Haines v. Branson Cabin Rentals, LLC
| Decision Date | 07 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 36836,SD 36836 |
| Citation | 635 S.W.3d 172 |
| Parties | Terry R. HAINES and Zelma M. Haines, Trustees of the Terry R. Haines and Zelma M. Haines Revocable Trust, et al., Plaintiffs, Connie Burch, Jeffrey Finnell, and Kathryn L. Finnell, Appellants, v. BRANSON CABIN RENTALS, LLC, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appellants’ attorney: Rick J. Muenks, Springfield.
Respondents’ attorney: Greggory D. Groves, Springfield.
Appellants1 own condominium units subject to the Declaration of the Cabins at Grand Mountain Condominium ("Declaration"). The Declaration provides, "No Owner ... may rent his [unit] for a period of less than thirty (30) days except that [units] may be rented as a part of a nightly/weekly/monthly rental program managed by ... [Respondents]." The Declaration also provides that Branson Cabin Rentals, LLC, and Thousand Hills Management Company, Inc. (collectively "Respondents"), have the exclusive right to operate and regulate short-term rental of condominium units. We will refer to these provisions collectively as the "Management Program."
Appellants began to rent their units on a nightly or weekly basis through a management company other than Respondents. The condominium owner's association assessed a daily fine of $50 against Appellants when they used a management company other than Respondents for short-term rentals.
Appellants sued Respondents for a declaration that the Management Program is void and unenforceable. They also sought to enjoin the condominium owner's association from fining them for self-managing nightly rentals of their units. After considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Respondents, finding that the Management Program is a valid use restriction and not a development right. The judgment was certified for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b).
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction. Wilson v. City of St. Louis , 600 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 2020). " ‘The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’ " Id. at 767 (). This appeal falls under the general appeal statute, § 512.020(5),2 which provides that final judgments are appealable.
The judgment in this case is not final in the sense that it resolves all claims by and against all parties, leaving nothing for future determination. Wilson , 600 S.W.3d at 768. It is deemed to be final, however, because it has been certified for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b) and it disposes of a judicial unit. Id. at 769-71. The judgment here satisfies both of the Supreme Court's definitions of a "judicial unit" in that it disposes of all pending claims between Appellants, Branson Cabin Rentals, LLC, and Thousand Hills Management Company, Inc., and Appellants’ remaining claim for injunctive relief against The Cabins at Grand Mountain Owner's Association, Inc.,3 is sufficiently distinct from the dismissed declaratory judgment claim. See id. at 771-72.
We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in certifying its judgment under Rule 74.01(b) and that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. E.M. by and through McInnis v. Gateway Region Young Men's Christian Ass'n , 613 S.W.3d 388, 395 (Mo. App. 2020).
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Behrick v. Konert Farms Homeowners’ Ass'n , 601 S.W.3d 567, 572 (Mo. App. 2020). Interpretation of the language of the Declaration also is reviewed under the de novo standard. Mullin v. Silvercreek Condo. Owner's Ass'n, Inc. , 195 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Mo. App. 2006).
"In determining the meaning of [declaration] provisions, we consider the document as a whole and give the words their natural and ordinary meaning." Willows Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Kraus , 467 S.W.3d 312, 314 (Mo. App. 2015). "We will find ambiguity in these provisions only if the terms are susceptible of more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly and honestly differ in the construction of the terms." Id.
We construe condominium declarations strictly. Clampit v. Cambridge Phase II Corp. , 884 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Mo. App. 1994). "The rule of strict construction means that we cannot give the declaration ... a broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms, and we cannot presume anything that is not expressed by the declaration." Taticek v. Homefield Gardens Condo. Ass'n , 502 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Mo. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). This provides condominium buyers with confidence that what they see is what they get, and that a court acting under its equity powers will not act in contravention of the Declaration. Clampit , 884 S.W.2d at 345.
"Condominium ownership is a creature of statute." Id. The Uniform Condominium Act, § 448.1-101 et seq. ("UCA"), applies to all condominiums created in Missouri after September 28, 1983. Section 448.1-102. As relevant to this appeal, the UCA contains the following definitions:
A condominium declaration must include, "A description of any development rights and other special declarant rights reserved by the declarant,...
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