Hahn v. Hahn

• Decision Date: 06 July 2018
• Docket Number: No. 20170303-CA,20170303-CA
• Citation: 427 P.3d 1195
• Parties: Randy R. HAHN, Appellant, v. Adrienne R. HAHN, Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

427 P.3d 1195

Randy R. HAHN, Appellant,

v.Adrienne R. HAHN, Appellee.

No. 20170303-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 6, 2018

Randy R. Hahn, Appellant Pro Se.

Kevin McGaha, Attorney for Appellee.

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and Erin T. Middleton, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Utah Attorney General.¹

Judge Michele M. Christiansen authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred.

Opinion

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 After a bench trial, the trial court modified the parties’ divorce decree and parenting plan, granting primary physical custody of the parties’ minor children to Adrienne R. Hahn (Mother) and ordering Randy R. Hahn (Father) to pay child support. Father appeals, raising several challenges, including the constitutionality of certain Utah Code provisions governing custody and child support. We affirm and remand for the purpose of determining Mother’s attorney fees incurred on appeal, which award we limit as described below.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father divorced in New Mexico, entering into a marital settlement agreement and stipulated parenting plan, eventually agreeing to the entry of a final divorce decree in 2014. The parenting plan provided that the parties would share joint physical and legal custody of their minor children. The decree did not impose a child support obligation on either party. Instead, the parties agreed that no child support would be paid by either party for one year following entry of the decree so that each could obtain employment. Following this deferment, the parties agreed to calculate child support using New Mexico Child Support guidelines.

¶3 Mother relocated to Utah and in 2015, registered the decree, parenting plan, and related orders with the Third District Court in Salt Lake County. She then filed a petition to modify those orders. Father filed an answer and counter-petition through counsel, but he subsequently filed an amended answer pro se. Both parties asserted that a substantial material change in circumstances justified modification of the original decree and orders.

¶4 In his amended answer, Father also raised general constitutional challenges to Utah’s child custody and support statutes. Father later filed a motion for declaratory judgment in the modification proceeding, alleging many of the same constitutional challenges. Mother responded with a request for temporary orders, including a request for child support of $1,680 per month and attorney fees. Father responded and argued that no child support should be awarded to either party and also sought an award of attorney fees.

¶5 Following a hearing, a domestic commissioner recommended denial of Father’s amended answer for child support and parent-time, and denial of Father’s declaratory judgment motion as moot. The commissioner imputed income to Father of $10,533 per month based upon Father’s average earnings from 2010, 2011, and 2012,² and ordered Father to pay child support in the amount of $1,369 per month. The commissioner reserved ruling on the issues of child support arrearages and Mother’s request for attorney fees. Father objected to the commissioner’s recommendations and requested a hearing before the district court.

¶6 The district court heard argument on Father’s objections and overruled them, affirming the commissioner’s temporary orders with some modifications. The court ordered Father to pay $1,350 per month in child support, and to pay $1,000 of Mother’s attorney fees. The court’s award of attorney fees was related to Father’s "instigat[ing] unnecessary proceedings or litigation, ... [and] mak[ing] arguments that are without merit." Because Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, the court required Father to pay a minimum of $123 per month toward the ordered child support and apply for two jobs per week, or face potential contempt of court proceedings. Thereafter, the case was certified for trial on the issues of (1) physical and legal custody of the children, (2) parenting plan, (3) child support, (4) child support arrearages, (5) insurance coverage for the children and premium payment, (6) right to claim the children as dependents on taxes, and (7) attorney fees. Prior to trial, Mother relocated to a different city in Utah, and Father relocated to Texas from Utah.

¶7 In late January 2017, shortly before the bench trial was set to begin, Father filed (1) a motion to continue the trial, (2) a motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge and commissioner, (3) a motion requesting a jury trial, and (4) a motion for summary judgment. The presiding judge of the district court denied the motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge. The trial court then denied the motion to continue and motion for jury trial, reserving time at the beginning of trial to address Father’s summary judgment motion.

¶8 Through his motion for summary judgment, Father sought a declaratory judgment that Utah’s custody and child support statutes are unconstitutional. Father asserted that

Utah, like state courts across the country, has failed to protect [fundamental] rights. Instead courts have usurped these fundamental rights, enabled by legislative statute, in Utah no less, that: the government’s interest is superior to the fundamental rights of fit parents and their children; and the government is entitled to determine custody and support in the "best interests of the child" merely because parents divorce.

Before trial began, however, Father sought to withdraw the motion for summary judgment, submitting instead a "Declaration of Rights." Father also sought to withdraw the motion to disqualify the assigned trial judge, despite the presiding judge’s earlier denial of that motion. Father, who then, as now, was not represented by counsel,³ filed his documents the morning of trial.

¶9 Father failed to appear for trial, and the trial court, despite significant efforts, could not reach him. In his absence, the court denied Father’s motion for summary judgment on the merits and proceeded to take evidence on the modification petitions.⁴ Following trial, the court ordered the parties to share joint legal custody and awarded sole physical custody of the children to Mother. Father was designated as the "relocating parent" and awarded visitation pursuant to statute. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). The court also ordered Father to pay (1) $1,761 per month in future child support, (2) $13,690 in child support arrearages, and (3) $3,300 for Mother’s attorney fees in addition to the $1,000 amount previously ordered. Father appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 Father first argues that the court deprived him of his right to a jury trial.⁵ We review the question of whether Father had a right to a jury trial for correctness. Failor v. MegaDyne Med. Products, Inc. , 2009 UT App 179, ¶ 9, 213 P.3d 899. We have stated, however, that "it is the prerogative of the judge who actually tries the case to make the determination of whether an issue is one in equity or one in law wherein the party can insist on a jury as a matter of right." Id. (quotation simplified). Accordingly, "unless it is shown that the ruling determining the equitable or legal nature of the issue was patently in error or an abuse of discretion, this court will not interfere with the ruling." Id. (quotation simplified).

¶11 Father next asserts that the court improperly imputed income to him in ordering him to pay prospective child support and child support arrearages. We review the basis for and calculation of imputed income for abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Christensen , 2017 UT App 120, ¶ 10, 400 P.3d 1219. Additionally, "[t]he trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Rayner v. Rayner , 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 4, 316 P.3d 455 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "We will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, unless they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Christensen , 2017 UT App 120, ¶ 10, 400 P.3d 1219 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Jury Trial

¶12 Father asserts that he was entitled to have a jury determine the factual questions at issue in this post-divorce modification proceeding and that the court erred in denying his request for a jury trial. We disagree and conclude that the court properly denied Father’s motion for jury trial.

¶13 In Utah, an original decree of divorce may include "equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). The court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify or make new orders. Id. § 30-3-5(3), (4). Domestic cases, generally, are "equitable in nature," Noble v. Noble , 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988), including proceedings to modify divorce decrees, Christensen v. Christensen , 628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1981) ("The modification of divorce decrees is a matter of equity[.]"). "[T]here is no right to a jury trial in domestic cases where there is a ... mix of remedies but those matters remain equitable." Buck v. Robinson , 2008 UT App 28, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 648 ; see also Hyatt v. Hill , 714 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J., concurring) ("Divorce actions existed at statehood, were considered equitable in nature, and no right to a jury trial existed.").

¶14 The modification proceeding underlying this appeal involved equitable orders largely relating to the care and custody of the parties’ children. The court addressed physical custody, legal custody, health care and medical expenses, insurance, child tax exemptions, and child support. Considering the nature of the proceedings and our precedent, the court properly concluded that the modification matter was...