Haines' Adm'r v. Watts' Adm'r

• Decision Date: 27 May 1891
• Citation: 53 N.J.E. 455,21 A. 1032
• Parties: HAINES' ADM'R v. WATTS' ADM'R.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

21 A. 1032

53 N.J.E. 455

HAINES' ADM'R

v. WATTS' ADM'R.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 27, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Essex county.

H. W. Hayes, for plaintiff in error.

F. W. Stevens, for defendant in error.

GARRISON, J. The question in this case is whether the debt sued upon was barred by the statute of limitations.

At the trial the plaintiff, without objection, introduced testimony competent to prove the following state of facts:

In 1863, George Watts, the defendant's intestate, was in partnership with his brother, William, under the firm name of George Watts, and owed as a partnership obligation to William T. Haines, the plaintiff's intestate, a liquidated debt of large amount. In the same year Haines removed with his family to Canada, where he remained until 1868. During these years Haines received at stated intervals from the Wattses drafts for sums of money accompanied by letters, many of which have been preserved, and were offered and admitted in evidence. In 1868, Haines returned to Newark, and from this time forth continued to receive from the Wattses sums of money, the payments of which assumed a marked regularity, both as to time and amount, namely, $20 per month. In addition to this, Haines acted as night watchman for the Wattses and received $12 per week extra. These payments continued down to the death of Haines in 1875. After Haines' death the Wattses paid to his widow the sum of $10 per week, which was sent to her regularly once in each week by the cashier of the Wattses' concern, sealed in an envelope bearing her name and the amount. These payments to the widow continued down to the death of William Watts in 1883. Within six years from the date of the last payment so made this action was brought against the administrator of George Watts, who had survived his brother, William. During the period covered by this transaction many of the payments were accompanied by statements and declarations made by both partners tending to show that they were payments on account of a larger indebtedness. Especially was this true during the earlier part of the time. Later, when the system of payments had continued for many years with regularity, little or nothing was said at the time of payments concerning their object. The amount thus paid was over $0,000, and the period over which the payments extended was nearly 20 years. In this condition of the proofs the plaintiff was nonsuited upon the ground that the payments made within the six years next before suit brought had not been shown to he upon account of the debt in controversy. The view of the plaintiff's case held by the trial court, and the principle of law deemed applicable to such a state of facts, sufficiently appear in the following quotation from the remarks of the circuit judge at the time the nonsuit was granted:

"The evidence," he says, in reviewing the plaintiff's case, "shows that in July, 1863, Haines went to Canada, and remained there until 1868. During the time he remained in Canada moneys were remitted by the Wattses to Canada to him for his benefit. Those remittances were of a character that would seem to be in the nature of a payment on account of some debt. The proof also is that letters were written by the Wattses to Haiues during that time which would tend to show that those payments were made possibly on the account now in controversy. It is not a matter of any importance to consider that class of testimony, because this suit was begun in 1889, and the six years which is the period prescribed by the statute of limitations would have expired in 1883. The contention in this case is—and on that it must rest—that after the 1st of January, 1883, (which would be six years before the commencement of this suit,) such a payment had been made on account of this debt as would take the case out of the statute or limitations."

The general principle of law to be deduced from this language is that a plaintiff whose claim has been met by the statute of limitations, and who relies upon a new promise, evidenced by part payment within six years, must confine his proofs to such matters only as happened within those six years, and may not, in order to show the character and purpose of such payments, introduce in evidence any proof of a continuous transaction which antedates the running of the statute; in fine, that the statute is not only a bar to the old cause of action, but is also a bar to the evidence by which the new one may be proved.

In the case before us the proposition of the plaintiff, stated generally, was that in 1863 there had been a liquidation of the debt due him, and an undertaking by the debtor looking towards the gradual extinguishment of the entire debt; that this undertaking had been acted upon by both parties, and that it was evinced by numerous letters from the defendant accompanying part payments, and had been manifested by its continuous performance for almost 20 years, and until nearly $10,000 had been paid upon the original debt. The application to this state of facts of the principle of law adverted to is to deny to the plaintiff the right to show the true nature of payments made within the statutory period by any proof tending to show that they formed part of a system of payments, the character of which was settled at its inception, and can still be shown by the conduct of the parties and the declarations of the debtor himself, unless such payments and the declarations which...