Hain v. Jamison

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: STEIN, J.
• Citation: Hain v. Jamison, 2016 NY Slip Op 8583, 28 N.Y.3d 524, 68 N.E.3d 1233, 46 N.Y.S.3d 502 (N.Y. 2016)
• Decision Date: 22 December 2016
• Parties: Andrew J. HAIN, Individually and as Executor of Holly J. Hain, Deceased, Respondent, v. Angela J. JAMISON et al., Appellants, and Drumm Family Farm, Inc., Respondent.

28 N.Y.3d 524

68 N.E.3d 1233

46 N.Y.S.3d 502

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08583

Andrew J. HAIN, Individually and as Executor of Holly J. Hain, Deceased, Respondent,

v. Angela J. JAMISON et al., Appellants,andDrumm Family Farm, Inc., Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 22, 2016.

Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton (James P. O'Brien and Rachel A. Abbott of counsel), for appellants.

Cellino & Barnes, P.C., Buffalo (Ellen B. Sturm of counsel), for Andrew J. Hain, respondent.

Brian P. Fitzgerald, P.C., Buffalo (Derek J. Roller of counsel), for Drumm Family Farm, Inc., respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STEIN, J.

The sole issue before us on this appeal is whether defendant Drumm Family Farm, Inc., established its entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating the absence of a material question of fact regarding whether its alleged negligence was a proximate cause of decedent's death. We conclude that the Farm failed to meet its burden as the movant, and that proximate cause is, therefore, a question for the factfinder.

I.

Decedent, the wife of plaintiff, was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by one of the Jamison defendants as decedent was walking in the northbound lane of a rural road late one evening.¹ Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of decedent's estate, subsequently commenced this negligence action against the Jamison defendants and Drumm Family Farm, Inc. Plaintiff alleged that, at the time of the collision, decedent was assisting a calf that was loose in the roadway. The calf, owned by the Farm, had escaped its nearby enclosure.

The complaint alleged that the driver who struck decedent was negligent in operating her vehicle, and that the Farm was negligent for failing to maintain its fence and restrain or retrieve the calf, thereby allowing it to wander into the roadway. The Farm and the Jamison defendants answered the complaint, and asserted cross claims for contribution and indemnification.

Thereafter, the Farm moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims asserted against it, arguing that its alleged negligence in allowing the calf to escape or failing to retrieve it did not constitute a proximate cause of decedent's death. Rather, the Farm argued, decedent's intervening and unforeseeable act of exiting her vehicle and entering the roadway in an attempt to assist the calf, and the other driver's negligence in operating her vehicle, were the only proximate causes of decedent's death.

In support of its motion, the Farm proffered the driver's deposition testimony explaining the circumstances of the collision. According to the driver, she was traveling north on the road in question, shortly after 10:00 p.m., when she slowed her vehicle to maneuver a curve in the road. As she came around the bend, she saw "very bright" headlights from a vehicle pulled over on the left, or southbound, side of the road. As the driver's vision adjusted and she passed the stopped vehicle, she saw decedent in the road milliseconds before hitting her and what she thought, at the time, was a dog—but which she later learned was a calf.

The Farm also submitted portions of the deposition testimony of Daniel Drumm, the Farm's owner, wherein he recounted that the calf involved in the accident had been born earlier that day. Drumm averred that he did not know how the calf escaped his property, and that he did not learn of the calf's escape until his stepdaughter alerted him to it at approximately 10:00 p.m. Drumm's stepdaughter had, in turn, just learned that the calf was loose when another relative, who lived on the same property, telephoned to relay that, approximately 30 to 45 minutes earlier, a neighbor had seen the calf loose next to the road. Drumm testified that he immediately left his home to look for the calf, at which point he came upon the accident.

Plaintiff and the Jamison defendants opposed the Farm's motion, arguing that a question of fact existed regarding whether decedent's death was a foreseeable consequence of the Farm's negligence. Proof offered in opposition to the Farm's motion, including testimony from Drumm's deposition and the affidavit of a neighboring property owner, indicated that the fence surrounding the farm was in poor condition and that, on prior occasions, cows had escaped and wandered near and into the roadway, although Drumm asserted that the fence was intact at the time of the accident.

