Hailes v. State

• Decision Date: 17 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 62, Sept. Term, 2014.,62, Sept. Term, 2014.
• Parties: Jermaine HAILES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

442 Md. 488

113 A.3d 608

Jermaine HAILES

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 62, Sept. Term, 2014.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 17, 2015.

Brian L. Zavin, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Carrie J. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and WATTS, JJ.

Opinion

WATTS, J.

We decide: (I) whether the State may appeal from a trial court's exclusion of intangible evidence based on a determination that the evidence's admission would be a constitutional violation; if so, (II) whether, here, a declarant made a dying declaration two years before dying; and, if so, (III) whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to dying declarations.

We hold that: (I) the State may appeal from a trial court's exclusion of intangible evidence based on a determination that the evidence's admission would be a constitutional violation; (II) here, a declarant made a dying declaration two years before dying; and (III) the Confrontation Clause is not applicable to dying declarations.

BACKGROUND

In the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (“the circuit court”), the State, Respondent, charged Jermaine Hailes (“Hailes”), Petitioner, with first-degree murder and other crimes. Hailes moved to suppress a pretrial identification on the grounds that the identification was, among other things: (1) hearsay; and (2) testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.

The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and issued an opinion in which the circuit court found the following facts, which we summarize. On November 22, 2010, Melvin Pate (“Pate”) was shot once in the right side of his face. The bullet entered Pate's neck and severed C5, the neck's fifth cervical bone. Pate lost the ability to speak and became quadriplegic (i.e., Pate lost the use of all of his extremities). Pate was taken to Prince George's Hospital Center. On November 24, 2010, Pate was transferred to the Shock Trauma Center at the University of Maryland Medical Center (“Shock Trauma”). Immediately after Pate arrived at Shock Trauma, doctors told Pate that he had twenty-four hours to live, and Pate's eyes welled up with tears.

On November 26, 2010, two detectives of the Prince George's County Police Department showed Pate a photographic array that included a photograph of Hailes. By blinking (“blink hard” if he recognized the person who shot him) in response to the detectives' questions, Pate identified Hailes as the shooter.¹ At that time, Pate was restrained to a hospital bed; was on medical life-support equipment, including a ventilator; had several tubes in his body; and, by all indications, believed that his death was imminent. Pate did not die soon afterward, however. In 2011, Pate was released from Shock Trauma. In November 2012, Pate died as a consequence of complications caused by the gunshot wound

.

The circuit court granted the motion to suppress, determining that Pate's identification of Hailes fell under the “dying declaration” exception to the rule against hearsay, but was testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The State appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that: (I) the State could appeal from the circuit court's grant of the motion to suppress Pate's identification of Hailes; (II) Pate made a dying declaration; and (III) the Confrontation Clause does not apply to dying declarations.See State v. Hailes, 217 Md.App. 212, 271, 225, 236, 251–52, 92 A.3d 544, 578, 552, 558, 567 (2014). Hailes filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. See Hailes v. State, 440 Md. 114, 99 A.3d 778 (2014).

DISCUSSION

I.

Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl.Vol., 2014 Supp.) (“CJP”) § 12–302(c)(4)(i)² provides in pertinent part:

[T]he State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

(Emphasis added).

Hailes contends that the State's appeal from the circuit court's grant of the motion to suppress is not authorized by CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i). Specifically, Hailes argues that, because CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) uses the word “seized,” CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) authorizes the State to appeal only from a trial court's exclusion of tangible evidence; thus, here, CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) does not authorize the State to appeal from the circuit court's exclusion of Pate's identification of Hailes because it is not tangible evidence capable of being seized. Alternatively, Hailes asserts that, because CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) uses the past-tense phrase “to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights,” CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) authorizes the State to appeal only from a trial court's exclusion of evidence based on an existing alleged constitutional³ violation—as opposed to an exclusion of evidence based on a determination that the evidence's admission itself would be a constitutional violation; thus, here, CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) does not authorize the State to appeal from the circuit court's exclusion of Pate's identification of Hailes because the detectives did not violate any constitutional provision in obtaining the identification. The State responds that it can appeal from the circuit court's grant of the motion to suppress because the General Assembly did not intend for the State to be able to appeal from a trial court's exclusion of evidence only where the evidence is tangible and/or where the exclusion is based on an existing alleged constitutional violation.

“In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute's language, which the court applies where the statute's language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose.” McCree v. State, 441 Md. 4, 9, 105 A.3d 456, 459 (2014) (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the statute's language is ambiguous or not clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, the court “search[es] for [the General Assembly's] intent in other indicia, including the history of the [statute] or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process[,]” in light of: (1) “the structure of the statute”; (2) “how [the statute] relates to other laws”; (3) the statute's “ general purpose”; and (4) “the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9, 20 A.3d 801, 806 (2011) (citation omitted).

In Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 345, 748 A.2d 478, 488 (2000), this Court held that the State cannot appeal from a trial court's exclusion of evidence based only on an alleged violation of a statute—as opposed to an alleged violation of a constitution. This Court stated that, as used in what is now CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i), the phrase “alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Maryland, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights” modifies both “evidence offered by the State” and “property.” See id. at 338–39, 748 A.2d at 485.

Here, first, we conclude that CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i)'s language is ambiguous in that the word “seized” renders unclear whether CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) authorizes the State to appeal only from a trial court's grant of a motion to suppress tangible evidence, as opposed to pretrial identifications and other intangible evidence. CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i)'s legislative history, however, conclusively establishes that the General Assembly did not intend for CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) to authorize the State to appeal only from a trial court's grant of a motion to suppress tangible evidence. In 1982, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 39, which added to CJP § 12–302 a provision whose relevant language is identical to the relevant language of what is now CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i). See 1982 Md. Laws 3107 (Ch. 493, S.B. 39). Senate Bill 39's file includes a document entitled “S.B. 39—Criminal Cases—State's Right to Appeal,” which states in pertinent part: “[Senate B]ill [39] is aimed at those cases in which the Judge excludes a defendant's confession, physical evidence (such as drugs), or any evidence which is at the heart of the State's case.” (Emphasis added).⁴ Senate Bill 39 is identical to Senate Bill 196 (Md.1981), whose file contains the following note on the hearing before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee: “The type of evidence which is involved includes physical evidence obtained by search and seizure, confessions or admissions, and identifications of the defendant. ” (Emphasis added). Thus, CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i)'s legislative history makes clear that the General Assembly intended for CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) to apply to both tangible evidence and intangible evidence alike.

Next, we conclude that CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i)'s language is ambiguous in that the past-tense phrase “to have been seized in violation of” a constitution renders unclear whether CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) authorizes the State to appeal only from a trial court's exclusion of evidence based on an existing alleged constitutional violation—as opposed to an exclusion of evidence based on a determination that the evidence's admission itself would be a constitutional violation. CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i)'s legislative history, however, conclusively establishes that the General Assembly did not intend for CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i) to authorize the State to appeal only from a trial court's exclusion of evidence based on an existing alleged constitutional violation. As discussed above, CJP § 12–302(c)(4)(i)'s legislative history indicates that the...