Haigler v. U.S.
| Citation | 531 A.2d 1236 |
| Decision Date | 06 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1141.,No. 85-735.,85-735.,85-1141. |
| Parties | David V. HAIGLER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
G. Godwin Oyewole and Lawrence M. Baskir, for appellant.
David Schertler, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., and Michael W. Farrell, and Blanche L. Bruce,
Asst. U.S. Attys., were on brief, for appellee.
Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and MACK and NEWMAN, Associate Judges.
Appellant argues that his convictions on two counts of armed robbery1 must be reversed, and the indictment against him dismissed, because his right to an expedited trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD or Act), D.C.Code §§ 24-701 et seq. (1981), was violated. We agree with appellant's contention, and dismiss the indictment pursuant to Article V(c) of the IAD.2
In an indictment filed August 9, 1983, appellant was charged with six armed robberies that occurred over a one week period near the end of March, 1983. Appellant's arraignment on those charges was set for August 19, 1983, but he failed to appear, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Soon after, the government learned that appellant had been arrested in the state of Ohio and was being held in custody there. The government therefore filed a detainer with Ohio authorities on August 22, 1983, and on January 17, 1984, a Superior Court Judge issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum requiring appellant to be returned to the District of Columbia to face the pending armed robbery charges. Pursuant to that writ, appellant arrived in the District of Columbia on February 16, 1984 and appeared in Superior Court for arraignment on the following day. Under Article IV of the IAD, Mr. Haigler's trial should have commenced on or about June 15, 1984.
Although appellant's case was originally called for trial on May 17, 1984, he was not actually brought to trial until March 8, 1985, 386 days after he arrived in the District.3 The question before us is first, whether appellant preserved his right to a speedy trial under the IAD, and if so, whether the delays which resulted in appellant's trial being postponed beyond the 120-day deadline constituted continuances for "good cause" within the meaning of Article IV(c) of the Agreement.
As the court in Felix v. United States, 508 A.2d 101 (D.C. 1986) observed, previous decisions by this court have reviewed the history and general purposes of the IAD. See id. at 103 and cases cited therein. Essentially, the Act allows for the transfer of a person incarcerated in one state to another jurisdiction for the disposition of pending charges. See generally United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349-53, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1841-44, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). One of the purposes of the IAD is to ensure the speedy disposition of charges outstanding against a prisoner in other jurisdictions:
[C]harges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is . . . the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints.
Article I, Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
The Act establishes two different mechanisms by which a prisoner against whom a detainer has been filed can be transferred to a second jurisdiction for expedited disposition of the outstanding charges. Under Article III(a), a prisoner triggers the application of the Agreement by requesting final disposition of outstanding charges connected with a detainer. Article III provides that after such a request is filed, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days. The second mechanism is under Article IV(a), in which a prosecutor can have a prisoner who is serving a sentence in another jurisdiction (against whom a detainer has been filed) brought to the receiving state to stand trial. Under this article, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 120 days of the prisoner's arrival in the receiving state. Under Article IV, when the prosecutor initiates the extradition, there is no requirement that the prisoner make a request to be tried.
Both Article III and Article IV contain provisions which allow the stipulated time periods to be extended: "for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." Finally, Article V(c) provides that if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the specified time periods-180 days for prisoner initiated proceedings and 120 days for prosecution initiated proceedings—the indictment, information, or complaint is to be dismissed with prejudice.
The government does not contest the applicability of the 120-day provision of Article IV of the Act to appellant's case. Instead, it argues that appellant failed to preserve his right to assert an IAD claim on appeal by not raising the claim before or during trial. We find this argument unpersuasive.
"[A]bsent `good cause shown,' a failure to present a claim under the Agreement at the trial level constitutes a waiver of those rights under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 12(d)." Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 442 U.S 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979). While it is true that appellant Haigler did not file a written motion to dismiss the charges against him until after trial, he was not required to do so before trial in order to preserve his rights under the Act. As long as his actions "put the Government and the [trial court] on notice of the substance of his claim" before trial, United States v. Mauro, supra, 436 U.S. at 365, 98 S.Ct. at 1849, appellant's claim under the Act is preserved.4
Appellant's attempt, pretrial, to explain the applicability of the IAD to his case was sufficient to put the court on notice. This is especially true considering that appellant had to raise his rights under the Agreement in the difficult context of trying to demonstrate that his counsel was incompetent for the very reason that counsel had failed to file a motion under the IAD to dismiss the indictment against appellant. Thus, on March 8, 1985, when pretrial motions were heard, the following colloquy took place:
Now, that's when it was initiated and he told me that my request automatically was a waiver of extradition.
On this record, it is indisputable that appellant did raise the claim of his right to a speedy...
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