Haisma v. Edgar

Decision Date26 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 1-88-2889,1-88-2889
Parties, 161 Ill.Dec. 36 Thomas HAISMA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jim EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Frank J. Petru, Leoris & Cohen, P.C., Highland Park, for plaintiff-appellee.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Chicago, (Karen S. Rosenwinkel, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, the Illinois Secretary of State, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County directing him to comply with a previously entered order reversing the denial of full driving privileges to plaintiff, Thomas Haisma. Defendant contends that the trial court had no authority to give effect to the earlier order because the parties had entered into a valid settlement agreement and defendant had performed its obligation under the agreement.

On June 20, 1982, plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) while on the way home from a bachelor's party given for him. Plaintiff was parked, sleeping, when a police officer stopped and asked him if he could drive and, if so, told him to drive home. Plaintiff drove one block, and then was arrested and charged with DUI. A breathalyzer test measured his body alcohol level at .32. On October 21, 1982, plaintiff was convicted of the DUI charge.

Previously, on April 19, 1975, plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol while on the way home from a high school graduation party. He refused to take a breathalyzer test. This charge was later plea bargained down to reckless driving. (Previous convictions included illegal transportation of alcohol in 1974; speeding in 1975; and disregarding a traffic light in 1975.) Plaintiff's driver's license was temporarily suspended for refusal to take a breathalyzer and for committing three or more moving violations in a 12-month period. In 1980, plaintiff was convicted of disregarding a traffic light.

On September 17, 1982, an Alcohol and Drug "Initial Evaluation" form was completed by Robert Cimaglio of the Lake County Council on Alcoholism. He wrote:

"The client stated symptoms of a heavy history of alcohol abuse, a high tolerance towards alcohol, loss of control at times while drinking, blackouts, hangovers, also behavioral changes while drinking.

* * * * * *

The client seems to be in the middle stage of alcoholism. His awareness of where he is at is poor. The client stated that he has no intentions on stopping his drinking completely but has been trying to moderate himself. Strong denial."

Apparently as part of the same evaluation, the DUI Coordinator at Lake County Council on Alcoholism completed reports on October 26, 1982 and January 4, 1983, referring back to the September 17, 1982 evaluation and recommending plaintiff for attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous.

On November 27, 1982, defendant revoked plaintiff's driver's license pursuant to section 6-205(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95- 1/2, par. 6-205(a)(2).

On January 27, 1983, plaintiff sought a restricted driver's permit (RDP), or full driving privileges from the Secretary of State. (Secretary of State File No. C-1033-83.) He also requested a formal hearing, pursuant to section 2-118(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95- 1/2, par. 2-118(a).

On March 29, 1983, a hearing was held by hearing officer Joan Carger, who denied plaintiff's request for an RDP or full driving privileges. She pointed to the first alcohol assessment report of September 17, 1982. These findings and recommendation were adopted by defendant on April 29, 1983.

In November 1984, an alcohol assessment report was completed by Jack Clark of the Parkside Lodge, Mundelein. He found no alcohol addiction. Plaintiff was classified as Level I--nonproblematic.

In 1985, plaintiff sought an RDP or full driving privileges. (Secretary of State File No. C-1602-85.)

On April 3, 1985, a hearing was held by hearing officer Linda Smith. She denied plaintiff's request for an RDP or full driving privileges. She pointed to the first alcohol assessment report; and noted the November 29, 1984 assessment did not reflect the "multiple alcohol related arrests." She concluded "given the conflicting evidence, the Hearing Officer was unable to make a determination of the nature and extent of" plaintiff's use of alcohol. These findings and recommendation were adopted by defendant on May 6, 1985.

In October 1985, an alcohol assessment report was completed by Evan ("Jack") Clark of the Parkside Lodge, Mundelein. He found no alcohol addiction. The April 1975 reckless driving conviction was specifically noted. Plaintiff was again classified as Level I--non-problematic.

On January 22, 1986, plaintiff again sought an RDP or full driving privileges. (Secretary of State File No. C-885-86.)

On February 25, 1986, a hearing was held by hearing officer Louis Libert. The 29-year old plaintiff testified regarding the June 1982 DUI arrest. He had parked at a construction site and fallen asleep after leaving a party. At the direction of a police officer, he started to drive home, and was arrested one block later. Plaintiff testified that during the first [September 1982] assessment "I had a little disagreement with the gentleman performing the assessment. He asked me how much I drank, and I told him; and he came right out and called me a liar, and I was rather displeased with that." Plaintiff was asked why he had presented the first assessment at the earlier hearing if he believed it did not truly reflect his drinking habits. Plaintiff replied, "That was the only one I had. I didn't have $45 to get another assessment." Plaintiff also submitted testimony and letters from employers, friends and relatives stating that plaintiff had never had a drinking problem.

