Haigh v. Planning Bd. of Town of Medfield, 5D05-2809.

• Decision Date: 03 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 5D05-2809.,5D05-2809.
• Citation: 940 So.2d 1230
• Parties: Alan C. HAIGH, Appellant, v. PLANNING BOARD OF The TOWN OF MEDFIELD, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

940 So.2d 1230

Alan C. HAIGH, Appellant, v. PLANNING BOARD OF The TOWN OF MEDFIELD, Appellee.

No. 5D05-2809.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

November 3, 2006.

Michael Massey, of Saju, Massey & Duffy, LLC, Ocala, for Appellant.

Amanda R. Tise, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

PLEUS, C.J.

Haigh appeals a "Final Judgment Establishing Foreign Final Judgment" in favor of the Planning Board of the Town of Medfield ("Planning Board"). Haigh argues that the lower court denied him due process by entering this final judgment without giving him an opportunity to be heard. He also argues that the statute of limitations bars this action upon foreign final judgment. We reverse and remand.

In 2004, the Planning Board filed a "Complaint for Damages" against Haigh in Marion County. The complaint alleged that the Planning Board had obtained a final judgment against Haigh in 1993 in Massachusetts. The Planning Board sought entry of a Florida final judgment. Haigh filed an answer and eight affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations, lack of standing, partial payment and accord and satisfaction.

In 2005, the Planning Board filed a "Motion to Amend Complaint" with an attached "Affidavit of Foreign Judgment." In its motion to amend, the Planning Board acknowledged that under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("FEFJA"), sections 55.501-509, Florida Statutes, it "should have filed this cause of action as an Affidavit for domestication of foreign judgment." The motion also addressed Haigh's statute of limitations defense, noting that the five year limitations period in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes, "applies only to independent actions on a judgment and not to the recording of a foreign judgment and proceedings to enforce that judgment under FEFJA," citing Michael v. Valley Trucking Co., 832 So.2d 213, 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Based on these allegations, the Planning Board requested leave to amend the complaint and to allow its attached affidavit of the foreign judgment to be deemed filed. The lower court granted the Planning Board's motion to amend, deeming the affidavit filed and ordering Haigh to respond within 30 days. In response, Haigh filed another answer and alleged the same eight affirmative defenses.

The clerk of court sent Haigh a "Notice of Recording Foreign Judgment," presumably pursuant to section 55.505(2), Florida Statutes (2005). Haigh then filed a motion for summary judgment, which alleged that the action was barred by the five year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Planning Board filed a response to the motion for summary judgment alleging that the five year statute of limitations only applied to an independent action on a foreign judgment, not to "the recording of a foreign judgment and proceedings to enforce that judgment" under Chapter 55.

The Planning Board also filed a "Motion for Order Establishing Foreign Final Judgment and Entry of Florida Judgment." The motion alleged that the Planning Board was "entitled to a Final Judgment of Florida Court establishing and recognizing the Foreign Final Judgment."

Without holding a hearing on the Planning Board's motion or Haigh's motion for summary judgment, the lower court entered a "Final Judgment Establishing Foreign Judgment." This final judgment stated the Massachusetts judgment was "hereby recognized by the State of Florida and established as a Judgment in the State of Florida." It directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of execution.

On appeal, Haigh argues that the trial court, in entering final judgment without an evidentiary hearing or trial, violated his due process rights. He relies primarily on Walters v. Aquatic Sensors Corp., 633 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In that case, the clerk of court notified the judgment debtor that the judgment creditor had recorded a foreign judgment. The debtor timely filed a complaint to stay enforcement of the judgment and notice of lis pendens. The debtor's complaint alleged partial satisfaction as a basis for staying enforcement. Shortly thereafter, the trial court summarily denied the complaint and granted the creditor's petition to enforce judgment and issue of a writ of execution.

The appellate court reversed, finding that the entry of the enforcement order without a hearing denied the debtor due process of law. The Walters court noted that the FEFJA allows a judgment debtor to raise "any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment ... would be stayed," the consideration of which would normally require a hearing. Id. at 476.

The Planning Board argues that Walters is distinguishable because the debtors in that case followed the statutory procedure of filing a complaint to stay enforcement, but in this case, Haigh failed to follow the statutory procedure by filing an action. Instead, the Planning Board points to Cutler v. Harrison, 792 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) for support. In that case, the judgment creditor filed suit seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment. The judgment debtor opposed relief on procedural and substantive grounds, but the court ordered that the judgment be domesticated. The debtor did not appeal that order. Two years later, the debtor filed an action for declaratory relief, raising the same grounds raised in the prior litigation. The trial court dismissed the debtor's action on the ground of res judicata. The Cutler court affirmed, finding that although the original suit was not necessary, it had proceeded forward and was not appealed. Thus, res judicata barred a second suit on the same issues. In the instant case, however, Haigh has appealed his unsuccessful effort to challenge the final order domesticating the foreign judgment. As there has only been one suit regarding enforcement, res judicata does not bar his objections. Thus, Cutler is inapposite.

The FEFJA does not require a suit to be filed by the judgment creditor. On the contrary, the judgment creditor must simply record the foreign judgment in the clerk's office, at which point the clerk sends notice of the recording to the judgment debtor. §§ 55.503(1), .505(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Then, the judgment debtor may file suit contesting enforcement. § 55.509(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

Although Haigh did not follow the statutory procedure in the instant case, the Planning Board should not be heard to complain. It invited Haigh's error by not following the correct procedure in the first place. First, the Planning Board filed a common law action upon a foreign judgment outside the applicable statute of limitations. When it recognized its error, it should have dismissed its lawsuit and proceeded under the FEFJA. Instead, it moved to amend its complaint. The lower court granted the Planning Board's motion and ordered Haigh to respond. Haigh understandably responded by filing another answer and affirmative defenses.

While Haigh's filing of an answer and affirmative defenses was not the same as filing an action contesting domestication pursuant to the FEFJA,...