Haire v. 5445 Caruth Haven Lane Apartments Owner LLC
| Decision Date | 22 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil 3:21-CV-3127-S-BK |
| Parties | Tiffany Haire, Plaintiff, v. 5445 Caruth Haven Lane Apartments Owner LLC, Lincoln Property Company Inc., Travis Bowels, Nikki Saldana, Elia Nieto, Libby Hassell, Jennifer Morris, Jennifer Styers, Carolyn Taylor, UBS Realty Investors LLC, Bhavin Parekh, and Jennifer L. Owen, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for pretrial management. The Court now considers Defendants Hassell, Morris & Styers's Second Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Doc. 36, and Defendant Carolyn Taylor's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), Doc. 44. For the reasons that follow, the motions should be GRANTED.
This case stems from events surrounding Plaintiff's eviction from her apartment. She alleges in her pro se amended complaint that Defendant 5445 Caruth Haven Lane Apartments Owner LLC (“Caruth Haven”) and three of its employees harassed and discriminated against her in violation of her rights under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) by refusing to accommodate her request to walk her “emotional support” cat, Pumpkin, off leash in the apartment complex. Doc. 33 at 7-9. As relevant here, Plaintiff asserts that her former Caruth Haven neighbors, Defendants Libby Hassell (“Hassell”) and Jennifer Morris (“Morris”), falsely alleged Plaintiff had threatened them during a meeting with Caruth Haven management in July 2019 and in separate written statements thereafter. Doc. 33 at 5-6. Plaintiff further avers that Defendant Jennifer Styers, a friend of Hassell and Morris (collectively, the “Hassell Parties”) “verbally attacked” Plaintiff in July 2019 while she was walking Pumpkin, thereby defaming her character and subjecting her to ridicule, embarrassment, and public humiliation. Doc. 33 at 6. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that her former neighbor, Defendant Carolyn Taylor (“Taylor” and, collectively with the Hassell Parties, the “Individual Defendants”), (1) made false statements about Plaintiff during an investigation into Plaintiff's complaints to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and (2) harassed and threatened her. Doc. 33 at 6, 8.
Liberally construing her complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against the Individual Defendants for defamation of character and “aiding and abetting” and for conspiring with each other to engage in such conduct.[1] Doc. 33 at 6, 9. Plaintiff also arguably asserts that the Individual Defendants violated section 3617 of the FHA by harassing and intimidating her. Doc. 33 at 8-9.
The Hassell Parties now move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, partly for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and partly for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Doc. 36. Taylor seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Doc. 44.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). In the event of such a challenge, the party asserting jurisdiction “constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2013). A court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented with undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Clark v. Tarrant Cty., Tex., 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986).
Concomitantly, a plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) when the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff's complaint should “contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.” Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).
The Hassell Parties contend that to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege FHA claims against them, her allegations are not plausible for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction because she does not claim they discriminated against or harassed her based on a disability, but rather because she impermissibly walked Pumpkin unleashed at Caruth Haven. Doc. 36 at 3-4. Similarly, Taylor asserts that, as Plaintiff's former neighbor, she is not a proper defendant under the FHA because Plaintiff does not allege Taylor (1) knew of her disability or (2) acted as an “agent” on behalf of Caruth Haven in evicting her. Doc. 44 at 8-11.
Giving Plaintiff's complaint its most expansive construction, the only FHA provision she even arguably invokes against the Individual Defendants is 42 U.S.C. § 3617.[2] SeeHaines v.Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (). Section 3617 prohibits retaliation against an individual for exercising her rights under the FHA or helping another do so, to wit: “[i]t shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by” specified sections of the FHA.[3] 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998) (). Thus, although the Hassell Parties invoke Rule 12(b)(1), the undersigned will address Plaintiff's FHA claims on the merits.
The gist of these claims is that the Individual Defendants violated section 3617 by harassing Plaintiff for walking Pumpkin off leash despite her (unspecified) disability. Doc. 33 at 5-6, 8-9. But viable section 3617 claims generally are limited to housing providers and their agents/employees. See Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2010) (landlord); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1993) (landlord); Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1997) (apartment owner); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280-85, 287 (2003) (). Plaintiff makes no plausible suggestion in the operative complaint that the Individual Defendants acted in any such capacity.
Indeed, Plaintiff has pointed to no legal support for holding a neighbor - let alone a neighbor's friend - liable under the circumstances presented here. The Court's research also reveals no binding precedent on point. Cf.Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2021) (plaintiff failed to state claim where complaint provided no factual basis to infer defendants had “substantial control over” co-tenant, nor could such control be reasonably presumed to exist in the “typically arms-length relationship between landlord and tenant”); but see Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 328 (7th Cir. 2004) ( Jewish plaintiffs stated a section 3617 claim against homeowners' association where its president wrote “H-town property” on the wall of their home, vandalized their property, applied chemicals to their yard against their wishes, and association destroyed records of meeting where president threatened to “make an example” of plaintiffs); Sofarelli v. PinellasCty., 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991) ( dismissal of plaintiff's section 3617 claim where plaintiff alleged that community members (1) threatened “to break [plaintiff] in half” if he did not leave neighborhood, (2) ran up to plaintiff's truck, hitting it, shouting obscenities, and spitting at plaintiff, and (3) were quoted in local newspaper as saying they did not want black people to move into the community).
Even putting aside the lack of applicable precedent, the conduct Plaintiff alleges against the Individual Defendants does not rise to the level of coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference necessary to state a claim under section 3617. When Congress enacted the FHA, it did not intend to “convert every quarrel among neighbors . . . into a federal case.” Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., CIV. A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (citation omitted), aff'd 235 Fed.Appx. 227 (5th Cir. 2007) (per...
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