Hajenga v. Schwein

• Decision Date: 20 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-432.,04-432.
• Citation: 2007 MT 80,336 Mont. 507,155 P.3d 1241
• Parties: Travis Lee HAJENGA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael E. SCHWEIN, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

155 P.3d 1241

2007 MT 80

336 Mont. 507

Travis Lee HAJENGA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael E. SCHWEIN, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 04-432.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 23, 2005.

Decided March 20, 2007.

For Appellant: John R. Christensen, Tim Filz, Ragain, Christensen, Fulton & Filz, P.L.L.C., Billings, Montana.

For Respondent: Robert J. Phillips, John F. Haffey, Phillips & Bohyer, P.C., Missoula, Montana.

Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Travis Hajenga appeals an order of the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, awarding Michael Schwein summary judgment on Hajenga's suit to have an oral settlement agreement with Schwein's insurance adjuster set aside. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶ 2 Hajenga raises the following issue on appeal: Did the District Court err in granting Schwein's Motion for Summary Judgment?

Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 3 On May 23, 2002, Schwein and Hajenga were involved in an automobile accident at the intersection of State Highway 416 and Jellison Road near Billings, Montana. Hajenga was 18 years old at the time and had just graduated from high school in Stanford, Montana. He was traveling with a friend to Powell, Wyoming, to view the college campus there when the accident occurred.

¶ 4 According to Hajenga's affidavit filed with the District Court, Schwein drove his pickup into the path of Hajenga's vehicle causing a T-bone collision. Both vehicles were totaled and Schwein was cited for failure to yield the right of way. Hajenga was not cited for any traffic violations. Both Hajenga and his passenger were wearing seatbelts and escaped serious injury.

¶ 5 Schwein was insured by Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive). Shortly after the accident, Hajenga called Progressive and discussed the accident with a Progressive representative. In that conversation, Hajenga indicated that no one was injured in the accident. However, several days after the accident, Hajenga began experiencing pain in his neck and lower back. Consequently, Hajenga went to the emergency room at Benefis Health Care in Great Falls, Montana, where he was given a brief physical and sent home with muscle relaxants — no x-rays were taken.

¶ 6 Shortly thereafter, Hajenga left for a summer job in Juneau, Alaska. On June 10, 2002, an insurance adjuster for Progressive contacted Hajenga in Juneau and offered to pay him $1,000.00 for injuries he incurred in the accident.¹ Hajenga accepted the offer and cashed the check upon receipt. The dispute in this matter centers on the parties' understanding of the oral agreement in relation to the $1,000.00 payment.

¶ 7 The day after his conversation with Progressive's insurance adjuster, Hajenga sought treatment from a chiropractor in Juneau and requested that the bills be forwarded to Progressive. On Hajenga's first visit, the chiropractor conducted an extensive physical examination. Hajenga returned several times for follow-up chiropractic treatment before learning that Progressive was denying payment of his medical bills asserting that the $1,000.00 payment was a full and final release of any bodily injury claim arising from the accident. The only medical bill paid by Progressive was the $167.05 bill for Hajenga's emergency room visit to Benefis Health Care in Great Falls a few days after the accident.

¶ 8 Hajenga filed suit on July 31, 2002, alleging negligence against Schwein and asking that the District Court declare the purported release null and void, and against public policy. Hajenga also asked that Progressive be sanctioned for egregious conduct.

¶ 9 On September 2, 2003, Hajenga moved for partial summary judgment requesting that the oral settlement agreement be set aside. On September 17, 2003, Schwein moved for summary judgment requesting that the court render judgment in his favor based on the oral settlement agreement. The District Court heard oral argument on both motions on December 4, 2003. On April 21, 2004, the District Court issued its Order and Memorandum Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

