Haight v. White

• Decision Date: 18 August 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-00206-GNS-DW
• Parties: RANDY HAIGHT PETITIONER v. RANDY WHITE, Warden RESPONDENT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

RANDY HAIGHT PETITIONER
v.
RANDY WHITE, Warden RESPONDENT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:02-CV-00206-GNS-DW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

August 18, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (DN 1), as amended, and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 141). The Magistrate Judge has issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation ("R&R") (DN 160) recommending that the Petitioner's federal habeas Petition and his Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. The Petitioner has filed his Objection to the Report and Recommendation (DN 166). For the following reasons, the Petitioner's Objection is OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge's R&R is ADOPTED to the extent that it does not conflict with this opinion of the Court.

I. BACKGROUND

The Magistrate Judge's R&R sets forth in detail the extensive procedural history and the relevant facts of this matter, which the Court incorporates herein by reference. (R. & R. 2-15, DN 160).

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II. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), federal habeas corpus relief is available to state prisoners who are in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). To establish a right to relief, a petitioner must show that the state's highest court rejected the petitioner's claim on the merits, and that this rejection was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). These standards apply regardless of whether the state court explained its reasons for rejecting a prisoner's claim. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98 ("Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.").

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus relief if the state court arrives at a conclusion contrary to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the U.S. Supreme Court has decided on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Jones v. Jamrog, 414 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Under the

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"unreasonable application" clause, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). Relief is also available under this clause if the state court decision either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from U.S. Supreme Court precedent to a new context. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. The proper inquiry is whether the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable" and not simply erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 409-11.

It is not enough that a federal court conclude in its independent judgment that the state court decision is incorrect or erroneous. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)). See also Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328, 337 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a state court decision is not an unreasonable application merely because the state court's reasoning is flawed). "The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). See also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 777-78 (2010). AEDPA imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted) (citation omitted). The state court decision is evaluated using the law at the time of the petitioner's state court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 379-80 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).

When "it is possible 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision," habeas relief is unavailable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). For habeas relief to be granted, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

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justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103 (citation omitted). "The state-court decision need not refer to relevant Supreme Court cases or even demonstrate an awareness of them." Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "Instead, it is sufficient that the result and reasoning are consistent with Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 514 (citing Early, 537 U.S. at 8).

Under Section 2254(d)(2), the petitioner may obtain relief by showing the state court's factual finding is "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Thus, Section 2254(d)(2) applies when a petitioner challenges factual determinations by the state court. Notably, the factual findings of the state court are presumed to be sound unless the petitioner rebuts the "presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The U.S. Supreme Court has observed although this deference accorded to state court findings under Section 2254(e)(1) is demanding, it is not insatiable and it "'does not by definition preclude relief.'" Id. at 240 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). In sum, with respect to Section 2254(d)(2), "[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (internal citation omitted) (citation omitted).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 requires the Court to grant a motion for summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If a moving defendant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to at least one essential element of the plaintiff's claim, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to provide evidence beyond the pleadings, "set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "In evaluating the evidence, the court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

At this stage, "'the judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). But "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient," and the party's proof must be more than "merely colorable." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. An issue of fact is "genuine" only if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

C. Objection to the Magistrate Judge's R&R

When an objection is made to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, a district judge "must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). "[V]erbatim regurgitation of the arguments made in earlier filings are not true objections." Bushner v. Larose, No. 5:14CV00385, 2017 WL 1199160, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2017). When an "objection" merely states disagreement

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with the magistrate judge's suggested resolution, it is not an objection for the purposes of this review. Cvijetinovic v. Eberlin, 617 F. Supp. 2d 620, 632 (N.D. Ohio 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 617 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit has stated that "[o]verly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement." Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (citations omitted). Only specific objections are entitled to de novo review; vague and conclusory objections amount to a complete failure to object as they are not sufficient to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that are legitimately in contention. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). "The objections...