Hairston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 14-13218
| Decision Date | 07 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-13218 |
| Parties | THERESA HAIRSTON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt 16, 19)
On August 20, 2014, plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), District Judge David M. Lawson referred this matter to the undersigned for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits. (Dkt. 17). This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 16, 19).
Plaintiff filed the instant claims for period of disability, disability insurance, and supplemental security income benefits on January 26, 2012, alleging disabilitybeginning August 21, 2006. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64). At the hearing, plaintiff amended the alleged onset date to September 30, 2010. Id. Plaintiff's claim was initially disapproved by the Commissioner on April 24, 2012. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing and on April 8, 2013, plaintiff appeared, along with her attorney, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Patrick J. MacLean, who considered the case de novo. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64-75).1 In a decision dated April 25, 2013, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. Id. Plaintiff requested a review of this decision on May 30, 2013. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 64). The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, after the review of additional exhibits,2 the Appeals Council on August 11, 2014, denied plaintiff's request for review. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 55-57); Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004).
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS thatplaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and that the findings of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff was born in 1970 and was 42 years old at the time of the administrative hearing, and 39 years old the alleged onset date of disability. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 66). The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to plaintiff's claim and found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 81-82). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff's multi-level degenerative changes in the lumbosacral spine, left shoulder impingement syndrome, right foot pain, and obesity were "severe" within the meaning of the second sequential step. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 67). At step three, the ALJ found no evidence that plaintiff's combination of impairments met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. Id. The ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant can stand or walk for approximately two hours in an 8-hour workday and sit for approximately six hours in an 8-hour workday, with normal breaks. The claimant requires asit/stand option alternatively at will every thirty minutes. The claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs. The claimant is unable to reach fully extended, perform overhead reaching or handling, or push or pull with the left upper extremity. The claimant should avoid concentrated use of moving machinery or exposure to unprotected heights.
(Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 68). At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as an inspector. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 73). At step five, the ALJ denied plaintiff benefits because plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs available in the national economy. (Dkt. 11-2, Pg ID 73-74).
According to plaintiff, the ALJ looked for any evidence that would allow him to find that she was not disabled. Plaintiff maintains that there is not substantial evidence cited in the opinion to find her disabled, only an interpretation of the ALJ's reading of the medical records that were provided as the basis for the denial. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ used what was not present in the record or recorded at the various doctors visits to find her not disabled. He also used an MRI that was not completed as his basis for finding her not disabled, rather than the other two MRIs that were completed. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial evidence, rather by interpreting the record regarding undocumented items and deciding to use aparticular MRI.
Additionally, the ALJ makes reference in his opinion that in September of 2011, when plaintiff returned to her doctor with complaints of right leg pain, it was unclear if her medications were altered, however, in May of 2011, Tramadol was actually added to her medications, not appearing before in the record provided. In January of 2012, she was placed on Vicodin. Plaintiff points out that there are no additional records subsequent to early 2012 to determine what happened with the Vicodin and whether that helped even though her hearing was in April of 2013.
Plaintiff acknowledges that it is her responsibility, along with her attorney, to provide the medical support for the injuries claimed. She also acknowledges that was not done when the records existed prior to the ALJ hearing. Plaintiff requests, in the alternative, that the Court remand this matter to the ALJ for review of all of the medical records that are available from all of her doctors, not just the records that were picked by someone to include in the record. By not having the entire record before the ALJ, he was not able to see her entire medical history including any additional complaints to other hospitals, her physical therapy that she was required to do with continued pain, her primary care doctor's entire record. According to plaintiff, it appears that select records were obtained and submitted to the ALJ for review, which cannot give a clear picture of the medicalhistory of plaintiff. Further, plaintiff stated on the record that there were more medicals, but that they had not been submitted. Current counsel apparently has already obtained records going back to 2007 showing pain in her neck and back, primarily due to the car accident she had it 2006, although they were not submitted with plaintiff's brief.
Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ's credibility determination. According to plaintiff, it appears that the ALJ simply did not believe her statements that she needed assistance with her day to day care including bathing, dressing, etc and that she was only able to help her children with homework and that their father came over every day to get them dressed and off to school. Further, that she did not traverse her stairs only every other day and slept downstairs because she cannot go up and down stairs that easily. The children's father also takes care of the laundry because it is in the basement and plaintiff cannot go up and down that many stairs. According to plaintiff, the ALJ did not take any of that into consideration when he made his decision to find her not disabled.
Plaintiff was required to amend her onset date because the record did not contain medical records dating back to her accident in 2006. While it is ultimately the responsibility of plaintiff to provide the records to prove her case, plaintiff points out that she hired an attorney who then did not follow up on her testimony about having the records, neither did the ALJ. After taking testimony, the ALJdecided not to believe her testimony regarding her inability to care for herself as well as her children's needs, deciding instead that because she was able to assist her children with homework and put the medication in the nebulizer that she was able to work full time sustained employment. Further, the ALJ chose to not believe plaintiff when she stated she spent 23 hours a day laying down to ease the pain in her back. The record that the ALJ did have shows progressing, stronger medications for pain, again, the ALJ did not even address this issue, only stating he did not see where her medication was changed/increased on one date. Additionally, those records were almost a year old at the time of the hearing, making it even more difficult for the ALJ to get a clear picture of what was happening. Plaintiff argues that she should not be punished because her attorney did not either obtain the records for her or tell her that it is her responsibility to obtain the medical records that will show her issues both by her words to her doctors as well as any objective testing that was done.
Plaintiff, through her current counsel, argues that her attorney at the hearing level inexplicably failed to obtain and submit important medical evidence, and that her case should be remanded to allow consideration of those records. Plaintiff further complains that the ALJ selectively evaluated the medical records before him in an unfair manner, and inadequately evaluated the credibility of hersubjective complaints of her symptoms and resulting limitations. To the contrary, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and should be affirmed.
The Commissioner asserts that plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary prerequisites for remand for consideration of additional medical evidence. Pursuant to the Social Security Act, ...
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