¶ 10 Hajenga appeals the District Court's order granting Schwein's Motion for Summary Judgment. Hajenga does not appeal the court's denial of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, using the same M.R. Civ. P. 56, criteria applied by the district court. Lee v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 MT 59, ¶ 24, 304 Mont. 356, ¶ 24, 22 P.3d 631, ¶ 24 (citing Spinler v. Allen, 1999 MT 160, ¶ 14, 295 Mont. 139, ¶ 14, 983 P.2d 348, ¶ 14). The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of those actions which do not raise genuine issues of material fact and to eliminate the expense and burden of unnecessary trials. Boyes v. Eddie, 1998 MT 311, ¶ 16, 292 Mont. 152, ¶ 16, 970 P.2d 91, ¶ 16 (citing Kane v. Miller, 258 Mont. 182, 186, 852 P.2d 130, 133 (1993)). However, summary adjudication should "never be substituted for a trial if a material factual controversy exists," Lee, ¶ 71, thus we have observed that summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Lee, ¶ 25.

¶ 12 To determine the existence or nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact, we look to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Lee, ¶ 24 (citing Erker v. Kester, 1999 MT 231, ¶ 17, 296 Mont. 123, ¶ 17, 988 P.2d 1221, ¶ 17). In addition, all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the offered evidence will be drawn in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Lee, ¶ 25.

¶ 13 The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating a complete absence of any genuine factual issues. Lee, ¶ 25. Where the moving party is able to demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains in dispute, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion. Lee, ¶ 26. To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must present material and substantial evidence rather than merely conclusory or speculative statements. Lee, ¶ 26. As this Court has previously observed, "proof is required to establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact; a party may not rely on the arguments of counsel." Montana Metal Buildings, Inc. v. Shapiro, 283 Mont. 471, 476, 942 P.2d 694, 697 (1997) (citing City of Bozeman v. AIU Ins. Co., 262 Mont. 370, 378, 865 P.2d 268, 273 (1993)).

Discussion

¶ 14 Did the District Court err in granting Schwein's Motion for Summary Judgment?

¶ 15 In reaching its decision, the District Court relied on Deserly v. Department. of Corrections, 2000 MT 42, 298 Mont. 328, 995 P.2d 972, for the proposition that when a case involves cross-motions for summary judgment and the parties agree that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the court need only determine which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. While this is an accurate reading of that case, Deserly is distinguishable from the facts in the case before us.

¶ 16 In Deserly, the parties expressly stipulated at the close of discovery that there were no questions of material fact, hence they submitted the case to the district court for a decision. Deserly, ¶ 3. In the case sub judice, the parties did not so stipulate. Instead, the District Court determined that "[a]lthough the parties have not per se agreed that no issue of material fact exists ... there is no issue of material fact that would preclude the Court from adjudicating as a matter of law."

¶ 17 Hajenga argues on appeal that the District Court erred by using the wrong standard for ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment and by failing to draw all reasonable inferences from the offered evidence in favor of the party opposing each summary judgment motion. Hajenga maintains that the fact that both parties moved for summary judgment did not serve to waive Hajenga's right to assert the existence of a question of fact relating to the terms of the settlement, and did not serve to authorize the District Court to sidestep questions of fact. We agree with Hajenga that the correct standard to apply in this case is found in Ike v. Jefferson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 267 Mont. 396, 884 P.2d 471 (1994).

¶ 18 We stated in Ike that "the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, do not bar either party from claiming the existence of issues of fact sufficient to prevent entry of summary judgment against it, in spite of simultaneous motions for summary judgment by opposing parties." Ike, 267 Mont. at 399, 884 P.2d at 473-74 (quoting Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2nd Cir. 1993)). We further stated in Ike that

[w]hen faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, a district court is not required to grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other.... "Rather, the court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration."

Ike, 267 Mont. at 399-400, 884 P.2d at 474 (quoting Heublein, 996 F.2d at 1461). "[T]he fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not establish, in and of itself, the absence of genuine issues of material fact." Montana Metal Buildings, 283 Mont. at 477, 942 P.2d at 698 (citing Duensing v. Traveler's Companies, 257 Mont. 376, 385, 849 P.2d 203, 209 (1993)).

¶ 19 Consequently, in evaluating cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court — and this Court in its de novo review — must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Hajenga raised issues of rescission, mutual...