Haines v. Hayden
| Decision Date | 21 April 1893 |
| Citation | 54 N.W. 911,95 Mich. 332 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | HAINES v. HAYDEN. |
Error to circuit court, Kent county; Allen C. Adsit, Judge.
The will of James H. Brown was admitted to probate, and Alice I Hayden, to contest the will on the ground of testamentary incapacity and undue influence, appealed to the circuit court, where a trial by jury resulted in a judgment against the will, and proponent appeals. Affirmed.
A charge that if testator executed a will under an insane delusion that a story in regard to contestant's legitimacy was true, and it was the cause of his making an unequal disposition of his property, when in fact the whole story was false, then there was such a mental delusion as would avoid the will, could not have misled the jury, where they were further charged that "a person persistently believing supposed facts which have no real existence against all evidence and probability, and conducting himself on the assumption of their existence, is, so far as such facts are concerned, under an insane delusion.
Dunham & Preston, ( Blair, Kingsley & Kleinhaus and Alfred Russell, of counsel,) for appellant.
Clark H. Gleason, ( Edwin F. Uhl and Mitchell J. Smiley, of counsel,) for appellee.
On the 25th day of June, 1891, James H. Brown died, at the age of 84, leaving an estate amounting to about $160,000. He had on the 10th day of February, 1881, executed in due form an instrument as and for his last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate in the probate court. On appeal to the circuit of Kent county a contest was made on the two grounds of mental incapacity of the testator, and undue influence exerted by the proponent, Margaret L. Haines. The proponent and contestant are full sisters. At the time of the execution of the will the wife and mother was still living and the natural objects of the testator's bounty were the aged and invalid wife and the two sisters who are here litigants. When the will was made Mrs. Hayden was a resident of Denver, Col., and Mrs. Haines was a widow, her former husband, Mr. Rogers, having died in 1880. She continued to reside in Grandville, a few miles from the city of Grand Rapids, the testator's home. The will, as drawn contained the following provision: "I give and bequeath to my said daughter Margaretta L. Rogers $10,000, in trust for the benefit of my daughter Alice I. Hayden, wife of Charles Hayden, now living at Denver, in the state of Colorado, to be used by my said daughter Margaretta L. Rogers for the benefit and support and maintenance of my said daughter Alice I. Hayden during her natural life, after the death of the said Charles Hayden, her husband, and at any time when from personal injury or ill health he shall be unable to support his wife during his lifetime, and to be paid to the said Alice I. Hayden under the circumstances and upon the contingencies last above mentioned, in such sums and at such times as in the judgment of my said daughter Margaretta L. Rogers the said Alice I. Hayden may need the same; and after the death of said Alice I. Hayden I give and bequeath the said sum, $10,000, or what shall remain of the same at that time, to the said Margaretta L. Rogers, her heirs and assigns, forever." The wife was given, in lieu of dower and statutory allowances, some small items of personal property in the house, and what money should be in the house at the time of the testator's death, the use of the homestead during her life, and a further provision of the will was a bequest of $5,000 to Margaret, in trust for the benefit of the wife during her life, the residue to go to Margaret. The remainder of the estate was bequeathed absolutely to Margaret, and she was named as one of the executors of the will. An agreement was drawn, bearing the same date, which provided that Hon. J. W. Ransom was to act as managing executor, and account to Margaret. This agreement was signed by Margaret within a day or two of the execution of the will. Both the question of undue influence and mental incapacity were submitted to the jury, and a general verdict against the will returned. The proponent appeals, and assigns error upon rulings as to the admissibility of testimony, upon the charge of the court, and upon the refusal of the court to charge as requested. The assignments number 429. Many of them have been abandoned, and such others of them as we think important can be grouped in a manner which will lead to an understanding of the questions involved.
