Hajiabdi v. Metro. Transp. Network
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-268 (ECT/ECW) |
| Parties | Abdinoor Hajiabdi, Abdikarim Abdulle, Halima Abdulle, Seynab Abu, Fadumo Adam, Mohamed Adan, Cabdikhadar Axmad, Hassan Egal, Jama Husien, Abdirahman Khalif, Mohamud Mire, Mohamed Mohamed, Sacdi Said, and Abdikarim Mohamed, Plaintiffs, v. Metropolitan Transport Network, Inc., d/b/a MTN; MTN Leasing, LLC; and Tashitaa Tufaa, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Stephen W. Cooper and Stacey R. Everson, The Cooper Law Firm Chartered, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.
Sharon Robin Markowitz, Kristin Berger Parker, and Anne Marie Buethe, Stinson LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs United States citizens of Somali heritage who are or were employees of Defendant Metropolitan Transportation Network Inc. (“MTN”), assert numerous claims against MTN, its owner, Tashitaa Tufaa, and an affiliated business organization, MTN Leasing, LLC. Plaintiffs' claims arise under federal and state law and fall into several buckets. There are national-origin discrimination claims, disability discrimination claims, whistleblower claims, wage claims, and tort claims. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss some of Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. In response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs consented to the dismissal of some claims.[1] Left for adjudication are Plaintiffs' conversion, breach-of-fiduciary-duty, fraud, and unjust-enrichment claims. These claims will be dismissed because they are not plausibly pleaded.
I[2]
MTN, a corporation with offices in Fridley, Minnesota, contracts with the Minneapolis Public Schools (Special School District No. 1) “and other [Minnesota] schools to provide transportation services for students and other transportation services[.]” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 32 [ECF No. 6]. MTN “operates a fleet of over 300 vehicles and has more[] than 300 employees.” Id. ¶ 8. Tufaa owns MTN and is “actively involved” in its “operations and decision-making.” Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs are current or former employees of MTN who “worked primarily as bus drivers or dispatchers.” Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs are United States citizens “of Somali heritage and birth.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs advance claims in six counts: (1) Plaintiffs allege that MTN discriminated against them “based on their national origin” and assert claims under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76-83. Though Plaintiffs do not include allegations regarding disability discrimination explicitly in Count 1, the Amended Complaint elsewhere includes such allegations, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20, 26, 61-62, 64-65, and presumably based on these allegations, Plaintiffs also include in Count 1 a claim under the American with Disabilities Act. Id. at 11 (Count 1 heading). (2) In Count 2, Plaintiffs allege that MTN “was entrusted with funds” obtained from the Minneapolis Public Schools “that belonged to Plaintiffs” but “used them for its own purposes.” Id. ¶¶ 84, 86. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims under Minnesota common law for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 12 (Count 2 heading). (3) Plaintiffs allege that MTN failed to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. ¶¶ 89-96. (4) Plaintiffs allege that MTN has failed “to promptly and accurately pay wages” to them in violation of the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act, Minn. Stat. § 181.101, et seq., and other unspecified federal and state wage-and-hour laws. Am. Compl. at 13 (Count 4 heading) and ¶¶ 97-101. (5) Plaintiffs allege in Count 5 that “MTN intentionally engaged in a pattern and practice of fraudulent inducements to Plaintiffs to obtain their labor and/or to obtain compensation from third parties for representing that [Plaintiffs] were its employees and ready for work.” Id. ¶ 102. Based essentially on this allegation, Plaintiffs assert Minnesota common-law claims for fraud and unjust enrichment. Id. ¶¶ 102-116. (6) Finally, Plaintiffs allege in Count 6 that they were subjected to adverse treatment because they reported several legal violations to MTN, and they assert “[w]histleblower” claims under unspecified Minnesota common law and statutes. Id. at 16 (Count 6 heading) and ¶¶ 117-122. Except for their abandoned discrimination claims against Tufaa, Plaintiffs are understood to assert each of these claims against MTN and Tufaa. See id. ¶ 7 ().
As mentioned, Defendants' motion challenges Plaintiffs' conversion and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims in Count 2 and the fraud and unjust-enrichment claims in Count 5, so a somewhat more particular description of the allegations underlying these claims is useful. The conversion and breach-of-fiduciary duty claims in Count 2 both arise out of the same allegations concerning MTN's use of funds from the Minneapolis Public Schools. Plaintiffs allege that in 2020, after COVID-19 prompted the cancellation of in-person classes, the Minneapolis Public Schools “committed to paying drivers, including Plaintiffs, through the end of the school year.” Id. ¶ 43. Though MTN “took the money” from the Minneapolis Public Schools and said it would pay Plaintiffs, MTN “pocketed some intended for Plaintiffs, [] paid Plaintiffs much less than should have been paid[, ]” and “used the money for its own purposes.” Id. ¶¶ 44, 46, 47. Plaintiffs allege that the Minneapolis Public Schools “entrusted” these funds to MTN for Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 84.[3]
It is not clear precisely which of the Amended Complaint's allegations support Count 5's fraud claim.[4] Plaintiffs allege that MTN made several representations, some to Plaintiffs and others to third parties. MTN's representations to Plaintiffs include: (a) that it would “correct” underpayments on paychecks, Am. Compl. ¶ 36; (b) that it “could no longer provide” certain “raw data” underlying payroll records, id. ¶ 39; and (c) that it would “pay the drivers, including Plaintiffs, but claimed that the [Minneapolis Public Schools] had not paid the funds for the employees[, ]” id. ¶ 44. Without identifying particular statements, Plaintiffs also allege that MTN “intentionally engaged in a pattern and practice of fraudulent inducements to Plaintiffs” and “made a series of materially[]false statements to Plaintiffs about their compensation. Id. ¶¶ 102, 103. Plaintiffs also allege that MTN “continued to represent to the paying third parties [i.e., the Minneapolis Public Schools and the federal government] that Plaintiffs continue[d] to work for them, in order to obtain funds, but have not paid those Plaintiffs anything, and have contradicted themselves regarding the status of said Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 70-71 ().
Plaintiffs' explanation of Count 5's unjust enrichment claim suggests it follows from their fraud claim. Plaintiffs allege: “As a direct result of the fraudulent behavior, Defendant MTN has enjoyed unjust enrichment.” Id. ¶ 115. This claim also seems to depend on the same core allegations that support Plaintiffs' conversion and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims-i.e., that MTN improperly obtained and retained funds from the Minneapolis Public Schools.
II[5]
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Gorog, 760 F.3d at 792 (citation omitted). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Because it challenges only state-law claims, Defendants' motion implicates settled rules regarding a federal court's application of state law. “[F]ederal courts exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims must apply the substantive law of the forum state.” Cuellar-Aguilar v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc., 812 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In some cases, this means applying the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine which state's law governs. See Ferrell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 796 (8th Cir. 2005). But here, the Parties agree that Minnesota law governs Plaintiffs' state-law claims, and there is no reason to second-guess the Parties' agreement on this question; almost every fact relevant to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in Minnesota. See Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Main Street Ingredients, LLC, 745 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 2014) (). In applying Minnesota law, a federal district court must follow decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court or, in the absence of binding precedent from that court, “must predict how the Supreme Court of Minnesota would rule, and . . . follow decisions of the [Minnesota Court of Appeals] when they are the best evidence of Minnesota law.” Id. (quoting Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 691 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Under Minnesota law, “‘[t]he elements of common law conversion are (1) the plaintiff has a property interest and (2) the defendant ...
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