Hairston v. Allen, 2081 MDA 2015
| Decision Date | 16 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2081 MDA 2015,2081 MDA 2015 |
| Citation | 153 A.3d 999 |
| Parties | Alexander HAIRSTON v. Shannon R. ALLEN i/d/b/a Grabs, Inc. ; i/d/b/a Jugs & Mugs; and Joshua Miller, individually Appeal of: Shannon R. Allen |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Andrew D. Bigda, Forty Fort, for appellant.
William M. Blaum, Moosic, for Hairston, appellee.
Appellant, Shannon R. Allen, appeals from the order entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition for an order directing Appellee, Alexander Hairston, to amend his praecipe for entry of judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On October 4, 2009, Appellee went to a bar owned by Appellant Allen and/or Grabs, Inc. and doing business as Jugs & Mugs in Luzerne County, PA. Appellee alleged Appellant asked Appellee to help clear out a group of unruly patrons in the bar, including Joshua Miller and his companions. A scuffle ensued, during which Mr. Miller reached over one of his companions and slashed Appellee with a knife across his face. As a result of the assault, Appellee claimed he sustained serious injuries to his face and body. Appellee filed a complaint on June 20, 2011, alleging intentional tort, assault and battery against Mr. Miller, and negligence against Grabs, Inc. and Appellant as the bar owners. The complaint did not allege joint and several liability or assert the defendants were joint tortfeasors. Pretrial discovery ensued.
On December 10, 2014, the case was referred to compulsory arbitration because the amount in controversy was $50,000.00 or less. After an arbitration hearing on January 26, 2015, the panel of arbitrators issued an award in favor of Appellee in the amount of $40,000.00. The arbitrators apportioned liability against Mr. Miller at 85% and against Appellant at 15%; this award did not impose joint and several liability. The prothonotary correctly docketed the award as apportioned, with notice per Pa.R.C.P. 1307 to all parties on the same day. No party appealed the arbitration award.
Appellee filed a praecipe for judgment on April 8, 2015, in the amount of $40,000.00, plus $400.00 in interest, against Mr. Miller and Appellant, certifying notice of the praecipe per Pa.R.C.P. 237. Attached to the praecipe was a copy of the arbitration award, as apportioned between Mr. Miller and Appellant. The prothonotary entered judgment, in the correctly apportioned amounts, on the arbitration award with the attachments and issued notice of entry of judgment to both parties on the same day.
On April 28, 2015, Appellant filed a petition, requesting the court to order Appellee to amend his praecipe for judgment because Appellee's praecipe "misrepresented" the award where the judgment entered was not properly apportioned. Appellee filed an answer on May 13, 2015. On October 20, 2015, the court denied Appellant's petition for amendment. Appellant timely appealed on November 17, 2015.1 On December 15, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellant timely filed on January 4, 2016.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW, AN AWARD THAT IS "APPORTIONED" BETWEEN INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT TORTFEASORS LIMITS THE NEGLIGENT TORTFEASORS' LIABILITY TO THE HARM HE CAUSED. IS A COMPULSORY ARBITRATORS' UNAPPEALED APPORTIONED AWARD BETWEEN THESE TORTFEASORS ENFORCEABLE?
Appellant initially argues the arbitrators decided as a matter of law to apportion liability between Mr. Miller and Appellant, and Appellant should be responsible only for the harm he caused. In other words, Appellant claims the award did not result in joint and several liability, so he is accountable just for his share of the award, not for the entire award. Although Appellee sustained a single injury, the arbitrators determined the harm did not defy reasonable apportionment and could be allocated between Mr. Miller and Appellant. Because the arbitrators in this case, as the judges of both law and fact, unanimously decided to apportion the award between Appellant and Mr. Miller, Appellant states he and Mr. Miller are not joint tortfeasors. As a result, Appellee cannot execute on the judgment in full solely against Appellant.
Additionally, Appellant contends the trial court had no after-the-fact authority to revisit the arbitrators' decision to apportion the harm and damages, as the arbitrators' decision was final upon expiration of the appeal period. Appellant stresses Appellee's only remedy was to appeal the arbitration award within thirty days, if he wanted a single judgment; and Appellee did not appeal.
Finally, Appellant argues the court erred by relying on the preamended version of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act ("Act"),2 because the Act applies to actions sounding in negligence only. Appellant submits the Act does not apply to this case, where Appellee averred one count of intentional/willful conduct against Mr. Miller and one count of negligence against Appellant. Appellant insists both counts must be grounded in negligence for the Act to apply in this case. Appellant concludes Appellee cannot be allowed to praecipe for a judgment that conflicts with the arbitrators' apportioned award, after the appeal period has run; and the court overstepped its authority and misapplied the law in allowing the full judgment to be enforced solely against Appellant. We agree.
In compulsory arbitration, the board of arbitrators conducts the hearing as a judge would conduct a trial without a jury, ruling on legal as well as factual matters. Conner v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 820 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa.Super. 2003). Whether the harm sustained is capable of apportionment is a question of law. Capone v. Donovan , 332 Pa.Super. 185, 480 A.2d 1249, 1251 (1984). Apportionment is a practical inquiry into the specific circumstances and depends on the unique context of each case. Glomb v. Glomb , 366 Pa.Super. 206, 530 A.2d 1362, 1365–66 (1987) (en banc ), appeal denied , 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988). Allocation of liability among distinct causes is possible when the injured party suffers discrete harms or a reasonable basis exists to define the contribution of each cause to a single harm. Id. at 1365. Once the trier of law's decision to apportion liability is made, the trier of fact then decides how to allocate the fault. Voyles v. Corwin , 295 Pa.Super. 126, 441 A.2d 381, 383 (1982).
"When a board of arbitrators issues its award and disposes of the claims before it, its decision is final unless and until it is appealed." Connor, supra at 1272. If a party is dissatisfied with a compulsory arbitration award, he has the right to appeal for a trial de novo within thirty days. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d) ; Pa.R.C.P. 1308. If no appeal is filed within thirty days, the prothonotary, upon praecipe , shall enter judgment on the arbitration award as rendered. See Pa.R.C.P. 1307(c).
The law on comparative negligence is codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102. Amendments to this statute are applied prospectively only. Costa v. Lair , 241 Pa.Super. 517, 363 A.2d 1313, 1314 (1976). See alsoSlaughter v. Pennsylvania X–Ray Corp. , 638 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1981) (). Further, Section 7102 applies only in actions founded in negligence. McMeekin v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc. , 365 Pa.Super. 580, 530 A.2d 462, 464 (1987), appeal denied , 518 Pa. 619, 541 A.2d 746 (1988). The statute in effect at the time of the incident at issue provided:
42 Pa.C.S.A. 7102(a) –(b) (emphasis added).3 Apportionment of damages was not the standard under the prior version of Section 7102 ; nevertheless, apportionment was still allowed after an inquiry into the specific circumstances of the case. Glomb, supra.4 In reviewing a decision to apportion damages under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102, the standard is whether there are evidentiary circumstances or incontrovertible facts of such weight as to convince the court an injustice occurred, not whether the reviewing court would have come to a different decision. Lopa v. McGee , 373 Pa.Super. 85, 540 A.2d 311, 312 (1988).
In the instant case, Appellee was assaulted in Appellant's establishment on October 4, 2009, during a bar fight. Mr. Miller, another bar patron, cut Appellee with a knife. Appellee filed a complaint on June 20, 2011, in which he asserted intentional tort, assault and battery against Mr. Miller, and negligence against Grabs, Inc. and Appellant as the bar owners. The complaint did not allege joint and several liability or assert the defendants were joint...
To continue reading
Request your trial