It is first contended that there is no testimony in the case having a legitimate tendency to show that testator was mentally unsound at the time of the execution of the will, in 1881, or that he was a monomaniac upon the subject of Alice's legitimacy; and in this connection it is urged that the two theories of contestant, namely, that the deceased was possessed of an insane delusion on the subject and that Margaret had so poisoned her father's mind as to induce belief in her false claim as to Alice's legitimacy, are at variance. It is claimed that even if there was evidence of insane delusion, yet that under the instructions of the court the jury were permitted to treat a mistake of fact induced by false evidence as amounting to a delusion. It is also claimed that the court erred in allowing too wide a range to contestant in the introduction of testimony as to the declarations of the testator after the making of the will, and that such inquiry should be limited to a period so near the date of the execution as to form a part of the res gestate. It is also claimed that subsequent facts and circumstances were introduced, and that these were incompetent. It is contended that even if the testimony tending to show subsequent evil influences be admissible to rebut an inference of subsequent ratification, or to overcome an inference in favor of freedom of action, to be drawn from the fact that the will was not destroyed, yet that such testimony is not competent to be considered by the jury as tending to prove the original exercise of undue influences, and that in the present case the jury was permitted to consider it for that purpose and for all purposes, and also that changed conditions rendered the testimony incompetent to prove by inference undue influence. The case as made out by the contestant was most extraordinary. The contestant's theory is that, when this instrument was made, Mr. Brown had become possessed of the notion that Alice was not his daughter, and that this idea was either an insane delusion, or that such belief was induced by the proponent, who had, with the purpose of inducing him to disinherit her sister, poisoned her father's mind by concocting a story to the effect that many years before, and within a year prior to the birth of Alice, while the family resided in Adrian, she, (Margaret,) upon returning from school one day, discovered her mother and one Dr. Hoyt lying on the bed together in a compromising position. The evidence offered on behalf of contestant tended to show that the testator up to and during the year 1880, the occasion of her last visit home prior to the making of the will, was very affectionate towards her, and that she was apparently his favorite as between the two daughters. That, prior to the time of making the will, deceased had repeatedly declared that he did not intend to make a will, and, in effect, that he expected his property to go to his children in equal parts. That, on the occasion of the visit in Grand Rapids in 1880, she, in confidential conversation with her sister, stated that she hoped her mother would outlive her father, as her father would be likely to marry again, and she thought her mother would not. That in this same conversation the proponent told contestant that her father was an unchaste man; that he had been intimate with two of her aunts; and also that her mother was unchaste; that she had been criminally intimate with Dr. Hoyt; and that she (Alice) was the daughter of Dr. Hoyt. That at about this time the deceased commenced to visit his daughter Margaret at Grandville more frequently than before, and that upon the occasion of these visits he would return to his home morose, sullen, and irritable, and would avoid the society of his wife. That he visited Margaret the Sunday before the will was made, and that, when he went to Mr. Ransom to have the will drawn, it was with the purpose of entirely disinheriting his daughter Alice. That he was only induced by Mr. Ransom to make for her the uncertain provision finally incorporated as above quoted. That he afterwards told Mr. Ransom, under circumstances which may well lead to the inference that it was offered as explanatory of the terms of the will, that Alice was not his daughter. That no other source is shown for the origin of this story than Margaret. That Margaret herself testified in the probate court that she did within a year prior to Alice's birth witness conduct on the part of her mother and Dr. Hoyt, from which an inference of Alice's illegitimacy could fairly be drawn. That she denied having ever repeated the story except to her first husband, who died in 1880, and that the testator from this time on showed a coolness towards Alice, and avoided private conversation with her on her subsequent return to Grand Rapids. That on one occasion he asked her if she had told Margaret that she wished him dead. That she denied the story, and asked that she might be taken to Margaret, that she might deny the story to her, but her father dissuaded her. That Margaret often visited the city, and held conversations with her father outside of the house, and did not call upon her mother. That deceased said to others that Alice was not his daughter, and that Margaret afterwards did in fact tell her fath...
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