Haig v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn.
| Decision Date | 12 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1917,90-1917 |
| Citation | 584 N.E.2d 704,62 Ohio St.3d 507 |
| Parties | , 71 Ed. Law Rep. 1113 HAIG et al., Appellants, v. OHIO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
When the State Board of Education decides (pursuant to R.C. 3327.01) to confirm a local board of education's determination that it is impractical to provide actual transportation for students attending nonpublic schools, the decision by the state board does not make the state board a proper party to an R.C. 119.12 appeal.
Plaintiffs-appellants are parents of children residing on Kelleys Island. 1
The parents filed an appeal in common pleas court from the decision of defendants-appellees, the Ohio State Board of Education ("state board") and Franklin B. Walter, the state board's Secretary and Superintendent of Public Instruction ("superintendent"), denying their children actual transportation from Kelleys Island to private school on the mainland. The parents alleged that the state board's decision denied them rights provided under R.C. Chapter 3327.
By resolutions, the Kelleys Island Local School District Board of Education ("local board") and the Erie County Board of Education determined that it was no longer practical to provide actual transportation to the children of the protesting parents because the cost was exorbitant and the number of students made transportation unfeasible. 2 2 The parents objected to payment in lieu of transportation and an appeal to the state board followed.
On appeal, the state board adopted a resolution confirming the local board's decision.
The parents appealed the state board's decision to the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 119.12, contending that the resolution was not supported by the evidence and was not in accordance with law. In the same complaint, the parents also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The parents named only the state board and the superintendent as defendants. 3
The state board and the superintendent moved to dismiss the R.C. 119.12 appeal, claiming (1) the state board and the superintendent were not proper parties to the appeal, and (2) the parents were not entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
The common pleas court held that the state board was a proper party, that declaratory and injunctive relief was appropriate, and that the students were entitled to actual transportation to and from the school of their choice.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the state board was not a proper party to the appeal and that declaratory and injunctive relief was not appropriate.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, Thomas G. Pletz and David J. Coyle, Toledo, for appellants.
Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Christopher M. Culley, Columbus, for appellees.
This case presents three issues: (1) whether the state board was a proper party to the R.C. Chapter 119 appeal, (2) whether declaratory and injunctive relief was appropriate and (3) whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the state board's appeal. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that (1) the state board was not a proper party, (2) declaratory and injunctive relief was not available to the parents, and (3) the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal.
The parents contend that the state board is a proper party to an R.C. 119.12 administrative appeal challenging the state board's decision (pursuant to R.C. 3327.01) confirming the local board's determination that it is impractical to provide actual transportation to students. We disagree.
The state board performed a quasi-judicial function by adjudicating a dispute between two adverse parties: the parents and the local board of education.
The underlying dispute in this case is whether the students must be provided with actual transportation from Kelleys Island to attend nonpublic school in Sandusky. The parents initiated this action to compel that transportation. The parents relied upon R.C. 3327.01, which provides in relevant part:
"In all city, exempted village, and local school districts where resident school pupils in grades kindergarten through eight live more than two miles from the school for which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards pursuant to division (D) of section 3301.07 of the Revised Code and to which they are assigned by the board of education of the district of residence or to and from the non-public school which they attend the board of education shall provide transportation for such pupils to and from such school except when, in the judgment of such board, confirmed by the state board of education, such transportation is unnecessary or unreasonable." (Emphasis added.)
Under R.C. 3327.01, the responsibility for providing transportation for students attending nonpublic school is placed on the local board. It is the local board which initially determines whether it is unreasonable to provide that transportation. See Hartley v. Berlin-Milan Local School Dist. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 415, 416-417, 23 O.O.3d 370, 371, 433 N.E.2d 171, 173. The parents' dispute, therefore, is with the local board--the entity empowered by statute to provide the parents with the relief they seek.
The role of the state board, under R.C. 3327.01, is limited to confirming (or rejecting) the local board's decision whenever the local board finds that transportation is unnecessary or unreasonable. Thus, the General Assembly has placed the state board in the role of an adjudicator. The state board holds a hearing, weighs evidence, and renders a decision.
The state board is unable to directly provide the parents with the relief they seek. The state board has no independent statutory duty to provide transportation. Moreover, the state board has no authority to enforce the local board's duty to provide transportation. Cf. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 545 N.E.2d 1260 ().
As an adjudicator, the state board's interest is to render a fair decision in the dispute between the parties. It has no independent interest adverse to those of the local board or the parents.
Accordingly, we hold that when the State Board of Education decides (pursuant to R.C. 3327.01) to confirm a local board of education's determination that it is impractical to provide actual transportation for students attending nonpublic schools, the decision by the state board does not make the state board a proper party to an R.C. 119.12 appeal. 4
The parents also maintain that an R.C. 119.12 appeal may include an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. They argue that declaratory and injunctive relief is necessary to fashion complete relief in this case, i.e., to insure continuous transportation from Kelleys Island to school in Sandusky. We disagree.
Injunctive relief was unavailable to the parents. An injunction is an equitable remedy and will not lie where there is an adequate remedy at law. Gannon v. Perk (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 301, 308-309, 75 O.O.2d 358, 362, 348 N.E.2d 342, 347. R.C. 119.12 allows the common pleas court to suspend the order appealed from pending the outcome of the dispute. 5 Suspension of the order could have preserved (and in this case did preserve) transportation for the students from Kelleys Island to the mainland. That transportation could have been continued as a permanent order if the common pleas court had been presented with a proper dispute between the parents and the local board. These remedies would have given the parents everything they asked for. But to obtain these remedies the parents...
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