Hailey Marie-Joe Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.

Decision Date22 July 2014
Docket NumberNo. 2012AP2402.,2012AP2402.
Citation850 N.W.2d 866,356 Wis.2d 582,2014 WI 82
PartiesHailey Marie–Joe FORCE, a/k/a Hailey Marie–Joe Dziewa, a minor, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Joseph J. WELCENBACH, Plaintiff–Appellant, The Estate of Billy Joe Force, by its Special Administrator, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Jeffrey A. Brown and Regent Insurance Company, Defendants–Respondents. Mehgan Force, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Jason Oldenburg, and Lauren Force, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Jason Oldenburg, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffrey A. Brown, Defendants–Respondents, Regent Insurance Company, Defendant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

For the plaintiffs-appellants, there were briefs by Joseph J. Welcenbach and Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C., Milwaukee, and Jason R. Oldenburg and The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Joseph J. Welcenbach.

For the defendant-respondent American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffrey A. Brown, there was a brief by James C. Ratzel, Leslie A. Schunk, and Ratzel & Associates, LLC, Brookfield, and oral argument by Leslie A. Schunk.

For the defendant-respondent Regent Insurance Company there was a brief by Donald H. Piper, Jon D. Monson, and Piper & Schmidt, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Donald H. Piper.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Susan R. Tyndell, Peter M. Young, D. James Weis, and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Rhinelander, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association for Justice.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

¶ 1 This is an appeal of a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County, J. Mac Davis, Judge, granting summary judgment in favor of Jeffrey Brown, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, and Regent Insurance Company (collectively the defendants). The part of the judgment at issue here dismissed the consolidated actions of Hailey Marie–Joe Force, Mehgan Force, and Lauren Force, collectively the minor children of Billy Joe Force, the deceased, against the defendants.

¶ 2 The court of appeals certified the action to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.

¶ 3 The issue before the court is: Can minor children recover for the wrongful death of their father under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) (2011–12), 1 when the deceased leaves behind a spouse who was estranged from the deceased and who is precluded from recovering for the wrongful death?

¶ 4 Linda Force, the deceased's spouse in the instant case, is precluded from recovery for her husband's wrongful death because the circuit court dismissed her claim, concluding that she has no compensable damages under the wrongful death statute; this dismissal of Linda Force's wrongful death claim was not appealed.

¶ 5 In the instant case, Linda Force did not receive any financial support from the deceased from the time of their separation in 1997 to the deceased's death in 2008. Their long separation with no communication for many years was evidence that there was no interaction or affection between the spouses. The circuit court concluded that the unique facts of the instant case demonstrate that the deceased's spouse had no claim for damages for her husband's wrongful death under the wrongful death statutes. The dismissal of Linda Force's wrongful death claim is not before us.

¶ 6 The defendants argue that because the deceased's spouse is still living, she is a “surviving spouse” under the statutes; that her recovery for the wrongful death of her husband is zero; and that consequently the deceased's minor children do not have any set-aside from the surviving spouse's recovery.

¶ 7 The defendants rely on the statutory hierarchy of beneficiaries created by Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).2 The first class of beneficiaries is the surviving spouse, with a set-aside from his or her recovery for minor children “in recognition of the duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor children.” If there is a “surviving spouse,” other beneficiaries do not have a cause of action for wrongful death. If there is no “surviving spouse,” the cause of action passes to the next beneficiary in the statutory hierarchy.

¶ 8 We disagree with the defendants' interpretation of the statutes. We conclude that in order to avoid an absurd, unreasonable result contrary to the legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2),we construe the statutes under the unique facts of the instant case to allow the minor children to recover even though the deceased's spouse in the instant case is alive and does not (according to the circuit court) recover any damages for the deceased husband's wrongful death.

¶ 9 Our result comports with the dual legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes: (1) to impose liability on the wrongdoer; and (2) to protect relational interests, especially the interests of the deceased's minor dependent children.

¶ 10 The statutory interpretation advocated by the defendants would contravene these fundamental purposes of the wrongful death statutes by barring any wrongful death claim by Linda Force and the minor children, along with all lower-tier beneficiaries.

¶ 11 The defendants call for the unfair, unreasonable outcome that the Wisconsin legislature sought to avoid by enacting the first wrongful death statute in 1857: the wrongdoer would be immune from liability and no compensation would be recovered by the deceased's relatives who would have recovered had the deceased lived. The interpretation of “surviving spouse” should avoid such unreasonable, absurd results.

¶ 12 We examine the meaning of the phrase “surviving spouse” in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), in the unique fact scenario presented in this case.3 The words “surviving” and “spouse” are commonly used words. The text of the wrongful death statute does not define who is or is not a “surviving spouse.”

¶ 13 To interpret and apply the phrase “surviving spouse” in the wrongful death statutes, we examine the text of the wrongful death statutes using various interpretive aids. In interpreting words in a statutory text, we do more than focus on the dictionary definition of each word. Interpretive aids such as the legislative purpose, prior Wisconsin case law and case law from other jurisdictions, and statutory history help guide our interpretation of the phrase “surviving spouse.”

¶ 14 The legislative purposes are clear: impose liability on the tortfeasor and allow recovery by the deceased's relatives who would have recovered had the deceased lived. Our case law demonstrates that courts interpret the wrongful death statutes to apply to the unique fact situation presented by a case in order to meet the legislative purposes, rather than apply a strict literal interpretation of the phrase “surviving spouse.” Sister state case law similarly recognizes that a lower-tier beneficiary can maintain a claim even if a higher- tier beneficiary is alive, when the unique facts would otherwise contravene the purposes of the wrongful death statutes.

¶ 15 The statutory history of the wrongful death statutes demonstrates that the legislature has explicitly protected the rights of minor children to recover for wrongful death and left interpretation of the term “surviving spouse” to the courts in unique and specific fact situations.

¶ 16 Upon examining the statutory text with these interpretive aids, we conclude that the phrase “surviving spouse” in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not always simply mean any living spouse of the deceased. The meaning of the phrase “surviving spouse” has been elucidated by scrutinizing unique fact situations to define “surviving spouse” in accord with the legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, rather than considering only the literal meaning of the phrase “surviving spouse.”

¶ 17 For the reasons set forth, we interpret the phrase “surviving spouse” in the present case as not including Linda Force, the deceased's estranged spouse who, as a result of the circuit court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim (which was not appealed), is barred from recovery under Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2). If Linda Force is not a “surviving spouse” under the statute, the parties do not dispute that the minor children have a cognizable claim as lineal heirs. As lineal heirs of the deceased, the children would be first in line for any recovery for the wrongful death of their father.

¶ 18 We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment against the minor children and erred in dismissing the minor children's causes of action against the defendants for wrongful death. The minor children in the present case have a cause of action against the defendants for wrongful death as if Linda Force were not alive at the death of the deceased.4

¶ 19 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court against the children and in favor of the defendants and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

¶ 20 To assist the reader, here is a table of contents to this opinion:

Introduction: ¶¶ 1–20.

I. The facts and procedural history are not in dispute: ¶¶ 21–26.
II. We review a grant of summary judgment independently of the circuit court, using the same methodology as the circuit court: ¶¶ 27–31.
III. The statutory text provides some support for the defendant's interpretation, but in unique fact situations, the defendant's interpretation may not be a reasonable one: ¶¶ 32–55.

IV. The interpretation and application of the wrongful death statutes should be in accord with the explicit legislative purposes: (1) to render a wrongdoer liable when an injured party dies and (2) to compensate for the loss of a relational interest caused by the wrongful death, especially the interests of the minor children of the deceased: ¶¶ 56–68.

V. The Wisconsin case law and case law from other states reveal that “surviving spouse” does not always simply mean...

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