Supreme Court denied the Farm's motion, holding that it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that decedent's conduct in exiting her vehicle was sufficiently extraordinary and unforeseeable to break the chain of causation. Upon the Farm's appeal, the Appellate Division—with one Justice dissenting—reversed, granted the Farm's motion, and dismissed the complaint and cross claims as asserted against it (130 A.D.3d 1562, 14 N.Y.S.3d 267 [4th Dept.2015] ). The majority held that the Farm had established that its alleged negligence in allowing the calf to escape was not a proximate cause of decedent's death, reasoning that the Farm's negligence merely furnished the occasion for, but did not cause, decedent to enter the roadway, where she was struck by the Jamison vehicle.

The Jamison defendants sought leave to appeal the dismissal of their cross claims against the Farm; plaintiff did not move for leave to appeal. We granted the Jamison defendants leave to appeal (26 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 6457249 [2015] ),² and we now reverse.

II.

It is well settled that "[e]vidence of negligence is not enough by itself to establish liability," for it also must be proved that the negligence was a proximate, or legal, cause of the event that produced the harm sustained by the plaintiff (Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 501, 387 N.Y.S.2d 92, 354 N.E.2d 832 [1976] ). We have previously observed that "[t]he concept of proximate cause ... has proven to be an elusive one, incapable of being precisely defined to cover all situations" (Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 [1980] ). This is because the determination of proximate cause involves, among other things, policy-laden considerations; that is, the chain of causation must have an endpoint in order "to place manageable limits upon the liability that flows from negligent conduct" (id.; see Sewar v. Gagliardi Bros. Serv., 51 N.Y.2d 752, 759, 432 N.Y.S.2d 367, 411 N.E.2d 786 [1980, Fuchsberg, J., concurring]; Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 45 N.Y.2d 950, 952, 411 N.Y.S.2d 555, 383 N.E.2d 1149 [1978], mod. 46 N.Y.2d 770, 413 N.Y.S.2d 655, 386 N.E.2d 263 [1978] ).

The overarching principle governing determinations of proximate cause is that a "defendant's negligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is ‘a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury’ " (Mazella v. Beals, 27 N.Y.3d 694, 706, 37 N.Y.S.3d 46, 57 N.E.3d 1083 [2016], quoting Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ). Typically, the question of whether a particular act of negligence is a substantial cause of the plaintiff's injuries is one to be made by the factfinder, as such a determination turns upon questions of foreseeability and " ‘what is foreseeable and what is normal may be the subject of varying inferences' " (Kriz v. Schum, 75 N.Y.2d 25, 34, 550 N.Y.S.2d 584, 549 N.E.2d 1155 [1989], quoting Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ; see Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.3d 728, 737, 985 N.Y.S.2d 448, 8 N.E.3d 823 [2014] ).

When a question of proximate cause involves an intervening act, " ‘liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence’ " (Mazella, 27 N.Y.3d at 706, 37 N.Y.S.3d 46, 57 N.E.3d 1083 [emphasis added], quoting Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ). Thus, "[w]here the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed" (Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ). Rather, "[t]he mere fact that other persons share some responsibility for plaintiff's harm does not absolve defendant from liability because ‘there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury’ " (Mazella, 27 N.Y.3d at 706, 37 N.Y.S.3d 46, 57 N.E.3d 1083, quoting Argentina v. Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 554, 560 n. 2, 693 N.Y.S.2d 493, 715 N.E.2d 495 [1999] ). It is "[o]nly where ‘the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct,’ [that it] may ... possibly ‘break[ ] the causal nexus' " (Mazella, 27 N.Y.3d at 706, 37 N.Y.S.3d 46, 57 N.E.3d 1083, quoting Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ; see Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 33, 462 N.Y.S.2d 831, 449 N.E.2d 725 [1983] ). To state the inverse of this rule, liability subsists "[w]hen ... the intervening act is a natural and foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by defendant" (Kush, 59 N.Y.2d at 33, 462 N.Y.S.2d 831, 449 N.E.2d 725 ; Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological Assoc., 72 N.Y.2d 632, 636, 536 N.Y.S.2d 11, 532 N.E.2d 1239 [1988] ).

Although foreseeability and proximate cause are generally questions for the factfinder, there are instances in which proximate cause can be determined as a matter of law because "only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts" (Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 ; see Ventricelli, 45 N.Y.2d at 952, 411 N.Y.S.2d 555, 383 N.E.2d 1149 ). Such cases may arise when the plaintiff's injuries are caused by "independent intervening acts which operate upon but do not flow from the original negligence" (Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666 [emphasis added]; see Campbell v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 7 N.Y.3d 819, 821, 822 N.Y.S.2d...