Haig v. Wateree Power Co, (No. 10850.)

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: I. H. HUNT
• Citation: 112 S.E. 55
• Parties: HAIG et al. v. WATEREE POWER CO.
• Decision Date: 11 April 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 10850.)

112 S.E. 55

HAIG et al.
v.
WATEREE POWER CO.

(No. 10850.)

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 11, 1922.

[112 S.E. 56]

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Judgment.]

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Due.]

Fraser, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Fairfield County; Edward McIver, Judge.

Action by M. De L. Haig and others against the Wateree Power Company. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Decree sustained.

McDonald & McDonald, of Winnsboro, and Osborne, Cocke & Robinson, of Charlotte, N. C. for appellant.

G. W. Ragsdale and J. W. Hanahan, both of Winnsboro, for respondents.

I. H. HUNT, A. A. J. The facts in this case are embodied in the decree of his honor, the circuit judge, which is as follows:

"This action, which is brought for the recovery of money alleged to be due by the defendant to the plaintiffs as interest, arises out of a proceeding commenced by the defendant as petitioner against the plaintiffs herein as respondents for the condemnation of certain real estate owned by the respondents in that proceeding, for the purposes of acquiring certain easements upon and over the said real estate, including the right to flood the said lands with water. Pursuant to an order made by his honor, Judge Moore, of the Sixth circuit, a jury was impaneled by the clerk of court for Pair-field county to assess the compensation to be paid by the petitioner in said proceeding to the respondents therein for the easement sought. The jury rendered a verdict on the 6th day of November, 1917, fixing the compensation to be paid at the sum of $30,000. On this verdict judgment was entered and enrolled by the clerk of court on the 7th day of November, 1917. Prom this both petitioner and respondents appealed to the court of common pleas. The appeal was thereupon heard as provided by statute in the court of common pleas. A jury was impaneled to try the issues submitted to them, and rendered a verdict assessing the compensation to be paid to the respondents by the petitioner at the sum of $23,500. On this verdict judgment was also entered and enrolled by the clerk of court, on the 7th day of March, 1918. Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court was served by both sides, but thereafter, on the 3d day of February, 1919, a provisional settlement was reached by the parties, whereby the principal of the judgment was paid by the petitioner, and by mutual agreement the right of the respondents to demand and receive interest was reserved for decision of the court. The contention of the plaintiffs in this action, respondents in the condemnation proceedings, is that they are entitled to interest on the amount of the verdict rendered by the condemnation jury, or on the judgment entered on said verdict by the clerk of court as reduced by the verdict on appeal, from the date of the condemnation verdict and judgment, November 7, 1917, to the date of payment by defendant of the principal of the judgment, on the 3d day of February, 1919; or, at all events, if not entitled to interest on the ultimate amount found, from the date of the condemnation verdict, that they are entitled to interest on the amount of the verdict and judgment rendered on the appeal from that date, to wit, from March 7, 1918, to the date of the provisional settlement made on the 3d of February, 1919. The contention of the defendant is that the plaintiffs are not entitled to interest on the verdict as a sum ascertained and due, nor on the judgment entered on the verdict, the entry of which, it contends, was not authorized or required by law.

[112 S.E. 57]

In the view which I take of the case the plaintiffs cannot recover interest on the amount ultimately found by the jury on appeal from the date of the condemnation verdict rendered by the clerk's jury, for the reason that the verdict rendered on appeal in the court of common pleas must be presumed, under the rule of past, present, and future damages, to include all sums due to the plaintiffs up to the date of that trial on any account. But as to the verdict and judgment rendered on the appeal, I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to interest thereon at the legal rate from that date to the time of the payment by the defendant of the principal of the judgment, to wit, from March 7, 1918, to February 3, 1919, which amounts to the sum of $1,485. I hold that the judgment was properly entered and bore interest as such from the date of entry. But if I should be in error as to that, in the view which I take of the question the verdict rendered by the jury on appeal to the court of common pleas was a sum ascertained and due and would carry interest as such. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the plaintiffs recover of the defendant the sum of $1,4S5 and the costs of this action."

