Hailemariam v. Zewdie
Docket Number | 21-CV-0217 |
Decision Date | 23 March 2023 |
Citation | 291 A.3d 213 |
Parties | Admas HAILEMARIAM, Appellant, v. Tinsaye Kah ZEWDIE, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Jonathan H. Levy and Megan Moffett* , Washington, were on the brief for appellant.
Workneh Churnet was on the brief for appellee.
Before McLeese, Associate Judge, and Glickman and Thompson, Senior Judges.†
This appeal is from the dismissal of a complaint that appellant Hailemariam filed against her landlord, appellee Zewdie, on the Superior Court's Housing Conditions Civil Calendar. We affirm.
Appellant's complaint sought remediation of numerous alleged Housing Code violations. At the initial hearing, the parties apprised the trial judge that the matters in dispute included threshold issues regarding the scope of the tenancy, what part of the house had been rented to appellant, and whether the lease obligated the landlord to provide and repair a bathroom on the first floor of the dwelling. The judge stated that she "need[ed] to consult with the Civil Division management to see if this case would need to be transferred to a Civil II calendar because the Housing [Conditions Civil] calendar is not set up to handle contested motions like these." At the next status hearing, the judge referenced that consultation and informed the parties,
Appellant requested the judge to "retain jurisdiction at least over those violations" that were unrelated to the first-floor bathroom. The judge noted, however, that "most of the violations" did relate to that bathroom, and appellant's counsel agreed that was so. After further colloquy, the judge ruled that she could not
Following the dismissal of her complaint without prejudice, appellant filed a new complaint for damages and injunctive relief in the Civil Division of Superior Court. This complaint, No. 2021 CA 003168B, is still pending on the Superior Court's docket.
Appellant apprehends that the court dismissed her case for want of subject matter jurisdiction on the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar, and she argues that "[a] case over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction is not subject to dismissal ... merely because it is assigned to a unit of the court in which it does not belong."1 That is a correct statement of law. However, appellant's premise is mistaken, and the principle she invokes does not apply here. The dismissal was not for want of jurisdiction, but rather to effectuate a discretionary transfer of the case to a more appropriate civil calendar. Because the dismissal was, under the circumstances, functionally equivalent to a certification of the case directly to that calendar without a formal dismissal, we conclude that appellant was not prejudiced and reversal is not warranted.
The Case Management Plan for the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar expressly authorized the procedure that the court followed. In relevant part, the Management Plan states:
Thus, under the terms of the Case Management Plan, the judge was vested with broad discretion to manage the Housing Conditions Civil Calendar by certifying this case to the Civil 2 Calendar or dismissing the case without prejudice so that appellant could refile it on the Civil 2 Calendar herself. Generally speaking, a judge in this position should certify the case rather than dismiss it, because a dismissal...
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