffs brought this action in equity to compel the defendant to remove said encroaching walls from their land. The supreme court at special term granted the relief prayed for, and the judgment entered upon this decision was unanimously affirmed by the appellate division. The appeal to this court brings up the question whether two separate actions can be maintained upon a single cause of action.

Section 3339 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ‘There is only one form of civil action. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of those actions and suits, have been abolished.’ Under section 481 of the Code, the requisites of a complaint are simply that it shall contain: (1) ‘A plain and concise statement of the facts, constituting each cause of action, without unnecessary repetition,’ and (2) ‘a demand of the judgment to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled.’ These sections of the Code, and others which need not be specifically referred to, clearly evince the legislative intent to strip our modern procedure of the cumbrous forms and distinctions which made the practice under the common law and the earlier statutes so burdensome in its details and so uncertain in its results. Upon examining that portion of the Code which deals with actions to recover real property (chapter 14, tit. 1, art. 1), we find that the old term ‘ejectment’ has been discarded in the title, and it is now entitled ‘Actions to recover real property.’ This change of name was, obviously, a part of the plan of the codifiers to reduce our practice to a simple and composite scheme, under which all of the rights of litigants, both legal and equitable, so far as they are consistent with each other and affect the same parties, can be tried in one action and be merged in a single judgment. One of the essential features of such a scheme is to make separate provision for causes of action that are inconsistent with each other of affect different parties or require different places of trial, and this has been done in section 484 and various other kindred sections of the Code, which specifies what causes of action may be joined in the same complaint. It is true that in the chapter of the Code relating to actions to recover real property the name and many of the incidents of the former action of ejectment still persist, but this is undoubtedly due to that conservatism of the law which has ever led our legislators and courts to use familiar names, and to reason in old terms, when enacting or construing statutes designed to produce reforms in our law and practice. We shall have occasion further on to refer more specifically to this chapter in its application to the concrete question presented by this appeal. Let us now see whether the plaintiffs have more than one cause of action arising out of the wrong of the defendant, and, if not, what that cause of action is. The plaintiffs are the owners of a strip of land upon which the defendant has wrongfully entered and erected a wall, which is a portion of her house. The facts alleged show one primary right of the plaintiffs and one wrong done by the defendant which involves that right. Therefore the plaintiffs have stated but a single cause of action, no matter how many forms and kinds of relief they may be entitled to. The relief prayed for, or to which they may be entitled, is no part of their cause of action. Pom. Code Rem. § 455. The plaintiffs' right is to recover possession of their land. The defendant's wrong consists in the entry upon and use of that land without plaintiffs' consent. The particular nature of that wrong may require the application of different remedies for the enforcement of the right. But that does not change the nature of the cause of action, nor entitle the plaintiffs to split it into several causes of action. The complaint in the first action stated the facts upon which plaintiffs based their claim of title and right to possession. Under its allegations the title as well as the right to possession could be tested. Cagger v. Lansing, 64 N. Y. 417. The right to possession involved the removal of the encroaching wall, for without such removal there could be no real transfer of possession. This in turn required equitable relief which, under proper pleadings and an appropriate method of trial, could have been granted in the same action in which the title and right to possession were adjudicated. Corning v. Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191;Broiestedt v. Railroad Co., 55 N. Y. 220....