The exceptions raise the following issues on appeal:

"(1) That his honor erred in holding that a judgment had been entered and enrolled upon the verdict in the circuit court, the contention of the appellant being that there was no order of the court allowing such entry of judgment, and that same was without warrant or authority of law, and was wholly null and void.

"(2) For error in not holding that there could be no entry of judgment that would bear interest in said proceeding, because said verdict was not rendered in any action in the court of common pleas, and because there is no statute of the state authorizing or allowing entry of judgment upon such verdict, and because no valid order could be granted permitting the entry of judgment thereon, and that the same was wholly null and void.

"(3) Because his honor erred in holding that plaintiffs were entitled to interest upon the verdict in the circuit court as 'a sum ascertained and due.' Because under the Constitution and statute of the state the compensation so found was only payable before the taking and appropriation of said easement, and the same had been paid by appellant before taking possession of said easement.

"(4) That his honor erred in not holding that the condemnation statute of the state was exclusive, and that under such statute no judgment upon a verdict could be entered nor interest recovered on a verdict in condemnation proceedings instituted under said statute."

The action herein was brought under certain sections of our statute which directs the occasion, the manner and the agencies by which the sovereign right of eminent domain may become operative in South Carolina. That right is based upon the theory that when the state originally granted lands to individuals the grant was made under the implied condition that the state might resume dominion over the property whenever the interest of the public or welfare of the state made it necessary. Its origin antedates constitutional provisions and legislative enactments. It is one of the unwritten laws of all civilized nations. It is justified by the fact that the right of individuals must yield to the public good, and the welfare of the state is paramount to that of the individual citizen. It is a previously existing universal law that lay dormant in the state until proper legal authorities directed the occasion and the mode through which it may become operative. Under article 10, sections 3292s to 3305, inclusive, the General Assembly has directed the occasion and the manner of taking the property of a citizen and converting it into public use for the benefit of all the people and the welfare of the state. The right of the citizen, however, is hedged about with such provisions and enactments as guarantee and protect him from financial loss. While there is nothing in the nature of a contract between the landowner and the state, or the corporation to which the power is delegated, it is, in effect a compulsory sale with the compensation fixed in a fair and impartial manner. As this action is a special statutory proceeding, all acts and doings thereunder are limited to the specific power granted therein. Declarations, words, and phrases must be taken and construed in their legal and commonly accepted meaning.

The grounds of appeal from the decree of the circuit judge resolve themselves into two questions for the court to decide. First, is it legal to enter a judgment from a verdict of a jury in the statutory proceeding known as the Condemnation Act? Second, does the amount of the award fixed by the jury bear interest at the legal rate from the date of the verdict until the payment of the award?

This proceeding was brought under authority of sections 3292-3305, inclusive, vol. 1, Code of Laws 1912. It is a special statutory proceeding with the right of appeal to the circuit court. Railway v. Ellen, 95 S. C. 68, 78 S. E. 963, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1042. The rights and remedies granted thereunder are exclusive and must be confined within the limits of the purposes and privileges therein expressed. Section 3295 provides that—

The jury "shall ascertain the amount of compensation which shall be made to the owner thereof, and shall render their verdict in writing for the same."

Section 3296 provides for an appeal to the circuit court from the verdict so rendered. Section 3302 provides that-All proceedings "shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas for the County in which such proceedings were had, and shall be there of record."

Section 3303 makes provision for the payment of certain costs. There is no provision

[112 S.E. 58]

that the verdict should be entered as a judgment. It is evident that the General Assembly recognized the distinction between a verdict in a proceeding of this nature and a verdict on a money demand. In section 3953, vol. 1, Code of 1912, in providing for arbitration and award provision was made for an appeal to the circuit court, with the further provision that—

The award of the arbitrators "shall be filed with the clerk [of the court] of common pleas within five days...