The hearing officer acknowledged that plaintiff had been notified by his employer at that time that without driving privileges he would be terminated from his employment, because he was required to drive as far as 75 miles from his place of employment in the course of employment-related duties. Plaintiff submitted a letter from Magna-Tech, Inc., offering to rehire him as a heavy equipment operator at construction sites located throughout the state, if he received a driver's license. "I would have no reservations in rehiring [plaintiff] if he had a driver's license." In addition, Dependon, Inc. wrote that "[s]hould [plaintiff] regain his privilege of driving in the State of Illinois, I feel we would benefit from his expertise as a driver [of heavy duty trucks] for our firm." Sinesh Auto Body wrote that it "would "employ [plaintiff] again if he had a license to operate motor vehicles." He needed the license at Sinesh in order to road test cars. At that time, plaintiff worked at Sheridan Motors as a salesman, and urged that he needed a license to test drive cars, show cars to customers, and deliver cars to customers. He lived in a rural area located 13 miles from Sheridan Motors, and no public transportation was available.

The hearing officer denied plaintiff's request for an RDP or full driving privileges. He primarily pointed to the first alcohol assessment. On May 27, 1986, defendant adopted these findings and recommendation. (No. C-885-86) This is the decision involved in the present appeal.

On July 1, 1986, plaintiff filed a complaint in Chancery, seeking administrative review of the Secretary of State's decision in case No. C-885-86, under the Illinois Vehicle Code, Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95- 1/2, par. 2-118(e) and the Illinois Administrative Review Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 3-101.

On April 8, 1987, the trial court reversed the May 27, 1986 decision by the Secretary of State, finding it was "arbitrary and capricious and against the manifest weight of the evidence." The court ordered full reinstatement of plaintiff's driving privileges. (The transcript from the April 8, 1987 hearing is not contained in the record.)

On May 8, 1987, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the April 8, 1987 order. [Circuit Court No. 86-CH-6335; Ill.App.Ct. No. 1-87-1479.]

On July 21, 1987, this court stayed the effect of the trial court's April 8, 1987 order. Thus, plaintiff continued without driving privileges until December 11, 1987, when the parties entered into a settlement agreement under which plaintiff would immediately receive a restricted driving permit.

On the same day, defendant asked this court to grant its motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal in No. 1-87-1479. (Secretary of State File No. C-885-86.) The appeal was dismissed by this court on December 23, 1987. The April 8, 1987 trial court order apparently was not vacated at any time.

In December 1987, defendant issued a six month RDP to plaintiff.

On March 31, 1988, an alcohol assessment report was apparently completed, again classifying plaintiff as Level I--nonproblematic. (The report is not contained in the record, but is mentioned in the decision of hearing officer Kurasch, which is found in the appendix of defendant's brief.)

In May 1988, plaintiff sought full driving privileges or a renewal of his RDP, which was set to expire on June 28, 1988.

On May 19, 1988, a hearing was held by hearing officer Jonathan Kurasch, who denied plaintiff's request. [Secretary of State File No. C-3420-88.] In his [undated] findings and recommendation, the hearing officer mainly relied on plaintiff's failure to provide full disclosure to the [November 1984 and October 1985] assessors, specifically regarding (1) the 1975 DUI charge and reckless driving conviction [which was in fact included on the October 1985 assessment]; and (2) the blood alcohol content level at the time of the 1982 DUI arrest. He also pointed to a discrepancy between the findings of the first two assessments [which actually was a single assessment], and all the subsequent...

To continue reading

Request your trial
41 cases
  • Cannon v. Burge
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 15 Agosto 2014
    ...and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of contract law). See also Haisma v. Edgar, 218 Ill.App.3d 78, 161 Ill.Dec. 36, 578 N.E.2d 163, 168 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.1991) (same). A release within a settlement agreement also is governed by contract law. Farm Credit Bank......
  • Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 21 Junio 2013
    ...mindful that “Illinois public policy generally favors the peaceful and voluntary resolution of disputes.” Haisma v. Edgar, 218 Ill.App.3d 78, 86, 161 Ill.Dec. 36, 578 N.E.2d 163 (1991). “A settlement agreement is considered a contract, and construction and enforcement of settlement agreemen......
  • Law Offices of Colleen M. McLaughlin v. First Star Fin. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 28 Febrero 2012
    ...Ass'n v. I–Del, Inc., 255 Ill.App.3d 448, 476, 193 Ill.Dec. 760, 626 N.E.2d 1311 (1993) (citing Haisma v. Edgar, 218 Ill.App.3d 78, 87, 161 Ill.Dec. 36, 578 N.E.2d 163 (1991)). “ ‘The intent of the parties must be determined from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the contrac......
  • Ill. State Bar Ass'n Mut. Ins. Co. v. Law Office of Tuzzolino & Terpinas
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 22 Noviembre 2013
    ...the interpretation of other types of contracts also govern the interpretation of insurance policies.”); Haisma v. Edgar, 218 Ill.App.3d 78, 87, 161 Ill.Dec. 36, 578 N.E.2d 163 (1991) (“A settlement agreement is considered a contract, and construction and enforcement of settlement agreements......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT