Hailu v. Morris-Hughes
| Decision Date | 23 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-cv-00020 (APM) |
| Parties | MULUGETA HAILU et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNIQUE N. MORRIS-HUGHES et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This action involves claims brought by Plaintiffs Mulugeta Hailu William Perry, Yohannes Woube, and Mizan Werede for alleged procedural due process and statutory violations in the District of Columbia's administration of their applications for unemployment benefits. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants District of Columbia, Mayor Muriel Bowser and the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (“DOES”), Unique N MorrisHughes, violated their constitutional and statutory rights by denying, terminating, and seizing unemployment benefits without providing adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge those actions. Specifically, they allege that Defendants (1) failed to provide written notice of adverse unemployment benefits determinations and (2) improperly refused to review on appeal adverse unemployment benefits determinations that lacked written findings.
On April 14, 2022, this court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had failed to establish “a likelihood of standing for purposes of obtaining either their requested prospective or retrospective relief.” Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 27, at 2. Two months later, Plaintiffs Hailu and Werede voluntarily dismissed their claims without prejudice.
Notice of Dismissal by Pls. Mulugeta Hailu and Mizan Werede, ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Notice of Dismissal]. The remaining plaintiffs, Mr. Perry and Mr. Woube, then withdrew “their claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive remedies based on future injury.” Notice by Pls. Yohannes Woube and William Perry Withdrawing Their Claims for Pros. Decl. & Inj. Rem., ECF No. 33 [hereinafter Notice Withdrawing Claims].
What remains of the case are claims by Mr. Perry and Mr. Woube seeking retrospective declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and nominal damages. Defendants again move to dismiss for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Compl., ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Defs.' MTD], Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 29-1 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot.]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
The court first addresses Plaintiffs' sole claim against Defendants Bowser and MorrisHughes in their official capacities. In Count One, Plaintiffs assert a “private right of action” under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for failure to provide adequate notice before depriving Plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected property rights. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 35-45. As to that claim, Plaintiffs seek: (1) prospective injunctive relief that prohibits Defendants from denying, terminating, or reducing benefits without a written decision, and (2) a declaration that Defendants' failure to provide notice and an opportunity to challenge decisions denying, terminating, or reducing benefits through offset violates the Due Process Clause. Compl. ¶ 45, 30-31 ().
As stated above, Plaintiffs no longer seek prospective injunctive relief. See Notice Withdrawing Claims. And the only Plaintiffs who alleged that Defendants had offset their benefits without adequate notice and opportunity to challenge-Hailu and Werede-have voluntarily dismissed their claims. Notice of Dismissal; see Compl. ¶¶ 28-34. Because the remaining plaintiffs no longer seek prospective injunctive relief, and no plaintiff remains who suffered injury arising from the challenged offset practices, Count One must be dismissed.[1]
Five counts remain against the District. Plaintiffs bring three counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District has a policy, custom, or practice of: (1) failing to provide adequate notice of the reasons for denying or terminating benefits, and (2) providing insufficient process for individuals to contest denials or terminations, each in violation of the Due Process Clause (Count II) and 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (Count III), id. ¶¶ 46-54, 66-76; and (3) not making timely determinations and payments of employment benefits in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (Count IV), id. ¶¶ 88-100. Plaintiffs' remaining two claims are for failing to follow mandatory notice and hearing procedures (Count V) and failing to make timely benefits determinations (Count VI) in violation of the D.C. Code and D.C. Municipal Regulations. Id. ¶¶ 101-18.
A.
The District asks the court to hold, as it did when denying the motion for preliminary injunction, that no plaintiff has standing as to any claim. Defs.' Mot. at 13-17. The court's present inquiry is different, however. First, this matter is at the motion to dismiss stage, which requires Plaintiffs only to make a plausible showing of standing. See Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Second, Plaintiffs have now dropped their demand for prospective relief, meaning that their failure to establish future injury is no longer dispositive. They now seek only retrospective relief. Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 31 , at 6.
.
In addressing standing, the court begins with general principles of law and then evaluates whether any plaintiff has standing as to “each claim” and “form of relief sought.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The judicial Power” of the federal courts extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, “and there is no justiciable case or controversy unless the plaintiff has standing,” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “To establish standing, [a] plaintiff must show (1) [he] has suffered a concrete and particularized injury (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision[] ....” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 376-77 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing standing, and “[e]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a complaint must state a plausible claim that the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Humane Soc'y, 797 F.3d at 8.
Courts must “accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). However, courts “do not assume the truth of legal conclusions, nor do [they] ‘accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.'” Id. (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted)). In determining standing, courts “may consider materials outside of the complaint.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In a case with multiple plaintiffs, “the court need only find one plaintiff who has standing” to proceed. Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
2.
The court first assesses whether either remaining Plaintiff has standing with respect to the claims asserted. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Perry has properly pleaded injury in fact for two time periods: (1) from June 6, 2020 to February 28, 2021, when Mr. Perry “filed a claim,” “was entitled to benefits,” and “DOES failed to pay, or notify him of any decision regarding[] the claim,” and (2) after February 28, 2021, when “DOES sent him a notice denying his claim” and “failed to pay, or notify him of any decision regarding[] the request for a redetermination of benefits previously denied.” Pls.' Opp'n at 7. Further, they argue that “Defendants injured Mr. Woube by denying his benefits claim without any notice or opportunity to be heard,” id. at 3, and by failing to notify him of his benefits determination in a timely manner, see Compl. ¶ 33. Because the court concludes that Mr. Woube has standing as to each claim, it does not evaluate Mr. Perry's case for standing.
Mr Woube first applied for unemployment benefits in April 2020 and did not receive a determination until mid-October 2020. Id. He received no opportunity to dispute the denied benefits, and the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) refused to hear his appeal because Mr. Woube “could not provide a written DOES decision explaining the basis for” the benefits determination. Id. ¶ 34. Taking these allegations as true, the court finds that Mr. Woube's injury (denial of benefits without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard)[2]is “fairly traceable” to the District's failure to provide adequate notice of his benefits determination; accordingly, Mr. Woube has standing to bring Counts II, III, and V. Furthermore, the record shows that Mr. Woube did not receive a benefits determination for six months after he first filed a...
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